



Municipal Landownership and Housing in Sweden

Exploring links, supply and possibilities

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Abstract

This thesis comprises a number of studies, all directed at different linkages between municipal landownership and housing in Sweden. In all, the thesis consists of four papers. Of these, initial Paper I targets the emergence of the municipal landownership that still today are of crucial importance for the Swedish housing market. The main functions of the municipal landownership from the beginning of the 20th century and up until present time are retrospectively investigated and its role within Swedish housing during different times is elaborated upon. Paper II thereafter redirects focus to present time solely, and studies the management of the municipal land from particularly a housing perspective. More concretely, the disposal procedure – or land allocation practice – of the municipal land aimed for housing is investigated empirically, based on current practice in more than 25 municipalities. Paper III builds on preceding Paper II, but with a narrowed focus to a fundamental sequence of the disposal procedure – namely the developer selection. Accordingly, four different assigning methods, all derived from municipal practice, are discerned and their individual strengths and weaknesses are systematically discussed. Lastly, Paper IV attempts to illuminate an often overlooked dimension of the municipal landownership – as a potential and powerful instrument to counter polarizations between different social-groups, within the built environment. Necessary prerequisites in order to enable this are presented and an empirical study investigates whether this, somewhat concealed, potential in the municipal landownership seems to be utilized in practice.

Keywords: Landownership, Municipal Landownership, Land Allocation, Housing, Land Development, Land policy

Sammanfattning

Förevarande avhandling omfattar ett antal studier som alla gemensamt är inriktade på olika kopplingar mellan kommunalt markägande och bostadsbyggande i Sverige. Avhandlingen består av totalt fyra uppsatser. Av dessa behandlar inledningsvis uppsats I framväxten av det kommunala markägandet som även i nutid är av fundamental betydelse för den svenska bostadsmarknaden. Det kommunala markägandets huvudsakliga funktioner från början av 1900-talet och fram till idag undersöks och dess roll inom svenskt bostadsbyggande under olika tidsperioder lyfts fram. Uppsats II är helt fokuserad på nutid och studerar hanteringen av det kommunala markägandet utifrån ett bostadsbyggnadsperspektiv. Mer konkret studeras försäljningsproceduren – s.k. markanvisning – av den kommunala marken avsedd för bostadsbebyggelse, baserat på etablerad praxis i fler än 25 kommuner. Uppsats III bygger vidare på föregående uppsats II fast med ett avsmalnat fokus på en högst väsentlig sekvens i försäljningsproceduren – valet av byggherre. Fyra distinkta tilldelningsmetoder urskiljs från dagens kommunala praxis och deras individuella styrkor respektive svagheter diskuteras. Uppsats IV avser avslutningsvis att belysa en ofta förbisedd dimension av det kommunala markägandet – som ett potentiellt och kraftfullt verktyg att motverka polarisering mellan olika typer av befolkningsgrupper inom den bebyggda miljön. Förutsättningarna för att möjliggöra detta presenteras och genom en empirisk studie undersöks huruvida denna, något dolda, potential i det kommunala markägandet tycks utnyttjas i praktiken.

Nyckelord: Markägande, Kommunalt markägande, Markanvisning, Bostadsbyggande, Markexploatering, Markpolitik

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Appendix:

Questionnaire 1 – Municipalities

Questionnaire 2 – Developers

Paper I – Mark(ägarande) och bostadsbyggande – en belysning av kommunala markens funktion 1900-2015 [Land(ownership) and housing – an illumination of the function of the municipal land 1900-2015]

Paper II – Municipal land allocations: integrating planning and selection of developers while transferring public land for housing (Reproduced with permission from Springer)

Paper III – Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in Sweden

Paper IV – Municipal land allocations: a key for understanding tenure and social mix patterns in Stockholm

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Landownership and land use are strongly interdependent. Enabling a new type of development in an area, generally requires a parallel adaptation of both property boundaries and ownership structure (Larsson, 1993). The adaption of boundaries is normally required due to e.g. inconsistencies between existing boundaries and areas for infrastructure necessitated by a new land use. An alteration of the ownership structure – or rather transition – is likewise often required as an effect of an original landowner's inability or lack of interest in implementing a project in accordance with a new land use.

A wide range of components is required in order to implement a project – such as building material, labor and finance. As indicated above, land is a crucial prerequisite. There are, however, quintessential differences between land in general and buildable land. The latter type, aside from meeting physical requirements, implies an embedded development right – typically confirmed through an approved land use plan. Thus, it is buildable land, rather than land in general that is pivotal. Buildable land is clearly distinguished from the initially mentioned components as its fixed location prevents it from easily responding to market signals (Evans, 2004a,b; Adams et al., 2012; Alexander, 2014). Building material, labor and financing could thus be derived from a variety of sources. Buildable land on the other hand, is evidently far more difficult to obtain.

Possession of buildable land, with a more or less regulatory defined framework for future development, equips a landowner with a development right. Furthermore, landownership incorporates an implementation right. This right includes power to decide if and when a project on buildable land is to be realized – i.e. a control and supply function – and a potential to affect what is to be built within the development rights framework (Adams, 1994; Adams et al., 2002; Buitelaar and Segeren, 2011; Van Dijk and Van der Vlist, 2015). Hence, ownership of land could influence localization, scope, design etc. of projects on land in the process of being deemed buildable.

The advantages, or capabilities, enclosed in ownership of land have since long attracted attention by public authorities in Sweden. In total around 15 percent, or 6 000 000 hectares, of all land are in public possession through different entities of the State. Included in this, Sweden's 290 municipalities jointly assemble roughly 800 000 hectares. While public (and even more so municipal) land obviously constitute a minor share of the total land mass, it must here be recognized that less than 3 percent of the land in Sweden is developed and that housing currently covers around 1 percent, or 438 000 hectares (SCB, 2013). It should furthermore be noted that while the non-municipal part of the public land share typically aims at preserving current land use, the municipality-owned land often concerns that which is appropriate for new development. More specifically, the municipal land seems to be suitable for housing development in particular. This latter assertion is motivated by the extent of housing being constructed on land originating from municipalities, which in e.g. Stockholm and Gothenburg amounts to 80 and 70 percent respectively (Boverket, 2005). The linkage in Sweden between municipal land and housing can be traced back a long time (see e.g. Atmer, 1987; Passow, 1970; Ratzka, 1981). Its current status as an essential housing component is further illuminated by a recent and nationwide survey, reaching nearly all municipalities, conducted by the Swedish National

Board of Housing, Building and Planning. According to the survey, all 289 municipalities answered ‘owned land suitable for housing’, and 171 of them furthermore answered that they were ‘in progress of purchasing more’ (Boverket, 2016a). With each municipality additionally possessing a ‘planning monopoly’, granting legal power to practically solely determine the land use within their borders (Blücher, 2013), it is moreover evident they play a key role in the supply of housing.

Narrowing the focus entirely to housing developments, it is external (privatized) developers that carry out the actual implementation of most projects, independently of whether the land is supplied through a municipality or not. As for the municipal land, it is channeled to developers by so-called ‘land allocations’. However, while filling the gap between municipal land being a potential and an actual housing component – land allocations typically deviates substantially from an ordinary land transfer. Thus, a land allocation highly interacts with the planning process and thereto co-ordinates activities between municipalities and developers well into the implementation phase (see figure 1).




Fig. 1 Landownership transition pertaining to housing developments on private and municipal land respectively

Considering the seemingly favorable prerequisites for Swedish municipalities to effectively guide the supply of land, and indirectly housing production, it is quite remarkable that an uncontested – and dramatically accelerated – housing shortage can be observed. While housing shortages seems to be an endemic feature of urbanized regions worldwide it is moreover noticeable that this is not solely a metropolitan phenomenon in contemporary Sweden. Referring once more to the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, 240 out of 290 municipalities have a reported housing shortage (Boverket, 2016b). Up until the year 2025, the estimated demand exceeds 700 000 dwellings (Boverket, 2016c) and it should be evident that the supply of municipal land will be crucial if this construction level is to be accomplished. In parallel to years of an intensified housing shortage, it is furthermore possible to discern a consolidated polarization between different social groups within the built environment (ESO, 2016; Hedin et al., 2012). These partially interconnected processes could both be seen in the light of the ‘dismantle’ or ‘restructuring’ of State engagement on the housing market in the early 1990s (Christophers, 2013; Hedin et al., 2012; Turner and Whitehead, 2002). They have moreover both led to an intensified housing policy debate, and the discussed ‘roots’ for the inability of

the housing market to respond to years of increased demand are multiple. Briefly summarized, it ranges from perceived flaws in existing legislation targeting planning, building and rent setting, to the design of present appeal and taxation systems (Granath Hansson, 2015). Thereto, municipal land has started to seize more attention in this debate, and it has been questioned whether the management of this highly essential 'building block' impedes rather than eases housing construction (Konkurrensverket, 2015, Statskontoret, 2006 and 2012). This latter allegation is partially derived from the absence of compulsory legislation demanding a uniform disposal practice. Hence, municipal land disposal procedures – and analogously land allocation practices – constitutes somewhat of a grey area among Swedish municipalities. As for the social polarization within the already built environment, this is partially attributed to the geographical distribution of tenure alternatives (ownership/rental), which often differs substantially even between adjacent neighborhoods (ESO, 2016). Consequently, few municipalities can demonstrate a balanced tenure structure that enables integration at neighborhood levels. Meanwhile, the planning monopoly in its current form does not empower municipalities with a regulatory capability to affect current tenure imbalances through the planning system. They thereby seem to lack effective tools to steer the tenure of future housing projects – that is, unless they own the land. Accordingly, more than 70 municipalities have dictated a preferred tenure in connection to land disposals during the last two years (Boverket, 2016a).

1.2 Research objectives

Recapitulating the background depicted above it should be clear that not only a lack of buildable land constitutes a barrier towards housing being constructed – there is additionally a potential ownership constraint. It moreover seems obvious that Swedish municipalities, aside from being equipped with a planning monopoly, highly recognize the merits imbedded in landownership. Furthermore it is evident that their supply of land – despite rather unclear disposal procedures – has long been fundamental for the housing market.

Based on this context, the present thesis puts focus on a number of different linkages that all have municipal land in common on the one side, and housing on the other (i.e. the right 'process' in figure 1). An initial research objective for this thesis (henceforth abbreviated ROI) has been directed at retrospectively investigating the remarkably longstanding, and strong, linkage between municipal land and housing in Sweden. This constitute a fairly overlooked topic in Swedish housing research, and in order to investigate it, two more detailed research questions (abbreviated RQ) have been formulated:

- What underlying factors could explain the emergence of the municipal landownership and its connection to housing? (RQ1)
- What has been the main role of municipal land during different time periods? (RQ2)

A second research objective (abbreviated ROI2) has thereafter been to investigate a likewise unexplored area – namely the municipal land disposal procedure. Here the investigation focuses on present time solely, and more concretely it is guided by the following two research questions:

- How is the disposal procedure of municipal land structured today? (RQ3)
- Which assigning methods are applied when municipalities select developers and what are their respective rationales and weaknesses? (RQ4)

Moving back again to elements of the background depicted above, it has been accentuated that current planning legislation puts a limit on what municipalities can decide through their planning monopoly. It was additionally implicated that ownership of land, through its embedded implementation right, enables a possibility to affect what is to be built. Consequently, the planning monopoly in combination with landownership equips Swedish municipalities with a mandate to influence the population composition within the built environment – i.e. after a housing project has been implemented.

This has prompted a third research objective (abbreviated ROIII), aimed at illuminate how municipal landownership could be utilized as an integration tool. Municipal landownership could thus (potentially) affect housing (tenure) outcomes over a longer time horizon, and after the land has been transferred over to developers. The prerequisites for this are explored, and it is thereafter investigated whether this somewhat ‘hidden’ potential in the municipal landownership seems to be utilized in practice. This latter investigation was guided by a fifth and final research question:

- Do existing tenure imbalances between rental and ownership housing in and among neighborhoods seem to have an effect on the municipal disposal practice? (RQ5)

1.2.1 Linkage research objectives – papers

Figure 2 below, presents an overview of the linkages between each paper and their corresponding research objectives and research questions.

Research objective I	Paper I: Mark(ägande) och bostadsbyggande En belysning av kommunala markens funktion 1900-2015	Research question 1 & 2
Research objective II	Paper II: Municipal land allocations: integrating planning and selection of developers while transferring public land for housing in Sweden	Research question 3
	Paper III: Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in Sweden	Research question 4
Research objective III	Paper IV: Municipal land allocations: a key for understanding tenure and social mix patterns in Stockholm	Research question 5

Fig. 2 Overview research objective, paper and research question

As follows, ROI (investigating the linkage between municipal land and housing), RQ1 (what underlying factors could explain the emergence of the municipal landownership and its connection to housing) and RQ2 (what has been the main role of the municipal land during different periods of time) are dealt with in Paper I.

ROII (investigating the municipal land disposal procedure) is a joint topic of both Paper II and III, whereas RQ3 (how is the disposal procedure of the municipal land structured) is the focus of Paper II and RQ4 (which assigning methods are applied and what are their rationales and weaknesses) in Paper III.

Lastly ROIII (illuminating how municipal land could affect housing outcomes in a more long-termed perspective) and RQ5 (do existing tenure imbalances have an effect on the municipal disposal practice) are the subjects of Paper IV.

1.3 Research methodology

In order to investigate the three interconnected, yet separated, research objectives stated for this thesis, a combination of inductive qualitative and deductive quantitative research approaches have been applied.¹ The inductive approach, that entails utilization of predominately qualitative data and analysis, typically concerns research in which no prior theories are established and where the aim is to utilize observation of different patterns, with the intention of creating generalizations or theories at the end of the study (Flick, 2009; Goddard and Melville, 2004; Neuman, 2003). For the deductive quantitative approach on the other hand, prior theories are essential (Singh and Bajpai, 2008) and their importance are an effect of them, in turn leading to hypotheses being formulated and tested (Babbie, 2010; Gulati, 2009). As will be clarified below, the inductive approach adopted in this thesis adheres to ROI and ROII, whereas ROIII (or rather RQ5) is leaning mainly on a deductive approach. As neither of the findings connected to the research questions falling under the objectives are intended to provide any final or conclusive answers – but rather enhance understanding – the study as a whole could moreover be seen as what Singh (2007) refers to as exploratory research.

Concerning the first research objective (ROI), which in essence intends to retrospectively track the emergence of the municipal landownership and its connection to housing, a qualitative method relying on the studying of documents was applied. Methodically the study started with an initial step aimed at identifying a number of 'landownership functions'. A requirement of these functions was that they had to address topics of relevance today, as well as at the departure of the study which was determined to be the beginning of the 20th century. This resulted in three discerned ownership functions. Commonly, all selected functions had its origins in problems related to private ownership of land and it has consequently been these, publicly (i.e. State) perceived problems, which inserted a particular function into the municipal landownership. More specifically these problems – and corresponding ownership functions – have been circling around the control over 1) the built environment, 2) the implementation of the built environment, and 3) land values and unearned increment. In order to thereafter measure the impact of the discerned functions during different periods of time, a second document study was undertaken. Unlike previous document studies, this emanated from the dynamic legislative process, which during the whole time period studied, have resulted in a variety of acts being adopted, modified and (sometimes) abolished in order to tackle each of the identified problems. Accordingly, emerged legislation concerning planning and building, expropriation, land values and unearned increment have been investigated retrospectively from today and back to the beginning of the 20th century. Likewise the emergence of State-subsidies as a mean to stimulate implementation of housing – and more particular its ties to municipal land – has been investigated. In studying all these evolvments, focus has been predominately placed on the governmental investigations, that precede the adoption of every

¹ Following Johnson et al. (2007) the research, at least if viewed as a single study, could be classified as mixed method research as it combines elements from both the qualitative and the quantitative paradigm.

act, and were motives and rationales behind them are elaborated upon. Additional documents (books, articles) with varied origins in time have however also been utilized substantially as supplementary sources.

As for the second research objective (ROII) qualitative methods were applied yet again (even though the investigation does include some minor quantitative parts). However, in contrast to ROI, interviews and questionnaires accompanies written documents as the main sources of information. The stated objective here, which moreover could be seen as dual, aims at presenting a general description of two interconnected procedures – of which one constitutes an essential element of the other. Consequently the municipal land disposal procedure will be scrutinized on a general level first (RQ3) whereupon one element of it – i.e. the assigning methods utilized to discern suitable developers (RQ4) – are examined in a second step. Jointly these research questions require a comprehensive illumination of current practices adopted by Swedish municipalities. Accordingly, a rather diverse range of municipal practices, all with slightly unique characteristics derived from an unregulated, dynamic and evolving setting, needed to be operationalized into more generalized representations.

Beginning with methodology targeting RQ3, initial information was gathered by examining the homepage of the, as of the end of 2011, 15 most populous municipalities for public documents describing their respective land disposal practice – i.e. their ‘land allocation system’. This resulted in twelve documents that, at varied degrees, described their corresponding municipality’s land allocation system. Information obtained from the documents enabled construction of a web-based questionnaire containing 29 multiple-choice questions (see appendix 1). It was structured with an initial part aimed at receiving quantitative information on the extent of which the municipal land was utilized for housing, followed by questions concerning their overall system in general. The questionnaire was subsequently sent by email to 17 municipalities countrywide that had a reported housing shortage. The sending of the questionnaire had moreover been preceded by a request to each municipality regarding their willingness to participate and, if so, an appropriate representative for answering. Consequently all 17 municipalities answered the questionnaire. In parallel to the questionnaire, semi-structured interviews were thereto held with representatives from six municipalities. Of these, which included Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmö, neither participated through answering the questionnaire and in the end information from a total of twenty-six municipalities² was utilized in this study. Supplementary information was furthermore gathered from a large number of developers. Semi-structured interviews were held with representatives from three big developers active throughout the entire country, in order to capture their views on current municipal practices. Additionally, a questionnaire with 16 multiple-choice questions (see appendix 2) was sent to 237 developers who had either applied or been assigned municipal land allocation in the municipalities of Stockholm, Gothenburg, Uppsala or Helsingborg; totaling 88 respondents. Similar to the questionnaire sent to municipalities, this one was also structured in two parts with an initial quantitative focus on the respondents ‘familiarity’ with land allocations. This enabled a tentative separation between those who

² Municipalities (ordered after population): Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö, Uppsala, Linköping, Västerås, Örebro, Helsingborg, Norrköping, Jönköping, Umeå, Lund, Huddinge, Gävle, Nacka, Halmstad, Botkyrka, Växjö, Kungsbacka, Järfälla, Skellefteå, Täby, Tyresö, Lerum, Hälaryda and Strängnäs.

were experienced and further assurance that the views of a diverse field of developers were captured. Questions in this part included the total number of applied and assigned land allocations, the number of dwellings if they had been assigned, experience from one or several municipalities, etc. The second part was designed with a number of assertions regarding the efficiency, transparency, costs, competition etc. affiliated with the land allocation system. To these questions, the developers could either 'agree fully', to a 'larger extent', to a 'lesser extent' or 'not at all'. As for both compiled questionnaires it was moreover possible for the respondents to leave additional comments in connection to each question.

Moving over to the methodology concerning RQ4 – that aimed specifically at the 'assigning methods' utilized by Swedish municipalities when selecting developers – it was initiated with a revised home page scanning of municipal documents. This was now extended to the, as of the end of 2015, 50 most populous municipalities and resulted in a basis of 32³ documents that to at least some extent described their assigning practice – i.e. their assigning methods. Of these, 19 originated from the 25 most populated and including all top 12 municipalities. Several uniform patterns could be distinguished, which in turn resulted in four distinct methods being discerned. The revised document study was moreover supplemented with information previously gained through the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews mentioned above (regarding RQ3). Despite the fact that these surveys were aimed primarily at providing information of the land allocation system on a general level, they additionally revealed a detailed account of assigning practices as well. Aside from adding insights, previously collected data further strengthened the capability to evaluate merits and demerits with all of the four discerned methods.

Concerning the final research objective (ROIII) – to illuminate the importance of municipal landownership and its potential in a more long-termed perspective – it started with an initial identification of the municipal prerequisites to steer and affect the tenure composition⁴ in the built environment. In order to exemplify the embedded potential in municipal landownership, this study thereafter adapted a quantitative method that, unlike the studies above, turned its focus to one municipality solely (Stockholm). As a starting point here it was initially clarified that a widespread balance between rental and ownership alternatives is politically desirable in Stockholm (according to official documents). It is moreover clear that there are currently major tenure imbalances in several of Stockholm's neighborhoods. Simultaneously it is theoretically – with the prerequisites that Stockholm possesses – possible for the governing politicians to guide the tenure distribution (through Stockholm's extensive land possession). Based on this, three hypotheses were formulated in order to test whether Stockholm seems to align with its tenure balance ambition in practice. It was in other words investigated whether they seem to utilize the inbuilt capacity in their landownership to steer tenure balance (i.e. RQ5). As for the data in the study, it was gathered from two separate sources that both covered a total of eleven years. For variables representing existing tenure balance in the housing stock, data was gathered from the Growth and Regional Planning Administration in Stockholm (TRF). This publicly available data, subdivided from 131 distinct neighborhoods, covers the entire area of

³ See appendix in Paper III.

⁴ I.e. balance between rental and ownership housing.

Stockholm. The second source of data was provided, per request, from Stockholm's land development department. This data included close to 50 000 apartments assigned to housing developers through land allocations during the years 2002-2012. Besides year, tenure and developer (municipal or private) of each apartment, the data on land allocations thereto contained information regarding location. This allowed for the two sources to be combined by mapping all apartments accordingly over all neighborhoods in the supplementing TRF data. The final data set was subsequently analyzed through regression analysis.⁵

1.3.1 Linkage research methodology – papers

Figure 3 below, presents an overview of the linkage between each research approach (inductive or deductive) as well as the main method (qualitative or quantitative) and their corresponding papers.

Inductive approach	Paper I: Mark(ägande) och bostadsbyggande En belysning av kommunala markens funktion 1900-2015	Qualitative method (document)
	Paper II: Municipal land allocations: integrating planning and selection of developers while transferring public land for housing in Sweden Paper III: Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in Sweden	Qualitative method (document/interview/questionnaire)
Deductive approach	Paper IV: Municipal land allocations: a key for understanding tenure and social mix patterns in Stockholm	Quantitative method (regression analysis)

Fig. 3 Overview research approach, paper and research method

An inductive research approach has been applied in all papers except number IV, in which mainly a deductive approach was utilized. Similarly qualitative methods have commonly been adopted in Paper I-III, whereas Paper IV relied predominately on a quantitative method.

1.4 Thesis structure

This thesis consists of four papers (attached in the appendix) accompanied by this cover essay that serves the purpose of – based on the underlying core objective behind each paper – cohesively summarizing fundamental elements and thereto accentuating the findings related to each study. Implicitly this entails both simplifications and modifications. Accordingly, it should be acknowledged that several subordinated objectives embedded in each paper, as well as their corresponding findings, here have been left out or toned down.⁶ It should furthermore be acknowledge that some parts of this cover essay goes slightly beyond the scope of the papers. Aside from adding further insights associated

⁵ See more information in Paper IV concerning the data and the applied regression analysis.

⁶ Among more prominent objectives that been left out or toned down here, Paper II investigates the developers' view on the municipal disposal practice and the Swedish system is moreover put in an international context. Paper III thereto attempts to intermutually evaluate the assigning methods that have been discerned in accordance with ROII and RQ3.

with the research findings, the basic reasons behind the extended scope is to increase understanding or illuminate important contexts related to the main objectives.

Following the clarifications above concerning the ‘bond’ with the papers, this cover essay has been structured as follows. In this introductory chapter 1, focus has been put on clarifying the main objectives that have motivated the thesis, their contemporary relevance as well as the methodical proceedings undertaken in order to investigate them. Ensuing, chapter 2 is devoted to the role of the municipal land in Sweden – as a housing component. The emergence of municipal landownership and its increased attachment to housing is described accordingly, followed by a discussion directed on its dynamic role during the last century. Chapter 3 moves entirely into present time and slightly redirects focus to one vital part of the municipal land management – the disposal procedure. Consequently the Swedish ‘land allocation system’, designed to distribute municipal land aimed for housing to suitable developers gets scrutinized. Emphasis is directed specifically to the ‘assigning methods’ currently utilized in order to discern developers. Second last, chapter 4 stresses the potential of municipal landownership in a more long-termed perspective – as an integration tool. This is exemplified by illuminating how in particular landownership enables municipalities to guide the tenure of dwellings through their disposal procedures, thereby facilitating a socio-economical mix throughout the urban environment. The prerequisites for this are described and it is subsequently tested whether this capacity seems to be utilized in the municipality of Stockholm. Chapter 5 concludes this cover essay with a general discussion concerning future challenges, considerations that should be acknowledged and some of the thesis’ main contributions. It thereto points out a few possible directions for future research to begin.

1.4.1 Linkage chapters – papers

Figure 4 below, presents an overview of the linkage between the chapters in this cover essay and the attached papers.

Paper I: Mark(äga)nde och bostadsbyggande En belysning av kommunala markens funktion 1900-2015	Chapter 1, 2 & 5
Paper II: Municipal land allocations: integrating planning and selection of developers while transferring public land for housing in Sweden	Chapter 1, 3 & 5
Paper III: Disposal of municipal land aimed for housing: a critical evaluation of assigning methods applied in Sweden	Chapter 1, 3 & 5
Paper IV: Municipal land allocations: a key for understanding tenure and social mix patterns in Stockholm	Chapter 1, 4 & 5

Fig. 4 Overview of papers and corresponding chapters

As follows, chapters 1 and 5 partially cover all papers. Chapter 2 concerns Paper I solely. Likewise chapter 4 concerns Paper IV solely, whereas chapter 3 treats elements derived from both Paper II and Paper III.

1.4.2 Paper details

As becomes evident in the appendix, the four papers included in the present thesis deviates from each other in terms of language, scientific status and collaborations with fellow researchers. Below follows a brief description of each paper with respect to these mentioned issues.

Paper I is written solely by myself with due support from supervisors in setting the initial research design. The primary scientific aim of Paper I is to publish it in its current (Swedish) form as a KTH-report. A shortened and modified English version of Paper I might be produced later on with the intention to get it published in an international journal within the housing field. As for the initial choice of language, Swedish was chosen basically because an English presentation would have necessitated considerable simplifications. This primarily as Paper I relies heavily on juridical terms that in many cases lack counterparts internationally and, if they exist, often deviates to a varied extent in their exact meaning.

Paper II, like Paper I, is written solely by myself. Additionally, the paper was solely structured by me, while supervisors have contributed with regular feedback during the writing process. Paper II is published (2016) in the *Journal of Housing and the Built Environment* (Springer).

Paper III is written by myself with due support from supervisors in both structuring the research design and providing the analytical base. The scientific aim of Paper II is to later on submit it to a journal focused on either housing or land use policy. As for Paper III in its current form, it is primarily the length of it that has prevented it from being submitted in advance.

Paper IV is co-authored with a fellow researcher. Here I provided the idea of the study, conducted the necessary literature review while my co-author was mainly responsible for designing the analytical model that was utilized. The collection of data, formulation of hypotheses and analysis of results were undertaken jointly. Paper IV has been invited for a revised resubmission to *Housing Studies* (Taylor & Francis).

2 Municipal land – housing component

This chapter builds on Paper I and has two primary aims – i.e. answer RQ1 and RQ2. Consequently the emergence of municipal landownership and its connection to housing will be retrospectively traced to the beginning of the 20th century, and the role of the ownership during different times elaborated upon.⁷ Unsurprisingly the role of the municipal landownership – as well as the legal and financial instruments that shaped it – has been continuously adapted to the surrounding society. It should accordingly be acknowledged, that it is the interrelated development within a vast numbers of areas that essentially has affected the ‘ownership-function’. Before directing focus specifically on the functions discerned for this study, and their aggregated effect during different times, it is therefore fruitful to first bring some fundamental societal changes to attention.

To start with, the demographic of the population has shifted dramatically in numbers as well as location. Hence, aside from nearly doubling in size (today roughly 9 900 000 inhabitants) since the beginning of the 20th century, the Swedish population has gone from predominately rural to one in which about 85 percent lives in urban communities. Next to this, it has been a great shift in the division of ‘public responsibilities’ – not least concerning planning and building – between the State and the municipalities, accompanied by simultaneous decentralization of power to the latter during the years (see e.g. Hägglund, 2013). In parallel the numbers of unique municipalities has, through a series of amalgamations, dropped from around 2 400 at the start of the last century down to today's 290. Lastly to be mentioned here, housing policy – or rather the official view of housing as a public responsibility – has gone through at least three major phases during the time studied. While housing being seen initially as a strictly private market matter with only a minimum of State interventions, one prominent change of direction was initiated during the late 1930s. This transformation, executed primarily in the years following the Second World War, turned housing into ‘a pillar’ of Sweden's welfare system (Hedin et al., 2012). This transition replaced a previous market-oriented housing system, with a system characterized by vast State interventions in form of regulations and financial subsidies targeting producers (developers) as well as consumers (tenants). For nearly half a century this positioned the State accompanied by the municipalities as key players in a Swedish housing policy that practically circumscribed market forces as the main guidance for construction. However, during last decades quite drastic changes have occurred and an essentially market-orientated housing policy has been re-created once again. The State (and municipal) engagement on the housing market has consequently diminished substantially. This evolvment should, together with the societal transformations mentioned above, be kept in mind throughout this and remaining chapters.

2.1 Emergence of municipal landownership and connection to housing

Following RQ1, this part of the study circles around the legislative framework that have been developed in order to tackle three identified problems related to land, and additionally how the design of State-subsidies have connected the municipal landownership to housing developments in particular.

⁷ It should further be noted, although excluded here due to the delimitation in time, that several old cities and urban settlements that constitutes the urban environment in present days municipalities’ have once originated from land donated by the State (or the ‘Crown’ as referred to previously).

As for the identified problems, they have in common that municipal landownership would have – and still can – neutralize each of them. The ‘function’ of the municipal land could therefore be seen here as a dynamic reflection of how a constantly evolving legislation managed to – enable or ease transfers of land into municipal possession – or in parallel – reduce the need of municipal land in order to neutralize each problem. Likewise, the State-subsidies aimed for housing have had a major effect on the landownership function by ascribing different degrees of importance to it.

Focus below is initially turned to the main functions that throughout the time-period studied have ascribed municipal landownership a pivotal role within in dynamic and continuously expanding urban environment. This is followed by closer investigating the linkage between municipal land and State-subsidized housing. Altogether, and in line with ROI, this seeks to explain the in an international perspective vast municipal landownership that exists today and which in turn has necessitated locally elaborated systems for disposing the land – i.e. land allocation systems (i.e. the topic of ROI). Secondly, these accounts form the past illuminates that municipal land acquisitions during several decades was aimed primarily at land suitable for ‘future’ housing developments – thus explaining why in this landownership type is of particular interest from a Swedish housing perspective.

2.1.1 Municipal landownership functions

While municipal landownership undeniable contains a wide array of possible advantages, the study in Paper I discerned and settled with three main functions. These, the underlying problems associated with each of them and a brief recapitulation of the legislation⁸ that has evolved and regularly reshaped the functions are categorically presented below.

2.1.1.1 Control over the built environment

A first main function of municipal land concerns the control over the built environment, or essentially the land use. The corresponding problem here is subsequently connected to (private) landowners’ right to develop their land without any consideration of the municipal interest.⁹ Following this, it is in essence a problem relating to the attributes typically inserted in the ownership, i.e. the structure of the ‘property rights’ associated with the land (see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). The extent of this problem is moreover mirrored by the degree to which legislation circumscribe these attributes, and then in particular the right to develop. If this legislation is scarce – a landowner’s right to develop is extensive – with an inadequate built environment as a potential result. Implicitly, this has urged municipalities to acquire land for its control function when current legislation has been deemed insufficient – as in the beginning of 20th century Sweden.

To counteract this problem, without necessitating ownership of the land, State-sanctioned legislation targeting spatial planning and building has increasingly empowered municipalities with a multitude of passive instruments. The property right, or in essence the ‘development right’, inherited in the landownership have in other words been increasingly circumscribed. The municipalities’ ability to

⁸ The legislation will here only be synoptically summarized. See Paper I for a more extensive account.

⁹ It could thereto be noted that State ownership of land could – from a municipal viewpoint – constitute a similar problem if opinions regarding the land use do not coincide.

control the land use and the built environment within their administrative borders – without owning the land – has consequently changed radically from the early 1900s. For a rather long period of time however, it was only the relatively few areas in a municipality covered by an adopted land use plan where any actual control existed. Over time the ability to control both land use and building activities, within as well as outside of adopted land use plans, have increased and since 1931 legislation have enabled municipalities (with some assistance from the State) to exercise at least a partial influence over all land. It was nevertheless not until 1948 the development right linked to the ownership of land was severely restricted. This followed the adoption of a new building act which required that all developments of more substantial nature had to be preceded by a mandatory municipal planning process, and thereafter confirmed in a specific type of land use plan. If a land area or a proposed development project was deemed not suitable from a municipal perspective, planning could simply be refused – i.e. a municipal planning monopoly was established.¹⁰ The development right previously linked to landownership was consequently passively transferred almost entirely to the municipalities'. Affected landowners were moreover – as still today – not entitled any compensation at all if a proposed development, for whatever reason, was deemed not suitable. The situation since then has changed little, and accordingly all projects of any scale must, regardless of who owns the land, pass the municipal planning process before an implementable development right is granted (today via a so-called 'detailed development plan').

To conclude, the evolvement of the planning and building legislation has theoretically, as well as practically, neutralized the municipal 'control problem' that up until the middle of the last century urged municipalities to acquire land. It is consequently not necessary for municipalities to own land in order to have an effective control over the built environment anymore – implicating that this ownership function is of rather insignificant importance today.

2.1.1.2 Control over the implementation of the built environment

Next to municipal landownership guaranteeing control over the land use and what is to be built, another of its main functions has been to ensure control over the implementation – i.e. assure the construction of planned developments. As already brought to attention in the introduction, its related problem stems from the difference between a municipality-approved 'development right', and an ownership-attached 'implementation right'. Following this, it is the interest of the landowner that ultimately decides not whether – but if and when – an approved project will be implemented. It could moreover be many reasons to why landowners lack an implementation interest (see e.g. Adams et al., 2002; Buitelaar and Segeren, 2011). This implementation problem has frustrated Swedish municipalities since long, and not least in times of experienced housing shortages.

One legislative remedy has been to empower municipalities with statutory instruments to – when deemed necessary due to a 'public objective' – expropriate the ownership of land and thereby the embedded implementation right. Private land considered vital for a variety of public objectives, such as roads, channels, electricity etc. have consequently been possible to expropriate for a long period of

¹⁰ I should however be noted that the State could (and still can) intervene in the municipal planning process leading the 'monopoly' to, in its meaning here, essentially being directed towards private landowners.

time. The list of public objectives enabling expropriation has moreover expanded quite drastically over the years and nowadays includes far more than just infrastructure-related purposes. Interrelated legislation concerning compensation as well as municipal precedence to the land – the latter concerning cases when a landowner's interest coincides with the public objective – has in a similar manner changed during the last century.

Briefly summarizing the legislative evolvments, it could be noted that expropriation has been a potential remedy to reluctant landowners since years before the start of the 20th century. Land necessary for primarily a wide array of infrastructure objectives, in especially urban areas, have consequently been possible to expropriate for the whole time period studied. A continually increased 'housing objective' has moreover enabled municipalities to gradually expropriate more and more land aimed for housing in particular. While initially only targeting a few special cases, it has subsequently – since around the end of the 1940s – been possible for Swedish municipalities to expropriate practically all land deemed (publicly) appropriate for future housing. Likewise, since the middle of the last century, it has been stressed that municipalities have precedence to this type of land regardless of current landowners' willingness or intentions to independently implement a specific project. Thus, for more than 60 years, Swedish municipalities have been equipped with legal instruments to expropriate practically all private land deemed necessary for implementing projects relating to a public objective. The general and statutory compensation level concerning the land in question has meanwhile shifted back and forth during the last 115 years and thereby, in a fluctuating manner, 'benefitted' either municipalities or initial landowners.¹¹ Simplified initial landowners have been decreasingly benefitted since the beginning of the 20th century and a strict 'market value principle' has been the benchmark for compensation during more than half a century. The situation has however recently changed in favor of private landowners as an extra 25 percent should be added to the market value nowadays – in line with the legal situation 100 years ago.

As similar to the control problem described above, legislation concerning expropriation has – at least theoretically – neutralized the 'implementation problem' that from time to time frustrated Swedish municipalities. Thus, if a particular area of land is needed for housing or any infrastructure-related purpose municipalities nowadays have the legal power to get in possession of it. Expropriation has however always been considered a complicated procedure and thereby, also depending partially on how the compensation should be calculated, refrained municipalities from utilizing the instrument.¹² Following this, the problem has not been neutralized in practice and the 'ownership function' is consequently still of importance from an implementation perspective – as will be emphasized in the final section of this chapter.

¹¹ The compensation level could moreover be seen as one indicator of the State view on municipal landownership as the specific design of this regulation could (and still can) stimulate, as well as, discourage municipalities from utilizing expropriation in practice.

¹² It should further be noted that Swedish municipalities previously (1968-2010) was equipped with a pre-emption right targeting all major land transaction. A motive foregoing the adoption of this legislation was to enable municipalities to 'voluntarily' acquire land without necessitating a complex expropriation procedure.

2.1.1.3 Control over land values and unearned increment

A third main function of the municipal landownership has been to control direct negative or otherwise inequitable effects derived from land values. The corresponding problem is basically that land close or within urbanized areas is not primarily valued based on its physical attributes. It is rather the unique localization of the land, combined with existing or potential building restrictions – i.e. its development right – that guides the value (see e.g. Alexander 2014; Evans, 2004a). Thus, it is typically the scarcity of ‘alternative’ land within a defined area that, in combination with adjacent and often publicly supplied infrastructure, determines the value – rather than visible efforts made by existing landowners. From both State and municipality perspective, (high) land values as well as its (unearned) increment have been considered to cause land speculation. This has in turn resulted in low construction rates and corresponding high costs for tenants. High land values have thereto been considered to cause inferior standard and unsuitable localization of the dwellings that has been built. The legislative answers to these problems – that on principal level only applies to privately owned land – have been aimed at tempering the increase of land values in general, or assure that not all of the increments accrue to landowners solely.

Focusing initially on the ‘unearned increment’, this problem has been on the housing policy agenda throughout the time period studied. Its priority has however shifted quite drastically in parallel with mainly an evolving legislation targeting the control over the land use, and thereto the degree of State engagement in the housing sector. Subsequently this problem has been at its highest positions during times of weak control legislation – i.e. predominately the first three decades of the 20th century – and during substantial State engagement – i.e. predominately the decades following the Second World War. It could moreover be noted that a partial transfer of the unearned increment from landowners’ to the public (State and/or municipality), generally has been considered political justifiable. The calculation of the ‘unearned’ part of the increment, the scope of it which is to be transferred to the public as well as the methodical procedure to do it has however been heavily debated. As a consequence, mainly due to lack of political consensus, any legislation directed at the increment specifically has never come into force.¹³ About half-through last century, the public focus moreover started to shift towards hampering rather than capturing the increment. For this purpose, several legal as well as financial instruments were added to the existing regulatory framework. Accordingly, a presumed land value increase became enough to expropriate also land adjacent to an area intended to be expropriated. The compensation for land aimed for housing was from now moreover to be determined based on the value 10 years before the question of expropriation being raised – to clearly cream of potential expectation values. A realization tax was also added to the revenue of all land sales – as opposed to before when land owned longer than 10 years was not affected. Thereto, as will be elaborated in next section, the steadily increased State-subsidies targeting housing developers, which now affected a majority of all construction, postulated a limitation on the ‘cost’ of the land component.

¹³ The debate concerning the calculation has mainly circled around the part of the increment that could be derived not clearly from neither a public investment nor an effort undertaken by the landowner – and who should have the justifiable right to this value. As for the scope some have advocated a minor percentage while others all of it and concerning the method the debate has focused on either a direct or indirect taxation.

To sum up, continuously increased municipal control over the land use accompanied by an enlarged mandate to acquire land either voluntary or through expropriation at more favoring compensation levels have, together with the mentioned realization tax, had at least two major effects. Firstly, it has progressively circumscribed private landowners ability to – seemingly without any effort – capitalize on the ownership solely. Secondly, heavily supported by the design of the State-subsidies for housing it has resulted in not only rather moderate land value levels – but also a gradual private-municipal ownership transfer of, in particular, land deemed suitable for future urban expansion. State enacted legislation aided by housing subsidies has consequently eased the ‘land value problem’ – at least partially and periodically. It is however still only municipal possession of land that fully neutralize the problem. From this latter point of view, it can moreover be noted that several legal instruments of the past directed at facilitating municipal land acquisition have vanished or been considerably modified during the last decade. Municipal incentive to keep land values on low levels have moreover transformed quite drastically due to the housing policy transition in the early 1990s. Following the transition land, in principle, went from being an included and price restricted component in a State-financed housing scheme into a residual component in a market-oriented system. While municipalities previously had an incentive to keep values low – and thereby enable housing developers to utilize State-subsidies – they have a reverse incentive today. Thus, land values could somewhat simplified be seen as implicitly transformed from a ‘private problem’ into a ‘municipal asset’ – as the economic value nowadays seems to constitute one rather prominent main function of municipal landownership.

2.1.2 Municipal landownership and State-subsidized housing

The above described problems relating to land have resulted in a constantly evolving legislation that, through different measures and legal instruments, has ascribed the municipal landownership a rather dynamic function. Additionally, and in parallel to these processes, State-sanctioned subsidies have been introduced to further strengthen the municipal capacity to guide housing developments in particular. Throughout the years, these housing subsidies, targeted at developers as well as end-consumers, have to different degrees been linked to municipal land. This have injected a supplementary function into the municipal landownership and thereto stressed the importance of it from a housing perspective. A two-parted portrayal of the evolving linkage between municipal land and housing subsidies follows below.

2.1.2.1 *First half of the 20th century*

Aside from a few municipalities’ early and independent initiatives to support their local housing markets it was the effects of the First World War that triggered a first more general engagement from the State. Preceding State-support had been minor and, with few exceptions, aimed primarily at improving the housing situation in more rural areas.¹⁴ This more general support, decided by the parliament 1917, resulted in subsidies targeting primarily urban municipalities with a more severe

¹⁴ It could thereto be noted that the State in 1907 enacted legislation that enabled municipalities to under a limited time period lease out their land for housing through a so called ‘site-leasehold’. One of the motives behind the site-leasehold – that is still a legally valid instrument (but nowadays heavily modified) – was to stimulate housing in or close to more urbanized areas.

housing shortage. The subsidy was basically structured with the State taking 2/3 of the cost, while the remaining 1/3 had to be taken by the receiving municipality in form a monetary contribution or something equivalent – such as land. An indirect connection was thereby established early between municipal land and State sanctioned housing. However, this initial connection was just temporal as the State withdrew the subsidies shortly after the end of the war, and it took until the middle of the 1930s before a support towards urbanized municipalities was re-introduced. The support was this time aimed solely at municipality-controlled developers, and the construction of rental housing for less well-off families with several kids. A requirement for municipalities that wanted to utilize the subsidy was that they, as similar to before, provided the land for free or otherwise contributed with an amount equally to the land cost. The municipal land requirement had two purposes – counteract land speculation and work as a differentiation tool between municipalities. The latter through (typically) demanding a higher financial sacrifice from more populated (and typically richer) municipalities than less populated. Soon thereafter, the break out of the Second World War had a negative impact on housing market as constructions rates fell substantially. This necessitated a continuously expansion of the State-subsidies during the years of the war, and thereto a widened sphere of recipients – i.e. also private housing developers and not solely ‘less well-off’ families as end-consumers. Throughout this expansion of the housing subsidies, the importance of municipal landownership was highlighted several times. Municipal land was thereto deemed as an adequate mean of contribution from the municipalities, which aside from the State, now were considered obligated to command the construction of housing. The housing subsidies were now moreover, due to drastically increased construction costs, coupled with a mandatory price control. Subsequently different building components, among them land, could no longer exceed a number of predetermined thresholds if the State-support was to be utilized.¹⁵ A natural consequence of this was that municipalities with more substantial landholdings could – solely through their land pricing practice – ease developers’ utilization of the subsidies. The municipal land pricing practice was thereto considered to propagate over to the private land and thereby it could hamper increased land prices in general.¹⁶

2.1.2.2 Second half of the 20th century

The years following the end of the Second World War II and up until the 1960s introduced few innovations in the State-subsidies with bearing on the municipal land. The State’s support to the housing sector did however, unlike after the end of the First World War, remain and likewise the inbuilt price control for different components. A minor modification of the subsidies in 1962 thereto clarified that State-subsidies was only to be granted when the land price pertaining to a specific housing project was considered reasonable. In 1968, the State also – to further stimulate municipal land acquisitions – established a specific land fund, active until 1981, from which money could be borrowed. An initial requirement was that the land in question had potential for future urbanization,

¹⁵ The State-subsidies thereto put a cap on the final price of the end product, i.e. the dwellings. This as one of the main ideas behind the State aid was that it should benefit final consumers, rather than (private) housing developers.

¹⁶ This was in turn of importance as it, from a municipal perspective, mitigated the compensation level when expropriation had to be utilized.

but later on also already developed land got comprised by the loan, if urban renewal was desired. A more extensive reformation of the general housing subsidies thereafter occurred in 1975 and among other modifications, a so called 'land condition' was introduced. The meaning of this condition was rather simple – State-subsidies which now financed the bulk of all new construction was, with a few exceptions, only to be given housing projects initiated on municipality-owned land. Consequently, land necessary for housing developments had to be supplied through a municipality and the State's support for housing was thereby practically fully linked to municipal landownership. The context to this reformation of the housing subsidies was that private landowners (often equal to development companies), despite existing planning legislation and expropriation tools, still was considered able to steer the development without enough considerations of what a municipality might want. Private ownership of land with development potential was thereto considered to be nearly equal with a guaranteed development right. This moreover, and naturally, limited competition in the construction phase severely, which in turn was considered to affect the final cost for housing consumers negatively. Additionally, the previous mentioned loans for municipal land acquisitions had not had the desired effect, and in some cases even resulted in increased land prices – due partially to increased competition from financially strong developers.¹⁷ Following this context, the aim of the land condition was two-folded. Firstly, it would transform municipalities into sole purchasers of land aimed for housing, with a general decrease in prices as a result. Secondly – the municipal land allocation procedure – would assure that land got assigned to only competent developers with the requirements and will to construct 'cost efficient' housing. The land condition's effect in practice was however remarkably moderate as the (already rather large) share of housing initiated on municipal land, prior the requirement around 75-80 percent, only increased to a bit over 80 percent.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the land condition remained as a requirement for State sanctioned housing subsidies until this support, and its attached price control, was altogether abolished during the early 1990s. This simultaneously ended a nearly 50 year old connection between municipal land and State-subsidized housing. Following this, the incentive for municipalities to acquire land diminished and without the price control, low land prices became less important (as stressed in section 2.1.1.3). However, several municipalities have since then continued to utilize their landholdings in order to subsidize housing, despite this seemingly being a violation against more current legislation demanding 'market pricing' (see more on this section 3.3.1).

2.2 The role of municipal landownership – a summarized analysis

Preceding sections of this chapter have categorially described how predominately the State, through enacted legislation and financial support, directly and indirectly have ascribed municipal land shifting functions within the built environment – not least concerning housing. In this two-parted section, that concludes present chapter, the role of the municipal ownership of land, and the coetaneous events that shaped it is analyzed via a more blended lens.

¹⁷ In 1972, a governmental investigation concluded that between the years 1964 and 1970, a majority of the (then) 21 largest housing developers had acquired land at a level comparable to a larger municipality.

¹⁸ The moderate increase was also an effect of possible exemptions of the land condition as well as general shift of the housing construction towards brownfield rather than greenfield developments.

2.2.1 Role in retrospect

Within a planning and building perspective, the role of the municipal landownership could first of all, looking back to the beginning of the 20th century, be divided into two separable phases. In the first of these two – the ‘control phase’ – the municipal inability to exercise control over the land use constituted the main deficiency. During this phase, municipal landownership enabled effective protection against unwanted development and thereto a possibility to simultaneously plan for a desirable one. In the second – ‘implementation phase’ – the control deficiency has been substituted by an inability to realize desired and planned developments. Here municipal landownership (principally) acts as a guarantee for projects being appropriately planned, and thereto accordingly implemented. Overlapping both these phases, municipal landownership have additionally mitigated the permanent ‘deficiency’ concerning (private) land value increment, and moreover enabled for municipalities to utilize State-support targeting housing.

A breakpoint between the control and the implantation phases could be discerned around the latter half of the 1940s. From here on the State, through its legislative function, empowers all Swedish municipalities’ capacity to practically solely determine if and how any form of more substantial development is to be undertaken.¹⁹ A continuous evolvement of the plan and building legislation through the first half of the century has thereby resulted in municipal mandate to control and plan the land use – independently of landownership. The municipal ability to get in possession of land is now also bolstered by extended legislation concerning expropriation. The initially inferior role of the municipal landownership as an implementation tool – for in particular housing – was however not only due to the weak control over the land use. Additionally, prevailing (welfare) politics up until the late 1940s, on national as well as municipal levels, clearly did not prioritize housing. Rather than a ‘public’ matter, construction rates were to be dictated nearly entirely by market forces. Subsequently municipal landownership, despite already being considered a facilitator for the implementation of infrastructure projects, was of rather insignificant importance in a housing implementation perspective. The role of the municipal land did however change as the earlier mentioned modification of the welfare politics, initiated during the 1930s, started to increasingly absorb housing as one of its ‘pillar’. In this new political setting, the municipalities were supposed to command the construction of housing and accordingly implementation of projects started to seize more of the attention. It thereto soon became evident that a planning monopoly, effectively granting power to control and plan the land use, was not enough from this latter perspective. Altogether, this converted the main role of the municipal landownership – from control into an implementation tool.

Moving back to the extension of the expropriation legislation that was undertaken half way into the last century these modifications partially transformed this legal instrument. This particular legislation had since before enabled municipalities to get in possession of land aimed for infrastructure and other types of public places. A municipality-controlled implementation of these areas was then meant to in

¹⁹ The phase-transition thereto coincides with the period of time in Sweden when the demographic switch between a rural and urban population is at its height and the first major wave of amalgamating municipalities is commenced – generally resulting in increased municipal competence.

turn stimulate implementation of projects (e.g. housing) on surrounding (and still private) land. Undertaken modifications now not only enabled the municipalities to at a higher degree expropriate 'surrounding land' aimed for development, but thereto accented their precedence to it.²⁰ This regardless of whether a current landowner's implementation intentions coincided with the municipality. Thus, and as for non-infrastructure projects, rather than stimulating voluntary implementation, the expropriation instrument was from now meant to actually transfer this land over to the municipalities and subsequently let them dictate the implementation.

However, as for in particular housing developments, implementation was still considered a problem at the end of the 1950s and throughout the following decade,²¹ despite the increased municipal power to utilize expropriation. The municipal landownership accordingly retained its main role as a facilitator for implementing (predominately housing) projects. Existing expropriation legislation was now moreover accompanied by a number of additional instruments, with a joint aim of assisting municipalities to obtain land. Accordingly, a municipal pre-emption right, targeting essentially all major land transfers (see note 12), as well as favorable State-sanctioned loans directed at land acquisitions was introduced. A modified realization tax that now affected all land transactions independently of the duration of the possession thereto, at least momentarily before the new rules came into force, increased the supply of land for the municipalities to exercise their pre-emption instrument on. Meanwhile, municipal acquisitions of State-owned land were facilitated through the establishment of a mutual 'land board' and the expropriation legislation was extended yet again – in case compulsory acquisitions would be needed. This latter mentioned extension practically enabled the municipalities to utilize expropriation whenever they considered a plot of land suitable for housing, and furthermore lowered the compensation level for it considerably. Paralleling the evolvement of modified legislation and added instruments to obtain land, the large-scaled State-subsides for housing developers got increasingly tied to the municipal land.²² Starting with the price control of, among other, the land component in the early versions of the support, and culminating with the municipal 'land condition' in 1975.

The fact that a substantial share of all housing in Sweden still today can be traced to municipal land is to a large extent plausible to attribute the legal instruments and State-subsides that evolved during the 1950s and 1960s.²³ Simultaneously, it is plausible to award the municipal landownership a key role in the factual implementation of more than 2 000 000 dwellings during the years 1945-1975. However, as an effect of a steadily reduced housing shortage up until the final decade of the last century its 'key

²⁰ The option to utilize 'site-leasehold' (see note 14), and thereby keep the land in municipal possession even after a project had been implemented, was now also strengthen through a major modification in this legislation. The site-leasehold instrument – and its role in Swedish housing– is more extensively accounted for in Paper I.

²¹ A governmental investigation in 1965 proposed a necessary production rate of 1 500 000 dwellings 1960-1975 in order to counter existing housing shortages. Same investigation furthermore estimated that 1 026 000 dwellings had been constructed 1945-1963.

²² The evolvement during the 1960s and 1970s is thereto paralleled by a second wave of amalgamating municipalities and a continued concentration of the population into certain regions and urbanized areas.

²³ This, alongside extended control legislation over the land use, is also a plausible explanation to the diminished political interest concerning land values and the 'unearned' increment, which was a prioritized topic during the first few decades of the 20th century.

role' as a facilitator for implementation of housing naturally became vaguer. When the subsidies to the housing sector thereafter was phased out in the early 1990s, the municipal landownership lost more of its importance – as it was no longer a necessary building block in a State-financed housing system. In the new planning and building act that came into force in 1987, it is furthermore possible to discern a diminished role of municipal landownership as a necessity for projects being implemented. This follows from the 'implementation-time', that ever since then been attached to the municipal land use plans that results in legally binding development rights (i.e. all detailed development plans). The purpose of this mandatory plan provision is to stimulate landowners to independently implement planned projects – rather than an intermediary municipal ownership take-over of the land. The somewhat subordinated role of the municipal landownership in the housing politics nowadays, as compared to 50 years back, is finally – from State perspective – reflected by the abolishment of several vital legal instruments that in the past encourage municipal land acquisitions. Consequently, while the financial support targeted directly at land acquisitions has been gone for over 35 years the municipal pre-emption right at land transfers disappeared from the legislation in 2010. More recent modifications in the expropriation legislation concerning compensation have thereto been reversed to nowadays primarily benefit original landowners rather than expropriating municipalities.

2.2.2 Role at present and beyond

Following preceding sections in this chapter, it should be evident that more than 100 years of (publicly) perceived problems associated with housing and private ownership of land – and the legal instruments created to counter these – is mirrored by the rather extensive municipal landownership existing still today. It is moreover reasonable to assume that municipal land is, and for long will remain to be, an utterly important housing component in Sweden. That fact municipal land, as of 2016, is extensively utilized for housing, not least in the most expanding regions and municipalities, is accordingly not surprising.

It is moreover evident that municipal landownership could, alike in its forgoing (and State-dependent) counterpart that practically necessitated it, offer advantages also in the market-oriented housing system of today. One of these advantages (still) concerns the implementation of projects. While the planning monopoly alone enables municipalities to affect the supply of buildable land it is – as consistently emphasized since the introduction of chapter 1 – the owner of it who has the ultimate control over the implementation. Landownership coupled with planning monopoly thereby persistently empowers municipalities with a possibility to better ensure that planned projects get implemented. Competition could thereto be stimulated through the disposal procedure (i.e. the topic of chapter 3) in which developers' gets assigned land and it is moreover possible for municipalities to better account for their specific interests in a project regarding design, sustainability factors, time-schedule etc. As compared to projects initiated on private land, municipalities are simply offered a greater ability to dictate and guide the built environment – provided a rational land allocation system. Municipal landownership is additionally, at least as of now, one of the most powerful tools in order to counter increased polarization between different income groups in the urban environment (as elaborated upon in chapter 4).

3 Municipal land – disposal procedure

Preceding chapter 2 aimed to retrospectively investigate the linkage between municipal landownership and housing in Sweden. From this it moreover became clear that municipal land will be a pivotal housing component, even when a prospective perspective is adapted. Chapter 3 is set solely in present time, and focuses is now narrowed down to the disposal procedure of this often essential housing component (i.e. ROII and covered by Paper II and III). The structure of the municipal disposal procedure (i.e. RQ3 and Paper II) and its components will accordingly be explored initially. This is followed by a closer examination of the specific assigning methods utilized to discern (suitable) developers (i.e. RQ4 and Paper III). Altogether, present chapter aims to present a contemporary account of the municipal land disposal practice – as it is applied in Sweden.

3.1 Land allocation

The disposal procedure of municipal land aimed for development in Sweden is somewhat ambiguously termed a ‘land allocation’²⁴. As will be clarified below, the ambiguity of this term, which indicates a factual transition between a municipality and a developer, stems from the fact that an assigned land allocation today merely marks the beginning of a process, that only in successful cases results in an actual land transfer.

3.1.1 Definition and meaning

Land allocation has – despite not being officially defined – since long been a fairly well-established term among Swedish municipalities for the distribution of their developable landholdings. The interpretation of a land allocation has however shifted quite drastically between municipalities, and while some have incorporated a chain of activities in it, others have simply equated it with the just the ownership transition. Its meaning seems furthermore to have shifted over time, with the latter mentioned interpretation generally being more common prior to the 1990s. A major step towards a uniform understanding of the term, and in line with the former interpretation, is moreover to be expected following a recently adopted Act on Guidelines for Municipal Land Allocations (*lag om riktlinjer för kommunala markanvisningar*). This act, which came into force January 1st 2015,²⁵ defines a land allocation in its first paragraph as:

“An agreement between a municipality and a developer that gives the developer sole right to under limited time and under given conditions negotiate with the municipality regarding transfer or lease of certain of the municipality owned land area for construction”

Following this definition, a land allocation is essentially an agreement between a municipality and a developer²⁶ that entitles the latter a time limited sole right to under a set of predefined conditions

²⁴ The term in Swedish is ‘markanvisning’.

²⁵ It can here be noted that the present study of the municipal disposal procedure were actuated in late 2011 – i.e. nearly three years before this act came into force. It was moreover evident from conducted interviews and questionnaires that municipalities and developers alike often interpreted a ‘land allocation’ slightly different.

²⁶ The Swedish Plan- and Building Act (*plan- och bygglag*) moreover defines a developer as the one that by ‘own account’ carry out or letting someone else carry out construction work. This interpretation of a developer as

negotiate with the municipality concerning a future land transfer (with an 'attached' project). Thus, neither land nor payment is transferred at the time a municipality assigns a land allocation to a developer – it is 'only' the right to negotiate that has been assigned.²⁷ It is moreover rather clear that it is one developers' sole right to negotiate with the municipality that constitutes the core in a land allocation. First of all, this allows them to spend time and resources on designing projects knowing there is a genuine municipal interest in it being realized. Secondly, it is an assurance for the developers' that a municipality is not negotiating with anyone else regarding the same project. Following the aim of all land allocations being an actual land transfer, the whole purpose of the negotiation is moreover to jointly devise a project – i.e. a development right – satisfying both parties. Being hinted in section 3.1.2 below, and then further expounded in section 3.2.4, the content, or scope of the negotiation thereby hinge considerably on when, in relation to the planning process, a land allocation is assigned. It is essentially this timing that determines the predefined frame or 'bargaining room' injected in a negotiation (and analogously land allocation).

A land allocation could furthermore, from a developer perspective, be considered as an option to buy municipal land. An assigned land allocation may consequently be 'returned' if the developer starts to doubt a project and no longer wishes to pursue an acquisition. It should nevertheless be taken into account that a returned land allocation could affect the relationship with a municipality negatively, and thereby reduce the likelihood of future assignments. Neither the municipality has any formal obligation to pursue an assigned land allocation, i.e. a land transfer will never occur unless every municipal demand on a project is fulfilled. The mandatory time limitation furthermore enable municipalities to, after the expirations date, re-assign a land allocation to a new developer. The time limitation is thereby essentially a municipal 'safety net' if, for whatever reason, any doubts should arise about either a developer or a proposed project. However, since it is always an active municipal decision behind every land allocation that gets assigned to a developer there should be at least an initial interest for the project from their side.

3.1.2 Role in the housing development process

A land allocation's role in the Swedish housing development process could a bit simplified be illustrated by looking initially on the main actors' (i.e. developers and municipalities) and their involvement in a typical project. Based on their respective engagement during the planning stage of a project and thereto the initial structure of the landownership Kalbro (2000) discern four typical models of the development process in Sweden (see figure 5 below).

primarily the one with a financial- and coordination liability – rather than the one actually (or necessarily) performing the construction work – is applied throughout this thesis.

²⁷ The formal assignment of a land allocation is normally a political decision, made by the Municipal council or some subordinated board. A municipality could also assemble its landholding, or a part of it, under some form of municipality-controlled corporation structure and it then usually the Board of Directors that official makes the assignment. The decision basis is however, in almost all cases, compiled by the department in a municipality with responsibility for the land and thus not by politicians or board members themselves.

	Developer not active in planning process	Developer active in planning process
Developer owned land	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
Municipality owned land	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>

Fig. 5 Models of the Swedish housing development process (derived from Kalbro, 2000)

With municipal landownership being a prerequisite the first two models are excluded, and thus only model 3 and 4 are of interest from a land allocation perspective. Since a land allocation moreover just constitutes one sequence in a project, a further delimitation of the ‘development process’ is needed before turning focus to the differences between the models. Following Healy’s (1992) definition of the development process as the physical, legally and material transformation of land from one use to another it becomes clear that it for most projects incorporates a wide array of activities. It is thereto quite reasonable that the order of sequences, as well as the list of events within a particular sequence, is far from uniform among projects (Healy, 1991 and 1992). A more pragmatic, but still adequate, illustration of the development process is moreover offered by Needham and Verhage (1998) who simply divide the development process in a ‘land development’ event followed by a ‘building development’ event. Accordingly, all activities necessary for a specific project to be implementable are covered in the first event, whereas it actually being implemented in the second. Although simplistic, this latter interpretation of the process is more appropriate to illuminate the role of a land allocation which in essence fulfills its main function during what the latter mentioned authors terms the land development event. Additionally, the land transfer, which marks the end of a successfully assigned land allocation, would coincide with the transition between these two events. However, as the term land development typically incorporates all steps from the detection of an appropriate land plot up until it is regulatory planned and properly serviced with sufficient infrastructure a further delimitation of this event is necessary as well. On a principal level, the part of the land development event equating a land allocation essentially overlaps the localization, scope and design of a development right – i.e. regular spatial planning activities.

Going back to the two models of the Swedish development process that originates from municipal land they deviate in one crucial aspect – the participating level of the developer during the planning process²⁸. Whereas model 4 centers on a close collaboration between municipality and developer, model 3 relies solely on the former actor when the legal frame (i.e. the development right) is set. Following this difference, it is quite obvious land allocations deviates in similar manner – depending on which models they are derived from. While land allocations adhering to model 3 just enable moderate modifications within the regulatory frame that has already been set by a municipality, those belonging to model 4 allows for significant developer influence. Thus, to sum up, land allocations

²⁸ I.e. the participating level in all events up until a development right has been finally confirmed in a legally binding detailed development plan – and a project accordingly being (juristically) implementable.

constitutes a part of all development processes initiated on municipal land and in essence – and to varied degrees – synchronizes with spatial planning activities during the land development event. As will be further illuminated in later sections (primarily 3.2.4) it is moreover a practice in line with model 4, that at least currently (see section 5.1) constitute the standard in Swedish practice.

3.1.3 Scope and utilization

Following the scope of a project being left out of from the definition, land allocations could theoretically comprise developments of all sizes.²⁹ As for housing, this means that the scope of a land allocation could range from one single dwelling to major projects involving several hundreds. However, the vast majority of land allocations involving professional³⁰ developers' concern projects with multi-family housing of varied scales. Figure 6, illustrates the distribution of land allocations among different developers in a larger greenfield development, which is to be divided into five separate detailed development plans (marked by dashed lines). In these types of development the scope of a land allocation typically corresponds to a separate block or a part of it.³¹




Fig. 6 Distribution of land allocations in a larger greenfield development.

²⁹ It could furthermore be noted that the definition of a land allocation applies to all type of projects – albeit housing being the sole focus in the present thesis.

³⁰ This delimitation basically excludes all private individuals who independently construct single-family houses for themselves on land supplied (or 'allocated') through a municipality. This practice is quite common in especially more rural municipalities with landholdings.

³¹ It should further be noted that land in a development area aimed for public infrastructure, such as roads, parks etc. are treated separately. A land allocations 'geographical scope' thereby typically corresponds with a serviced plot (or block as in figure 6).

As for the utilization of land allocations targeting housing projects, there are substantial differences between Sweden's 290 municipalities. This is moreover rather natural, following their often diametrically opposed settings with regards to landownership and not least the demand of new housing. Accordingly, some municipalities, generally those in expanding regions, utilize land allocations extensively while others do it more rarely (and some never). As a pointer of both utilization and scope the municipality of Stockholm assigned 129 unique land allocations during 2014-2015. These comprised in total 15 041 dwellings and the scope ranged from 10 to 1 100. More precise 92 land allocations concerned projects with between 50-250 estimated dwellings whereas 29 concerned less than 50 dwellings and the remaining 8 more than 250 dwellings (Stockholm, 2016).

3.2 Land allocation system

Unlike the term 'land allocation', the term 'land allocation system' lacks a univocal definition. Rather than a term, the land allocation system should moreover (and more appropriately) be considered as a concept. This becomes clear by looking at the system's core purposes – which basically is to distribute land allocations among competent developers and simultaneously ensuring that all forthcoming construction meets the municipal goals that has been set for the built environment. In line with the discussion above concerning utilization of land allocations, it is thereby the unique contextual setting in each municipality that shapes the system's individual design. As the land allocation system thereto should be able to, in all municipalities' alike, account for projects of drastically shifting types and scales further highlights its dynamic nature. Thus, each municipality's land allocation system should, for every project initiated on municipal (i.e. every land allocation), be able to discern between suitable and unsuitable developers. The systems' should further enable a collaborative environment with ability to absorb knowledge and demands from municipalities and developers alike. Consequently assigning methods when selecting developers, conditions framing a land allocations, its linkage to the planning process and criteria' put on developers all constitutes general elements. Focusing specifically on these mentioned elements furthermore enable an operationalization of the Swedish land allocation system. Accordingly, the brief and summarized presentation of the system below builds on a description of the conditions normally embedded in land allocations, characteristic developer criteria', commonly applied assigning methods when selecting developers and the assignments typical synchronization with the planning process.

3.2.1 Embedded conditions

Two primary aims of a land allocation's embedded, or 'predefined', conditions is to specify firstly all municipal requirements on a planned project and secondly an assigned developer's obligations and responsibilities during primarily the land development event (see section 3.1.2). These conditions are normally confirmed through the signing of a 'land allocation agreement'³², which thereto officially declares that a particular developer has been assigned a land allocation.

The embedded conditions could a bit simplified be divided into general and project-specific conditions. As for the former category these conditions applies to all assigned land allocations in a

³² The terminology for this initial agreement does however vary among municipalities.

municipality, and typically stipulates time-limits, constraints on 'resale' or conveyance and prerequisites for a municipal withdrawal of the assignment within the time-limit. This type of conditions could also require that a variety of municipal document, or guidelines, concerning energy-efficiency, water treatment, waste management etc. of are to be followed. It is moreover common that municipalities have a general condition clarifying that developers are responsible for all or certain costs up until an actual land transfer can occur (i.e. primarily cost associated with the planning process). Another typical condition can thereto clarify that an assigned developer solely bare the economic risk if a project is abandoned due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g. following successful appeals against a proposed project during the later stages of the planning process) and that this does not entitle a new assignment or any other form of compensation. The second, project-specific type of conditions normally includes an approximation of scope and land price³³, and thereto further specifies its content and design. Aside from more precise requirements regarding architectural and sustainability (energy intake levels, environmentally compatible materials etc.) aspects, the project-specific conditions might additionally prescribe a specific construction technique. Commonly applied project-specific conditions, pertaining to housing projects, moreover stipulate tenure form and in some cases even put limitations on future rent-levels.³⁴ It should lastly be acknowledge, that many of the project-specific conditions – especially those targeting a projects implementation phase – usually are modified or supplemented in later agreements closer to a projects actual implementation phase.

3.2.2 Developer criteria

The aim of a land allocation system's 'developer criteria' is to ensure that only suitable developers get assigned land allocations – or inversely that unsuitable developers not get assignments. They thereby fulfill a similar purpose as the developer selection phase (see subsequent section). However, while one target of this latter selection phase are to detect the most suitable developer for a specific project, the developer criteria primarily discern which developers who are to be eligible for land allocations in general. Following this, developers have to through various procedures prove, most importantly, financial capacity and thereto building capability. These fundamental 'solvency criterions' seem quite naturally – and unlike the embedded conditions – to be rather uniform among the municipalities and projects, despite their individual differences. Developers should moreover often prove they have the ability to meet different quality and environmental criteria. These later abilities, as well as building capability, usually require 'reference projects' making this an often essential criterion. Other typical criterion for being eligible include impeccable past performance (i.e. in case of earlier assignments), and not already being in possession of 'unused' development rights within a specific municipality. Likewise several parallel land allocations at one time could (temporarily) exclude developers from further projects on the municipal land.

³³ The price is usually expressed as 'indicative' and formulated in a price per square meter of the development right that is being legally enabled by a detailed development plan. It should thereto be noted that some municipalities postpone the price calculation until an actual land transfer can be realized and thereby omit it as an embedded condition at the assignment of a land allocation.

³⁴ It is essentially this municipal possibility to – through land allocations – actively guide tenure patterns in the built environment that is investigated and tested in ensuing chapter 4 (and Paper IV).

3.2.3 Developer selection

The prerequisites on housing projects – and analogously lands allocations – often deviate rather strongly from each other, depending not least on their unique geographical location. Similarly, municipal aspiration and wishes deviates highly between different projects, even within one single municipality. The primary aim of the developer selection is therefore to, through a levelling of all municipal prerequisites and wishes that might apply to a project, in each case distribute land allocations to the most suitable developer. This naturally necessitates different methodical consideration – i.e. ‘assigning methods’ – depending on the unique circumstances. Following this it is rather obvious that most municipal strategies concerning assigning methods differs between projects of more rudimentary character – with a potentially large number of suitable developers – and those more advanced – where the number has decreased substantially. It is moreover quite reasonable that the assumed attractiveness of a project will affect the methodical choice.

While numerous minor differences could be observed between the assignments of almost every land allocation, all municipalities studied in the present thesis, seemingly unexceptionally, utilizes a combination of two main approaches in the developer selection. These two approaches deviate in one crucial aspect – whether the assignment (i.e. the developer selection) is preceded by a formal comparison of developers or not. Hence, it is possible to distinguish a ‘tender approach’ and a ‘direct approach’. Of these all assignments under the latter approach is done directly through a negotiation with just one developer, while selections under the former are derived from different types of formalized comparisons between developers. Under these approaches, it is furthermore possible to distinguish a number of more distinct assigning methods. The two mentioned approaches as well as four discerned assigning methods are discussed more thoroughly in section 3.3.

3.2.4 Synchronization with the planning process

As brought already in section 2.1.1.1, all new developments (of scale) in Sweden necessitates a preceding and highly formalized planning process that, if successful, results in a detailed development plan³⁵ which incorporates a legally binding development right. The relative lengthy planning process contains several mandatory steps and typically numerous investigations, consultations examinations etc. have to be undertaken in order to ensure the suitability of a planned development.³⁶ It is essentially a land allocation’s synchronization with this process that (along with the embedded conditions) enables an adaptation of projects – combining both a developer and a municipality’s preferences.³⁷ It is thereby primarily the timing of a land allocation’s assignment in relation to the planning process, which enables municipalities to at a higher or lower degree absorb a developer’s

³⁵ It could be noted that Paper II refers to a detailed development plan as a ‘detailed plan’.

³⁶ See e.g. Thune Hedström and Lundström (2013) for more information on the Swedish planning process.

³⁷ It should here be remembered from figure 6 that a detailed development plan often comprises several blocks of individual projects (i.e. analogously land allocations). As for infill-projects it is however typical that one plan equals one land allocation.

unique competence and creativity.³⁸ It is furthermore this timing that (might) enable a municipality to, at varied degrees, translocate responsibilities and costs associated with the planning process. The timing of each land allocation's assignment, accordingly offers seminal guidance of its actual meaning (since it essentially frames a negotiations 'bargaining room', see section 3.1.1). As for the timing it is moreover possible to, from observed practice, discern three main strategies – early, semi-late and late assignments. Of these, the initial strategy clearly seems to be most common for land allocations designated for housing. The typical synchronization between a land allocation and the planning process is illustrated in figure 7.




Fig. 7 Synchronization land allocation – planning processes (as presented in Paper II)

Following the early strategy, the assignment of a land allocation occur either in parallel to the municipal decision to formally start the planning process or in connection to the process earlier

³⁸ The level of detail among adopted plans could however differ substantially. Accordingly detailed development plans with 'flexible' development rights could potentially enable a municipal absorption of creativity, competence etc. from developers even when land allocations' are assigned late in the planning process.

stages.³⁹ A developer thereby gets attached to a (planned) project at a point when only minor municipal planning constraints affect the land, and consequently when the development right is still highly adjustable. Of the two sub-approaches, the ‘parallel decision’ typically corresponds with projects initiated by a developer whereas assignments timing a ‘plan program’ or a ‘plan proposal’ normally concerns projects initiated by a municipality. The former approach is moreover most commonly applied for projects with an infill- or brownfield character, while the latter generally concerns larger greenfield developments. As for the semi-late strategy, the assignment and the planning process coincide around the time when a ‘plan proposal’ is to be presented. Here the municipality alone has outlined a project and injected a suggested development right into a proposed detailed development plan. More or less far-reaching planning restrictions have thereby been imposed and subsequently narrowed the adjustability of project before a potential developers is attached. This practice often aligns with projects of more basic nature and when municipalities have a rather clear idea about the desired end result. A prospective developer’s unique competence and creativity is thereby not deemed essential in these cases. Moreover, as the timing of a semi-late assignment still precedes the adoption of a plan, it is still – although rather time and resource consuming – possible to modify the attached (and proposed) development right if it turns out that no developer is willing to implement it. This possibility to inject modifications into a project is severely limited in all assignment that occurs late in the planning process – i.e. those in accordance with the ‘late’ strategy.⁴⁰ Following this, it seems quite rational that assignments based on an already prepared and adopted plan are rare as it opens up for a potential ‘implementation gap’ (see e.g. Evans, 2004a). Late assignments thus typically, at least for housing projects, correspond with cases when a previously selected developer has withdrawn from a project just prior to the actual land transaction. A late assignment strategy could sometimes also be utilized in combination with ‘flexible’ detailed development plans (see note 38 and section 5.1).

3.3 Methods for assigning land allocations

From the presentation above it should be clear that land allocations typically – at least when they are (early) assigned – constitutes rather intangible municipal objects. It should moreover be clear that land allocations in general offers developers a seemingly favorable risk-sharing structure that thereto allows for a significant degree of influence over the end-product (i.e. the development right). Unsurprisingly, these characteristics in combination with the structure of the Swedish (housing) land market results in land allocations being highly attractive on the developer market. It is accordingly not unusual that a vast number of developers are interested in a particular land allocation. Simultaneously the municipal aim of the developer selection is to, as emphasized in section 3.2.3, match each land allocation with the, given the project-specific prerequisites, most suitable developer.

Below follows a brief summary of legal aspects that affect the Swedish land disposal practice in general. The municipal practice when selecting developers is thereafter elaborated upon through an initial separation between two diverging approaches – ‘tender’ and ‘direct’ selections. From these two

³⁹ See Paper II for more information concerning the events preceding the assignment, as well as the final events.

⁴⁰ The ‘scope-condition’ (section 3.2.1) might however apply also for ‘late assigned’ land allocations and could in these cases delimit the scope of a project – despite an already adopted detail development plan enabling a more large-scaled housing project.

approaches, four ‘assigning methods’ are further distinguished – auctions, competitions without price, competitions with price and direct allocations. These assigning methods are accordingly presented and the municipal rationale underlying the utilization of each practice, as well deficiencies associated with each of them, is discussed (i.e. in line with RQ4).⁴¹

3.3.1 Legal implications

There are at present no legal boundaries pertaining specifically to the assigning part of the land disposal procedure, and municipalities are consequently able to independently devise their own methods for selecting developers. As for the mentioned ‘Act on Guidelines for Municipal Land Allocations’ (section 3.1.1), it only contains two paragraphs that aside from defining a land allocation stipulates that municipalities utilizing land allocations should adopt ‘guidelines’ describing their practice. While these guidelines could be comprehensive with ample descriptions of assigning methods, pricing practice etc., they are typically rather synoptically designed in most municipalities. The guidelines are moreover not legally binding and municipalities could accordingly divert from them. As for the actual land transfer however, both general and municipal-specific legislation apply. Accordingly, the Land Code (*Jordabalk*) prescribes the formalities to conclude valid sale agreements etc. and the Local Government Act (*Kommunallag*) further regulate municipal ‘business’ activities. Additionally, EU regulation directed towards state aid (*EU:s statsstödsregler*) affect municipal land transfers.⁴² It is essentially these latter two statutes that are of interest as they jointly aims at two things with at least a passive bearing on land allocations. Firstly, they compel municipalities to manage their assets (i.e. landholdings in this case) economically and thereby not transfer land at prices below its market value. Secondly, they prohibit municipalities from favoring certain developers by transferring land at a price that is less than the market value. This ‘market value’-principle should consequently be reflected upon in the assigning step independently of method – even though it in practice only targets the pricing of those land allocations that actual converts into real land transfers.

3.3.2 Two main approaches – four assigning methods

A common feature among all studied municipalities is that they seem to combine the usage of two rather dissimilar approaches when assigning land allocations to developers. Hence, Swedish municipalities utilize either a ‘tender approach’ or a ‘direct approach’. As already mentioned in section 3.2.3 these approaches deviate in one crucial aspect – whether the assignment (i.e. the developer selection) is preceded by a formal comparison between developers or not. Characteristic of all assignments categorized under the tender approach, which centers on a comparison, is thereby that they necessitate a prior specification of the land allocation. Municipalities consequently have to initially compile a project-specific program that includes all preconditions and thereto provide at least tentative guidelines of the expected outcome. It is moreover essential that explicitly stated assessment

⁴¹ The discerned methods are, as mentioned, intermutually ranked in Paper III. This based on resource consumption, transparency, ability to absorb developer creativity and capacity to stimulate competition.

⁴² The Public Procurement Act (*lag om offentlig upphandling*) could apply if a municipal land transfer is connected with additional construction commitments concerning public facilities (roads, sewage systems, parks etc.). Public facilities are however normally left out from land allocations and they could accordingly – if they are successful – be considered as ‘pure’ land disposals (see note 31).

parameters – which prospective developers could be evaluated against – are incorporated in the program. Based on the assessment parameters typically utilized by the Swedish municipalities, it is furthermore possible to discern three distinct methods falling under the tender approach – ‘auctions’, ‘competitions without price’ and ‘competitions with price’.⁴³ As for the direct approach on the other hand, the lack of a formal developer comparison prior to all assignments is the main characteristic. Here the initial comparison has been substituted by an informal negotiation phase with one specific developer, and without any officially stated requirements (i.e. no project-specific program). Land allocations assigned under this approach could in turn be differentiated depending primarily on who initiates the (informal) negotiation – an active municipality or an active developer – into several types. However, while these types have their own specific characteristic, which will be elaborated upon below, it is essentially the informal negotiation process that merge them together. Following this it is more appropriate to consider all the types as variations of one single method rather than several unique. The direct approach could consequently, while acknowledging its shifting types, be equated with one distinct assigning method – here termed ‘direct allocation’. Thus, to sum up, the four distinct assignment methods that will be categorically elaborated upon are – auctions, competitions without price, competitions with price and direct allocations.

3.3.2.1 Auction

As hinted by the name, auctions represent an assigning method in which the municipalities discern the most suitable developer for a specific land allocation by focusing entirely on their willingness to pay. The project-specific programs are in these cases usually limited and typically, for housing projects, just specify necessities such as the approximated number of dwellings (i.e. scope), preferred tenure, price index⁴⁴ and the general conditions that applies to all assigned land allocations in a municipality.⁴⁵ Prospective developers then turn in a bid indicating their willingness to pay and the auction normally follows a first-price sealed-bid procedure with the highest bidder being awarded the land allocation.⁴⁶ A developers bid is subsequently dependent on the estimated value of the finished product – i.e. the housing – as well as the expected aggregated cost of construction.

Municipalities typically highlight the fairly low resource and time consumption associated with the execution of an auction as the main rationale for utilizing this particular assigning method. This method is thereto presumed to stimulate competition following it being open for all interested (and eligible) developers. Auctions are thereto considered as a highly transparent assigning method that simultaneously assure that municipalities comply with domestic, as well as European legislation concerning municipal land not being transferred under its market value.

⁴³ The organization, structure and content – of preparatory- and evaluation phases alike – can be designed in a multitude of ways. This is the main motive for categorizing the tender approach based on assessment parameters rather than any other characteristic.

⁴⁴ The price index is essential following the often substantial time gap between the assignment of a land allocation and the actual land transfer (section 3.2.4). As for housing projects, the index is usually linked to the general price trend of dwellings in adjacent neighborhoods.

⁴⁵ The ‘solvency criterions’ (section 3.2.2) thereto applies – independently of utilized assigning method.

⁴⁶ Accordingly developers submit their bids simultaneously without knowing each other’s bid. The highest bidder is thereafter awarded the assignment at the price-level corresponding to the submitted bid.

Several objections could however be raised to these favoring arguments. First of all it could be questionable whether auctions truly stimulate competition in amore broad sense. An often lengthy and resource consuming planning process following the assignment necessitates financially strong developers. While this applies to all ‘early’ assigned land allocations – independently of method – it should delimit the number of potential developers substantially. It could therefore be questioned whether or not the auction method in particular stimulates an oligopolistic developer market. A land allocation’s ‘option structure’, in combination with its typically substantial ‘bargaining room’, could furthermore open up for opportunistic behavior. A developer bidding (too) high could consequently do so while consciously presuming that skillful negotiation during the planning process might result in a subtilized development right (changed tenure, widened scope etc.). Moreover being aware that land allocation could be returned, if the presumption turns out to be incorrect, further reduces the economic risk for a developer bidding (too) high significantly. Especially these latter mentioned flaws associated with auctions should be better accounted for by municipalities when they utilize this assigning method.

3.3.2.2 Competition without price

When municipalities utilize this assigning method the price-parameter has been subtracted from the assessment equation and the land allocation is accordingly channeled to a specific developer based on other factors. The project-specific programs (or more appropriately ‘competition program’) are here – and in contrast to the auction method – typically extensively elaborated and usually incorporates a wide array of desired sustainability and architectural aspects that are to be met.⁴⁷ It is thereto typical for the program to include a number of more objective and explicitly stated assessment parameters (such as rent-levels, energy intake, environmental classification etc.). Prospective developers who submit ‘bids’ on land allocations assigned through this method are subsequently evaluated on their proposals overall-performance.⁴⁸ The price-dimension is moreover not totally absent – but here it constitutes a predefined an embedded condition rather than assessment parameter. This predefined price level could furthermore be dynamically formulated and linked to the assessment parameters. Whether a developer’s proposal surpasses a municipality’s stated benchmark criteria concerning energy intake, rent levels etc. might accordingly have a spillover effect on the land price level.⁴⁹

One prime rational behind competitions without price, is that it enables municipalities to – while simultaneously stimulating developer creativity and offer a possibility to absorb their capacity – account for a wide set of policy goals at the assignment of land allocations. This assigning method is also considered as fairly transparent, and alike auctions it do not exclude any developers from participating in competitions and submit proposals on the municipal land. The fact that this method

⁴⁷ Depending on extent of the project-specific conditions predefined prior to an auction that method could highly resemble a competition. The fundamental difference is however that price is never an assess factor of relevance in present competition method.

⁴⁸ It is thereto not uncommon to divide this assigning method in sequential steps. An initial step (i.e. assessment) based on basic designs sketches and more synoptically descriptions could then be utilized to discern a number of prime proposals. In the second step, higher requirements are imposed and based on the elaborated proposals a final developer is chosen and subsequently assigned the land allocation.

⁴⁹ The price level of the land should nonetheless, in all cases, be in accordance with the ‘market value’-principle.

actively 'devalue' the price-parameter is thereto, by many municipalities, considered as a positive feature.

One obvious disadvantage with this assigning method is that a properly undertaken competition inevitably is costly and time consuming, this for municipalities and participating developers alike. As for the latter parties competitions in general necessitates a relatively extensive amount of resources to elaborate separate proposals that for a majority of the participators will be proven unsuccessful. This – similar to auctions – clearly disfavor all but financially strong developers. Organizing municipalities are likewise required to invest substantial resources throughout the process of a competition – initially to ensure the land suitability of a projects and then in all steps up until the evaluation phase. Yet another weakness is the, from a developer perspective, significant degree of uncertainty that is associated with this assigning method. This is generally due to the lack of an intermutually weighting between, often contradictive (and highly subjective), assessment parameters.⁵⁰ It is consequently difficult for developers to correctly interpret how municipalities values different assessment parameters. It is neither possible for municipalities to, in a similar manner as with auctions, ignore the risk of opportunistic behavior among participating developers. This type of behavior is thereto eased by the fact that a competition in general, would be very costly for a municipality to repeat once a developer has been awarded a land allocation. Often (but probably unintentionally) subjectively designed assessment parameters included in competitions, as well as the general extent of them, thereto makes it possible to question the transparency in this method.

3.3.2.3 Competition with price

A third and final assigning method categorized under the tender approach is competitions with price. As could be expected, this method combine price as well as other parameters in the evaluation and it thereby constitute somewhat of a hybrid between auction and competition without price. Assignments are consequently guided to 'suitable' developers by evaluating both their willingness to pay for the land allocation, and how they fulfil the remaining assessment parameters assembled for the competition. It is thereby, and moreover, essentially the extent and design of the non-price parameters that determines how closely this assignment method resemblance a straightforward auction.⁵¹

The line of argumentation in favor of competitions with price highlights its transparency and ability to enable competition, while simultaneously stimulating developer creativity. While these are similar to the arguments promoting the methods above competition with price thereto allows municipalities to more explicitly, but still dynamically, incorporate a monetary aspect in the assignment. Aside from more clearly observing the 'market value'-principle, this enables municipalities to better capture the willingness to pay – simply by letting participating developers do their own weighting of the land price-parameter. Enclosed in this assigning method is furthermore a less flagrant possibility for municipalities to reject developers that for whatever reason has been deemed 'unsuitable'. An

⁵⁰ As example of contradictive assessment parameters competitions (regarding housing projects) often strive for proposals with 'affordable' price or rent-levels and exceptional structural standard simultaneously.

⁵¹ This method could also, alike competitions without price, be divided into sequential steps in order to distinguish a 'winning' developer. It is furthermore possible to construct it as a two-step combination of competition and an auction by simply subtract the price-parameter in any of the steps.

unwanted developer's proposal could consequently be refused – despite offering the highest price – based on some other (and more subjective) assessment parameter.⁵²

In comparison with the foregoing competition-method, an added price-parameter further increases the degree of uncertainty among participating developers as they in all proposals skillfully must predict how a municipality weights it in relation to other assessment parameters.⁵³ This is one obvious imperfection with this method, which weaknesses otherwise essentially mirrors the ones associated with competitions with price. Accordingly, also this assigning method consumes substantial amounts of time and resources. Opportunistic tendencies among 'winning' developers are moreover still a possibility and its factual transparency can be questioned.

3.3.2.4 Direct allocation

A consistent characteristic of all direct allocations is the absence of an explicit and formal comparison of prospective developers prior to the assignment of a land allocation. Instead these assignments hinge on a preceding and informal negotiation between the municipality and a particular developer.⁵⁴ These informal negotiations could, as already mentioned, be initiated by developers as well as municipalities and depending primarily on the active part it is possible to discern different types of direct allocations. One type of direct allocation, derived from an active municipality, is when a certain area has been pointed out as suitable for development or in some cases even regulatory planned (i.e. model 3 in section 3.1.2) for housing projects. Developers are thereafter encouraged to compile their own proposals for the land in question and apply for direct allocations. Another type based primarily on an active municipality attempt to link developers into long-termed commitments by offering a recurring deliverance of municipal land (i.e. through direct allocations).⁵⁵ The exact geographical areas are typically not specified in these cases and the developer commitment typically stipulates a yearly construction rate of dwellings. Most direct allocations are however initiated by an active developer, approaching municipalities with more or less elaborated project-proposals on a plot of municipal land. These proposed projects are moreover often of an infill-character and typically aims to supersede old car-parks, redundant green areas etc. with new housing. Two other active developer types involves private land owners seeking to expand existing developments or projects on adjacent municipal land and current site-leaseholders of municipal land proposing to transform or extend their current land use.⁵⁶ If the municipality thereafter, in any of the above mentioned cases, find a proposed project

⁵² This reasoning does however apply to competitions without price as well.

⁵³ A clear indication from the empirical data is moreover that municipalities' heavily premier the price when it constitutes an assessment parameter in competitions.

⁵⁴ It should be noted that a municipality here could negotiate with several developers simultaneously regarding a specific plot of municipal land – that might later be encapsulated by a land allocation and formally assigned. This informal negation is however of an open-ended character and there are accordingly not any pre-defined conditions or constraints associated with the land (or project) in question.

⁵⁵ This type of direct allocation could however be initiated by an active developer as well.

⁵⁶ All active developer types seem quite naturally to be more common for areas were the (geographical) attractiveness of the land is high. Simultaneously the active municipality type seems more common when the context is the reverse.

promising and thereto suitable from a land use perspective a land allocation could be formally assigned – i.e. directly allocated.⁵⁷

Compared to previously described methods direct allocations generally consume less municipal resources. This follows partially from many of the preparatory tasks to ensure the physical suitability of a proposed project being levied over to (prospective) developer. The administrative burden and costs associated with the organization of an auction or competition is simultaneously drastically reduced. An open-ended point of departure (i.e. the informal negotiation process) thereto enables a great degree of mutual conformability in all proposed projects, prior to them being formally assigned. Altogether, these features constitute the main rationale behind direct allocations and it is accordingly not surprising that municipalities – when the situation allows them – seem to prefer this method. The potential of being assigned a direct allocation additionally creates incentives for developers, and thereby stimulate them to elaborate projects on land that a municipality might have overlooked. Direct allocations could also, albeit rather theoretically, ease problems related to opportunistic tendencies among assigned developers. This by the (tacit) possibility for municipalities to reward diligent developers – with recurring direct allocations – and at the same time punish negligence – by exclusion from this type of assignment. A persistent supply of buildable land is moreover often a necessity in order to attract developers to municipalities in more rural regions. The potential for municipalities to enter into long-term agreements concerning direct allocation could thereby facilitate the establishment of developers also in these (typically weaker) housing markets.

The most obvious imperfection concerning the municipal practice of direct allocation quite naturally relate to this method's transparency. The lack of a preceding and formal comparison of developers foregoing the assignment evidently opens up for (at least) suspicions of corruption and nepotism. Direct allocations accordingly, as opposed to the other assigning methods, embed a greater risk of arbitrariness and abuse of power. There is additionally a possibility that developers' – by simply recognizing these 'risks' – hesitate from criticizing municipalities in general out of fear that criticism might affect future assignments. To regularly seek land and actively propose projects without any guarantees is thereto costly and as with the other methods direct allocations seems to favor financially strong developers in particular. Without a broader comparison of developers (and their individual proposals) prior to assignment there is moreover unavoidable that more optimal projects occasionally gets neglected. Land allocations assigned through direct allocations might furthermore, alike competitions, create a municipal 'lock-in' with a specific developer if an attached project is highly customized.

3.4 Final remarks

Municipal land has evidently been a vital Swedish housing component for decades. The lack of (research) attention targeted at the disposal procedure of this highly essential 'building block' is thus rather noteworthy. It is however possible to, at least partially, attribute this previous absence of

⁵⁷ The time-period between first proposal and formal assignment could however be rather extensive. A formal assignment moreover typically requires a preceding agreement between municipality and developer concerning the price (and how it is to be indexed).

interest in land allocations to the contextual setting that up until the early 1990s ascribed the disposal procedure a more humble function. While the disposal procedure previously aimed primarily at simply distributing buildable plots (i.e. already regulatory planned land) to State-subsidized developers at cost price levels, the return of a more market-oriented housing system have added a distinct monetary aspect to all land allocation. This 'new' land value dimension has substantially affected not only the role, but also the view on the municipal land for developers and municipalities alike. A parallel transition from a plan-led planning practice into a more developer-led has thereto re-shaped the function of the disposal procedure (and analogously the land allocation system) into one that – rather than 'just' distribute – aims to in a collaborative manner create implementable development rights. An early interaction between municipalities and developers, prior to the planning process, has thereby become somewhat of an implicit necessity.

Among the merits with Swedish land allocation system, as it is generally practiced at present, is that it offers a possibility to adapt each project after the often contrarious interests that exists between municipalities and developers. It is thereby possible to in land allocations incorporate necessary demands of both stakeholders – prior to a development right being regulatory framed and any land transferred. The system thereto – while preventing the launching of futile projects – enables municipalities to, if wanted; absorb a developer's creativity, competence and financial strength. A land allocation's option-structure combined with all actual land transfers' being dependent on a legally binding (and agreed) development right, i.e. a municipal planning veto', additionally creates an environment with clear incentives to co-operate.

Moving over to the developer selection each of the four discerned assigning methods proposes individual merits and demerits from a municipality perspective. Hence the auction method constitute a transparent and less resource demanding procedure for assigning land allocations, whereas both competition methods ads a possibility to further guide the details in a project – but at the expense of a more costly procedure. Direct allocations simultaneously offer a fairly time- and less resource demanding opportunity to rely more on active developers proposing projects that could be simply rejected or accepted on more non-transparent terms. Their respective rationale seems to moreover explain the commonly applied practice among municipalities to alternate between different assigning methods when assigning land allocations. However, important underlying issues targeting all assignments independently of method concerns the rather abstract nature of a land allocation and thereto the often unavoidable tradeoff between conflicting municipal aspirations. It is therefore crucial to carefully consider how each individual method, as well as the mixture of utilized methods, not only inhibit opportunistic behavior and stimulate a competition on the municipal land market – but also how it enables municipalities to encourage and absorb developer creativity. It is finally fundamental to reflect over the weighting between resource consumption and transparency in each assignment.

4 Municipal land – integration tool

This chapter's main objective (i.e. ROIII) is to illuminate a mainly overlooked dimension of the municipal landownership and the disposal practice combined – namely its potential and ability to affect housing outcomes even after a project has been physically implemented.⁵⁸ A well thought-out utilization of the municipal landownership and land allocations could thereby affect not only what is to be built – but also for whom it is built. Municipal land can accordingly function as an integration tool by enabling housing opportunities for a variety of different income groups, and thereby ease a socio-economic mixture within neighborhoods. This particular linkage between municipal landownership and housing will be elaborated upon in section 4.1. In section 4.2 it is thereafter investigated whether this 'hidden' potential seems to be utilized in practice (RQ5) – by focusing on the geographical distribution of apartment tenures in land allocations assigned by the municipality of Stockholm.

4.1 Affecting tenure and social mix patterns

4.1.1 Linkage between social mix and tenure mix in Swedish housing policy

Socially mixed neighborhoods has since long been an embedded and explicit stated housing policy goal in Sweden, and an important component to achieve this has been the adaption of a 'housing mix strategy' (see e.g. Andersson et al., 2010; Bergsten and Holmqvist, 2013; Holmqvist, 2009).⁵⁹ A part in this strategy has in turn aimed at obtaining a mixture of ownership and rental housing – i.e. a tenure mix – stretching all the way down at individual neighborhood levels. A fair tenure mix within a specific neighborhood is accordingly intended to enable housing opportunities independent of income – while only the type of tenure will be dependent on income. The main responsibility for the implementation of this housing mix strategy has moreover been decentralized from the State. It is thus assumed that Sweden's 290 municipalities are capable to shoulder the responsibility for achieving and maintaining a balanced tenure mix throughout their administrative borders. In practice however, the legal instrument they have been empowered with (or/and their ambitions to achieve a social mix) seems insufficient as increased polarization between income groups can be observed (see section 1.1.). While it is not necessarily causality between this evolvement and an unbalanced tenure mix it is nonetheless evident that many neighborhoods are dominated by a particular tenure. It is thereto clear that these tenure imbalances have started to be seen as a quite severe problem in many municipalities.

4.1.2 Linkage between tenure mix and (municipal) landownership

Before turning focuses to the potential of landownership – in terms of affecting the tenure mix composition – it needs to be explained which tenures that are to be mixed, as well as, how existing planning legislation could support municipalities. Starting with the different tenures they could a bit simplified be divided into four types – 'owner-occupied', 'cooperatives', 'private rental' and 'public rental'. Among these the first two types necessities a down payment and could be categorized as ownership. Both these types are moreover tradable on the open market and typically owner-occupied

⁵⁸ Bodström (1994) constitutes a rare (and exhaustive) example of when this dimension of the municipal landownership in Sweden is targeted scientifically.

⁵⁹ I should here be noted that 'social mix' in a Swedish housing policy sense primarily has targeted a socio-economic mix whereas demographical and ethnic aspects have (at least previously) been of less significance.

housing concerns individually owned single-family housing or row-houses, whereas cooperatives generally adheres to jointly⁶⁰ owned multi-family housing. The two remaining types are accordingly forms of rental, which in almost all cases concerns apartments in multi-family housing. These two rental types – mainly characterized by the landlord being a private or municipal (i.e. public) company – are essentially the same in terms of the economic environment guiding new construction and the tenant-attractiveness are in both cases based primarily on their respective location (see e.g. Magnusson and Turner, 2008). There is however (often) one crucial deviation between private rentals and public rentals that justifying them being treated separately. Whereas both types lack an upper level mean testing – i.e. both types are eligible for all income groups – their respective (minimum) income requirements typically differ. This generally enables private landlords to in practice exclude income groups in the lower segment from private rental apartments. Simultaneously, this imposes a ‘supplementary’ responsibility for in particular these income groups on the municipal land lords, and in turn their stock of public rentals. A somewhat concealed effect of this is that a genuine social mix down on neighborhood levels necessitates not only the mere existence of rental alternatives – but rather public rentals in particular. Moving over to the municipalities statutory powers it has been accentuated several times in preceding chapters that they all possess a ‘planning monopoly’. This essentially empower each municipality with a capability to solely guide all new developments in terms of when and where they are to be allowed, and how they should implemented. It thereby enables municipalities to decide which land within their border that is suitable for housing projects and where other types of land use activities are wanted. It moreover enables them to decide the scale of all projects. However, and of particular interest from a tenure mix perspective, neither planning monopoly nor other planning legislation entitles municipalities mandate to determine tenure for housing. An ‘inclusionary housing’-schemes – relying on a regulatory planning framework – in line with practice in many countries (see e.g. De Kam et al., 2014) could accordingly not be utilized in order to affect the tenure mix balance in Sweden. This ‘tenure-privilege’ is instead – and alike the implementation right (see section 1.1 and 2.1.1.2) – inserted in the ownership of the land. The ownership aspect thereby becomes cardinal for every municipality with an ambition to align with national housing policy goals concerning a mixture of tenures.

Conveniently, and as clarified in chapter 2, many Swedish municipalities possess considerable landholdings considered suitable for housing. All these municipalities accordingly have the capability to implement a tenure mix policy and thereby effectively affect existing tenure imbalances.⁶¹ Dependent on extent and localization of their landownership they might furthermore have capacity to affect it on neighborhood levels. Practically, this is done through the land disposal procedure and by – while acknowledging present tenure compositions – inflicting the ideal tenure as an ‘embedded

⁶⁰ A tenant, or ‘owner’, in a cooperative is theoretically a shareholder in a ‘housing association’ that in turn is the juridical owner of a physical building. The share entitles to a defined space – i.e. an apartment – and a transfer of a share accordingly corresponds with a transfer of a specific apartment.

⁶¹ As elaborated upon Paper IV, facilitating tenure conversions from rental to ownership could thereto be utilized by municipalities in order to ‘correct’ existing tenure imbalances.

condition' (see section 3.2.1) in all their assigned land allocations.⁶² In order to maintain (or achieve) a 'genuine mix' including a fair share of public rentals it is moreover pivotal to ensure the presence of municipal landlords in all neighborhoods. Usually this is analogous with a balanced distribution of land allocations assigned to municipal developers – making this somewhat of a secondary requirement in order to stimulate a true socio-economical mix.

4.2 Affecting tenure and social mix patterns – the case of Stockholm

As discussed above, municipal landownership incorporates a possibility to affect the tenure balance in a municipality, and thereby also a potential to guide the urban environment in terms of its future population. Below it is investigated whether this potential in the landownership seems to be utilized in the municipality of Stockholm, the capital of Sweden. This based on all roughly 50 000 apartments⁶³, that have been channeled through land allocations in Stockholm between the years 2002-2012. Methodically⁶⁴ the tenure, location and developer (municipal or private)⁶⁵ of all apartments have been registered and combined with a data set for 128⁶⁶ individual neighborhoods of Stockholm. This latter data set contain yearly information on current numbers of private rental, public rental and ownership apartments in the housing stock and thus enabled a statistical study.

4.2.1 Preconditions and ambitions

Stockholm's landownership amounts to roughly 70 percent of all the land within its administrative borders and the central prerequisites for maintain and stimulating a tenure mix seems thereby to be fulfilled.⁶⁷ It is moreover evident that their land is used extensively for housing, as it is approximated that around 80 percent of all new housing in the municipality originates from their landholdings.⁶⁸ While primarily relying on private developers to produce ownership (mainly cooperatives) and private rental apartments Stockholm thereto possesses three municipal developers that enables them to secure a supply of public rentals.

Of significant importance from a tenure mix perspective, Stockholm thereto aligns with national housing policy and has since many years, following a superior goal to mitigate segregation, officially declared an ambition of balance and mix of tenures throughout the municipality (see e.g. Stockholm, 2007; Stockholm, 2009; Stockholm, 2014). This ambition should likewise be reflected upon in their land allocations practice (Stockholm, 2014). Additionally and partially embedded in this ambition, Stockholm has delegated its three municipal developers a specific task to increase the number of

⁶² It should here be noted that for land allocations concerning rental apartments, many municipalities convey the land through site-leasehold (see note 14 and 20) rather than a regular sale in order to ensure (through the site-leasehold agreement) that an assigned developer or succeeding landlord do not initiate a conversion.

⁶³ The extremely few land allocations in Stockholm concerning other types of housing than apartments have here been left out.

⁶⁴ See Chapter 1 and Paper IV for more on the methodology and data.

⁶⁵ In the municipality of Stockholm an assignment to a municipal developer, nearly unexceptionally, equals a municipal landlord and vice versa for private developers.

⁶⁶ It can here be noted that three of Stockholm's 131 administrative neighborhoods were omitted due to absence of existing housing.

⁶⁷ It should be acknowledged that a not insignificant part of the landownership already is used by buildings (often through site-leaseholds), infrastructure and green areas. This does however not exclude the possibility that even this type of municipal land being utilized for land allocations (see e.g. section 3.2.4 and 3.3.2.4).

⁶⁸ See also section 3.1.3 for current information on Stockholm's utilization of land allocations.

public rentals in neighborhoods where the share of this particular type is low (Stockholm, 2015). Focusing on new construction of apartments originating from municipal land this would imply a land allocation practice that acknowledges present imbalances of rental and ownership apartments among neighborhoods – which in many cases are evident (see e.g. figure 8). The land allocation practice should thereto consider specifically the presence of public rental apartments.




Fig. 8 Distribution of rental and ownership apartments in included neighborhoods, with those being on the 45 degree line having an equal tenure balance.

With the described context in regards, the following hypotheses were formulated to test whether Stockholm seems to align with its ambition concerning a balanced tenure mix throughout its urban landscape, and thereby utilize their landholding and land allocations as an integration tool:

- Stockholm acts in accordance with its ambition of having a mixture of tenures within all its neighborhoods – as showed by a land allocation practice not impairing current mix
- Stockholm acts to promote its ambition of having a mixture of tenures within all its neighborhoods – as showed by a land allocation practice further compensating for historic imbalances
- Stockholm utilizes its own housing developers to stimulate a mixture of tenure within all its neighborhoods – as showed by a land allocation practice considering particularly the distribution of existing public rentals

4.2.2 Result and discussion

Table 1 Statistical result on the allocation of tenure types.

Variable	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV	
<i>Tenure</i>	<i>New Ownership</i>		<i>New Rental</i>		<i>New Private Rental</i>		<i>New Public Rental</i>	
	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>p-value</i>	<i>Coeff</i>	<i>p-value</i>
<i>Distance</i>	-0.036	(0.532)	-0.080**	(0.026)	-0.044	(0.391)	-0.073**	(0.019)
<i>Rental Dominance</i>	0.330	(0.260)	0.093	(0.761)	-0.090	(0.750)	0.222	(0.384)
<i>Rental</i>	-	-	-0.0002*	(0.005)	-	-	-	-
<i>Private Rental</i>	-0.0005*	(0.002)	-	-	-0.0003**	(0.013)	-0.0003*	(0.000)
<i>Public Rental</i>	-0.0002***	(0.070)	-	-	-0.0000	(0.737)	-0.0002**	(0.041)
<i>Ownership</i>	0.0004***	(0.052)	-0.0000	(0.950)	-0.0000	(0.562)	0.0001	(0.311)
<i>Low Income</i>	0.0005*	(0.000)	0.0002**	(0.034)	0.0004*	(0.006)	-0.0000	(0.502)
<i>Low-Middle Income</i>	0.0000	(0.919)	0.0000	(0.815)	-0.0003	(0.187)	0.0002	(0.240)
<i>Middle-High Income</i>	-0.0006**	(0.045)	0.0000	(0.859)	0.0001	(0.747)	-0.0004	(0.240)
<i>High Income</i>	0.0007	(0.211)	-0.0006	(0.157)	-0.0001	(0.737)	-0.0004	(0.332)
<i>Total Population</i>	-0.0001*	(0.005)	-0.0000	(0.177)	-0.0000	(0.235)	0.0000	(0.442)
<i>Constant</i>	4.99*	(0.000)	5.67*	(0.000)	5.17*	(0.000)	5.47*	(0.000)
<i>N</i>	1280		1280		1280		1280	
<i>N(zeros)</i>	1100		1119		1198		1180	
<i>Wald chi-square</i>	47.93	(0.000)	16.75	(0.052)	20.43	(0.025)	43.03	(0.000)
<i>Log pseudolikelihood</i>	-9513.55		-8132.79		-3129.44		-3514.46	

(Note: *, ** and *** represent significance and the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. p-values within parenthesis)

Concerning the first hypothesis, table 1 reveals some contradicting evidence. As the results of model I suggest, Stockholm allocates fewer ownership apartments to neighborhoods with an over-representation of rental apartments (public or private). The results of model I moreover reveal that the more rental apartments (regardless of public or private), the fewer ownership apartments seems to be allocated, while simultaneously an inverse relationship holds for ownership apartments. This contradicts an outspoken ambition towards tenure mix in all neighborhoods. However, as particularly construction of ownership apartment is dependent on (interested) private developers the municipality is hardly solely responsible in this case. As for model II, it shows some evidence speaking for the first hypothesis and rental apartments seems accordingly to be allocated at a lesser extent to neighborhoods that have many apartments of this type. The results do however not indicate any relation between the number of ownership apartments and corresponding amount of allocated rental apartments. Moving over to the second hypothesis, it is the coefficients for Rental Dominance in each model that are of interest. Here the coefficients in Model I and III has the sign that would be expected if Stockholm were compensating. The coefficients are however not significantly different from zero in any of the models and there is thereby no statistical evidence of a visible compensation strategy making up for historical imbalances. Finally the results in table 1 do show some support for the third hypothesis as Stockholm seems to at least partially acknowledge the share of public rental apartments in their assignments of land allocations to municipal developers. This as the 'negative' effect of already existing rental apartments have significant coefficient for both private and public rental in model IV. It is however not a significant positive relation with respect to ownership apartments, as would be reasonable (and possible) given the combined force of municipal developers and landownership. A rather controversial, but yet plausible, factor explaining this is strictly economical and more specifically targets land values.

This following current policy documents guiding land allocations in Stockholm that stipulates land for ownership apartments being sold whereas land for rentals (private as well as public) is to be conveyed through site-leasehold – i.e. leased (Stockholm, 2010). In turn this implicates an instant, often substantial, payment in the first case and a more moderate and periodic payment in the second. It is at least assumable that this could induce (short-termed) politicians to favor ownership over rentals of any type whenever land values are high – as typically for neighborhoods characterized by a high share of ownership apartments.

To sum up, the investigation reveals that Stockholm's tenure mix ambition seems to be at least partially reflected in their land allocation practice. Although no support for a compensation strategy could be found new ownership- and rental apartments appear to be distributed fairly even among neighborhoods and observed deviations appear to be related with obstacles primarily outside of municipal control. Likewise allocation of public rental apartments seems to acknowledge current housing stock and thereby prevent an increased agglomeration of this type. Altogether this indicates that in Stockholm – the municipal landownership is utilized at least partially in order to facilitate a social mix. However, by recalling from section 4.1.2 that the public rental apartment type is pivotal for income groups in the lower segment it could be questioned whether not assignments of land allocations to municipal developers should be utilized more extensively in some neighborhoods.

5 Concluding discussion

Following chapter 2 it seems rather uncontroversial to assert that municipal landownership had – and will remain to have – a major impact on the supply of housing in Sweden. Housing as well as other types of developments originating from land owned or controlled by different forms of public authorities, acting on local, regional or state level, is moreover far from a strictly Swedish phenomenon (see e.g. Louw, 2008; Verhage, 2001, 2003; Bonneville, 2005; Monk et al., 2013 for Netherlands and France, Lahdenperä, 2009; Viitanen et al., 2003; Havel, 2009 for Finland and Poland, Fisher et al., 2007; Admas et al., 2012 for England, Røsnes, 2005 for Norway, Bogason et al., 2008 for Denmark, Eidelman, 2016 for Canada, Turk and Korthals Altes, 2010 for Turkey, El Araby, 2003 for Egypt, Cai et al., 2013; Du et al., 2011 for China, Ooi et al., 2011; Yuen, 2009; Haila, 2000 for Singapore and Ching and Fu, 2003; Chiu, 2007; Hui et al., 2014 for Hong Kong). It is thereby, while acknowledging that the extent and type of the public landownership might vary substantially, evident that different forms of distribution-systems' that guides the supply of 'public' land to selected developers exists in many countries. It is thereto obvious that the land disposal procedures in each individual country most certainly display its own set of context-specific characteristics. However, and in contrast to what can be observed elsewhere, the Swedish land disposal procedure, i.e. the land allocations system, seems to distinguish itself in one major aspect.⁶⁹ This aspect concerns the general lack of regulatory planning conditions at the time a developer gets attached to a project (i.e. assigned a land allocation). As furthermore clarified in in chapter 3, this incorporates a noteworthy possibility to in each project absorb and capitalize indispensable demands from both the municipality – carrying greatest responsibility for the planning – and the developer – who is in primary charge of the implementation. The Swedish land disposal procedure thus facilitates a noticeable flexibility in projects and thereto mitigates the risk of subsequent 'implementation gaps' (see section 3.2.4). This elaborated practice seems to in turn have affected the developer selection, i.e. the municipal utilization of assigning methods. Here many Swedish municipalities rely predominately on direct allocations, rather than any method under the tender approach which seem to constitute established practice abroad (see e.g. Blake and Collins, 2004; Fisher et al., 2007; Peng and Thibodeau, 2012; Zheng and Kahn, 2008). Aside from many municipalities emphasizing substantially higher costs associated with auctions, or any forms of competition, these methods are considered to impede the flexibility in land allocations. Simply the 'insight' that an adequate project-proposal might be 'rewarded' with a direct allocation is thereto considered to create incentives for developers to actively – and independently – scan a municipality's landholding. While acknowledging the merits with direct allocation, it is nevertheless impossible to ignore the transparency issue which constitutes its main deficiency. As this issue moreover alone seems to restrain public authorities abroad from utilizing this type of assigning method, it is at the very least possible to question all municipalities in Sweden that relies solely on direct allocations in their land allocation systems. Moving over to an adjacent subject, it is pivotal for all municipalities to, regardless of utilized assigning method, carefully consider the effects of embedded conditions (section 3.2.1) in a land allocation and an assignments synchronization with the

⁶⁹ Paper II thereto discusses a number of additional aspects in which the Swedish land allocation system seems to deviate within an international context.

planning process (section 3.2.4). While chapter 4 highlights one highly important dimension derived from the former aspect, it is essentially the latter that dictates whether land allocations will be targeted towards a broad or narrow group of potential developers.

5.1 Considerations and challenges

A consequence traceable to the notion that current land allocation practice, i.e. early assignments, excludes small and mid-sized developers from the municipal land market is that some municipalities more lately have reverted partially to the ‘old’ practice in some projects (see section 3.1.1).⁷⁰ The first interaction between municipality and developer in the development process has thereby essentially been postponed from the planning step to the succeeding implementation step (see model 3 in section 3.1.2). This practice usually hinges on a flexible detailed development plan, and is supposed to reduce both costs and the risk for developers and thereby facilitate increased competition.⁷¹ The sole right to negotiate – i.e. the core in a land allocation – has thereby been transferred one step. Rather than a negotiation concerning a detailed development plan, it is in these cases essentially a negotiation regarding a building permit (that is regulatory framed by a detailed development plan). Whether this practice with inspiration from the past – and were implementation gaps constitute one of the main hazards – will become dominant once again remains to be seen. It can here also be noted that the list of municipal aspirations and requirements targeting projects originating from their land seems to be continuously extended. As many of these requirements are directed at different sustainability factors, which essentially applies to the implementer of a project, it could be questioned whether a postponed interaction with developer increases or decreases the possibility to incorporate them in projects.

Moving over to the landownership, it together with the planning monopoly, undoubtedly equips municipalities with a powerful instrument to direct and control projects through all steps in the development process up until the implementation. As practically all developers, independent of size, are at least partially dependent on recurring land allocations, additionally creates clear incentives for them to implement projects impeccable. There are nonetheless several ethical challenges connected to the double role in many municipalities – being both planning authority and dominating landowner (see e.g. Montgomery, 1987; Needham, 2014; Van Dijk and Van der Vlist, 2015). A municipality’s vested interest in an assigned land allocation might accordingly (and likely often subliminally) result in a down-prioritizing of its planning obligation to likewise consider the public interest at all times. It might further lead to, as acknowledge in section 4.2.2, municipalities getting into rather precarious dilemmas’ when it comes to balance valid economical interest against likewise valid social aspirations (concerning e.g. a fair mix of tenures). With all long-termed developers strong dependence on municipalities as planning authorities, in all projects, and thereto landowners, in many projects, might thereto fuel an environment in which the former part refrain from criticizing the latter, as discussed in section 3.3.2.4. All this implicitly highlights the importance of transparency when it comes to how a

⁷⁰ As for now, this practice seems to correspond mainly to larger greenfield developments intended to involve several developers. It is moreover typical that this practice is combined with any of the methods falling under the tender approach rather than the direct approach (see section 3.3.2).

⁷¹ The risk here pertains particularly to the planning process and the possibility that a project gets withdrawn during the reviewing stage, or through a successful appeal against it (see section 3.2.4.).

municipality manages its landholding, in accordance with officially declared policy goals and aspirations. Naturally this also applies to a municipality's land allocation system and stresses the importance of the decision basis behind each assigned land allocation being publicly available. It should accordingly be simple to trace land allocations to a specific developer and thereto obtain information on both the embedded conditions (price, tenure, scope etc.) and the municipal goals that have guided a particular assignment. Lists over land allocations and assigned developers should thereto be easy accessible, e.g. on a municipality's website, and updated regularly. It should moreover be clear which assigning method that was utilized in each case in order to discern a 'suitable' developer, as well as the underlying rationale for this methodical choice. As for particular land allocations assigned through a direct allocation they should furthermore be accompanied by an at least brief motivation to why a specific developer was selected through this practice.

5.2 Contributions and future research

The seemingly strong linkage between municipal landownership and housing in Sweden, as well as its underlying and historical foundation, constitutes a mainly overlooked subject within existing housing research. This likewise applies to the present supply of municipal land aimed for housing – and then specifically the system that guides it – that up until now seems to have been even less explored in a research setting. The present thesis (more precisely Paper I, II and III) plainly attempt to fill these observed 'gaps'. Accordingly previous (and in some cases still present) main functions of the municipal landownership has been investigated retrospectively and based on State-provided legal instruments and financial support its periodically pivotal role for housing has been elaborated upon. From this account it becomes clear that there is a longstanding linkage between municipal land and housing, and that this have brought about the situation today – i.e. one in which the majority of housing in many municipalities originates from old landholdings. Implicitly, the historical exploration moreover clarifies that the municipal landownership since long has necessitated locally elaborated systems for conveying the land to developers – i.e. land allocation systems. How these systems' presently are structured, is furthermore investigated through an empirical study of current practice. The main components of the land allocation system has been discerned and it has been clarified how the whole disposal procedure nowadays have been heavily integrated with the spatial planning process. A more thorough investigation has thereto been devoted to one fundamental component in the land allocation system – i.e. the developer selection. Besides filling the above mentioned 'gaps' the present thesis (and particular Paper IV) have attempted to further extend existing housing research by illuminating how municipal landownership and land allocations combined (potentially) could facilitate a widespread and socio-economical mix population.

As for future research, several aspects of the land allocation system deserve a more thorough examination. Further research should for example investigate the effects in the long run of levying traditionally municipal planning tasks over to developers. The valuation and pricing practice of land allocations should thereto be further scrutinized. Additionally the effect of land values and its subsequent impact on the housing stock, and in particular the tenure composition, needs to be further investigated.

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Appendix

Questionnaire 1 - Municipalities

1. Hur stor andel mark inom kommunen, lämplig för framtida exploatering av bostäder, ägs av kommunen?

- ☐ 0-20%
- ☐ 21-40%
- ☐ 41-60%
- ☐ 61-80%
- ☐ 81-100%

Kommentar

2. Hur många bostäder har färdigställts i kommunen under åren 2007-2011?

- ☐ 0-200
- ☐ 201-500
- ☐ 501-1000
- ☐ 1001-1500
- ☐ >1500

Kommentar

3. Hur stor andel av de bostäder som har färdigställts under åren 2007-2011 har byggts på mark som ägts av kommunen?

- ☐ 0-20%
- ☐ 21-40%
- ☐ 41-60%
- ☐ 61-80%
- ☐ 81-100%

Kommentar

4. Hur många markanvisningar, med projekt som omfattar fler än 5 bostäder, har kommunen fördelat under åren 2007-2011?

- ☐ 0-10
☐ 11-20
☐ 21-30
☐ 31-40
☐ >40

Kommentar

5. Hur många olika byggherrar har erhållit markanvisning under åren 2007-2011?

- ☐ 0-5
☐ 6-10
☐ 11-15
☐ 16-20
☐ >20

Kommentar

6. Hur många bostäder har de projekt som markanvisats under åren 2007-2011 innefattat totalt?

- ☐ 0-200
☐ 201-500
☐ 501-1000
☐ 1001-1500
☐ >1500

Kommentar

7. Vilken/vilka av följande metoder har kommunen använt då byggherrar tilldelats markanvisningar under åren 2007-2011?

- ☐ Direktanvisning
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat enbart på betalningsvilja
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat på betalningsvilja och andra parametrar
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande med förbestämt markpris (dvs. baserat på andra parametrar än betalningsvilja)
- ☐ Annan metod

Kommentar

8. Hur ofta har de olika metoderna använts under åren 2007-2011?

	0-20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	81-100%
Direktanvisning	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Anbudsförfarande baserat enbart på betalningsvilja	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Anbudsförfarande baserat på betalningsvilja och andra parametrar	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Anbudsförfarande med förbestämt markpris (dvs. baserat på andra parametrar än betalningsvilja)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Annan metod	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Kommentar

9. Vilken metod anser kommunen fungerar bäst för att nya/mindre byggherrar ska kunna etablera sig?

- ☐ Direktanvisning
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat enbart på betalningsvilja
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat på betalningsvilja och andra parametrar
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande med förbestämt markpris (dvs. baserat på andra parametrar än betalningsvilja)
- ☐ Annan metod

Kommentar

10. Vilken metod anser kommunen vara den enklaste att arbeta med?

- ☐ Direktanvisning
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat enbart på betalningsvilja
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande baserat på betalningsvilja och andra parametrar
- ☐ Anbudsförfarande med förbestämt markpris (dvs. baserat på andra parametrar än betalningsvilja)
- ☐ Annan metod

Kommentar

11. Har kommunen något helägt bolag vars verksamhet består av förvaltning, inköp och/eller försäljning av mark för ny bebyggelse?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

12. Hur lång tid går det vanligen från initiering av ett projekt till att det sker en formell markanvisning (dvs. beslut i någon kommunal nämnd, kommunstyrelse etc.)?

- ☐ 0-3 månader
- ☐ 4-6 månader
- ☐ 7-12 månader
- ☐ >12 månader

Kommentar

13. När, i relation till detaljplaneprocessen, tilldelas vanligen en byggherre markanvisningen för ett projekt?

- ☐ Innan arbetet med detaljplan påbörjats
- ☐ Tidigt under arbetet med detaljplan
- ☐ Senare under arbetet med detaljplan
- ☐ Efter det att detaljplan vunnit laga kraft

Kommentar

14. För ett större exploateringsområde - föredrar kommunen "större" markanvisningar (och färre involverade byggherrar) eller "mindre" markanvisningar (och fler involverade byggherrar)?

- ☐ Större markanvisningar
- ☐ Mindre markanvisningar

Kommentar

15. Vilken betydelse har följande parametrar vid tilldelning av markanvisning?

	Ingen betydelse	Liten betydelse	Stor betydelse	Avgörande betydelse
Byggherren har utnyttjade markanvisningar/byggrätter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Antal tidigare markanvisningar som en byggherre tilldelats	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Aktivt sökande av markanvisningar	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Byggherrens egna markinnehav	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Byggherrens betalningsvilja	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Kommentar

16. Underlättar kommunen markanvisningsförfarandet på något sätt för att nya/mindre byggherrar ska kunna etablera sig?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

17. Använder kommunen något/några av följande "incitament" för att få byggherrar att genomföra markanvisade projekt inom viss tid efter lagakraftvunnen detaljplan?

- ☐ Köp villkorat med byggstart
- ☐ "Straffavgifter" för outnyttjade byggrätter
- ☐ Kort genomförandetid i detaljplanen
- ☐ Annat

Kommentar

18. Har kommunen använt sig av markanvisning som förpliktigar byggherren att bygga i såväl "bra" som "mindre bra" läge?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

19. Skiljer sig markanvisningsförfarandet åt mellan projekt för ägande- och bostadsrätter kontra hyresrätter?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

20. Är det vanligt att omfattningen (t.ex. antalet bostäder) i ett projekt ändras från att markanvisningen ges till antagen detaljplan?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

21. Har allmännyttiga byggherrar någon form av förtur vid tilldelning av markanvisningar?

- ☐ Ja
☐ Nej

Kommentar

22. Hur bestäms markpriset i samband med markanvisning?

- ☐ Egen värdering
☐ Extern värdering
☐ Egen och extern värdering
☐ Annat

Kommentar

23. När bestäms priset på marken?

- ☐ Innan markanvisning
☐ I samband vid markanvisning
☐ Vid överlåtelse av marken
☐ Annat

Kommentar

24. Kopplas markpriset till någon form av index från att priset bestäms fram till överlåtelsen?

- ☐ Ja
☐ Nej

Kommentar

25. Hur framgår det för byggherrarna vilken av kommunens mark som är aktuell för markanvisning?

- ☐ Via hemsida
- ☐ Via kommunala styrdokument (översiktsplan, bostadsförsörjningsplan etc.)
- ☐ Framgår på annat sätt
- ☐ Framgår inte

Kommentar

26. Förs någon form av dokumentation (t.ex. register) över vilka byggherrar som ansökt och eller tilldelats markanvisningar?

- ☐ Både de som ansökt och tilldelats
- ☐ Bara de som tilldelats
- ☐ Bara de som ansökt
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

27. Finns det några kommunala styrdokument (mallar, markpolicys etc.) för hantering och försäljning av kommunens mark?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

28. Är de kommunala styrdokumenterna tillgängliga via kommunens hemsidan?

- ☐ Ja samtliga
- ☐ Ja vissa
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

29. Har kommunen en bostadsförsörjningsplan eller motsvarande dokument?

☐ Ja

☐ Nej

Kommentar

Questionnaire 2 – Developers

1. Företagsnamn (frivillig uppgift)

2. Hur många markanvisningar har ni sökt under de senaste fem åren?

- ☐ 0
☐ 1-4
☐ 5-10
☐ >10

Kommentar

3. Hur många markanvisningar har ni tilldelats under de senaste fem åren?

- ☐ 0
☐ 1-4
☐ 5-10
☐ >10

Kommentar

4. Hur stort antal lägenheter har ni tilldelats via markanvisning under de senaste 5 åren?

- ☐ 0
☐ 1-20
☐ 21-50
☐ 51-100
☐ >100

Kommentar

5. Har ni sökt markanvisning i flera kommuner och i så fall hur många?

- ☐ Ja, i 2-5
- ☐ Ja, i 5-10
- ☐ Ja, i >10
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

6. Har ni tilldelats markanvisning i flera kommuner?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

7. Skiljer sig kommunernas markanvisningssystem åt vad gäller t.ex. bedömningskriterier och tilldelningsmetoder?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

8. Om ja; utgör skillnaderna i kommunernas markanvisningssystem ett problem?

- ☐ Ja
- ☐ Nej

Kommentar

Hur väl stämmer följande påståenden in på er bild av kommunen/kommunernas markanvisningssystem och deras tillämpning av detta?

9. Markanvisningssystemet fungerar överlag bra - den kommunala marken hanteras på ett rationellt sätt

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

10. Markanvisningssystemet är transparent - det är enkelt att förstå vilka kriterier som är avgörande vid tilldelning

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

11. Markanvisningssystemet är positivt för konkurrensen i byggbranshen - alla byggherrar ges möjlighet att ansöka och nya byggherrar ges möjlighet att etablera sig

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

12. Goda kontakter med politiker och tjänstemän är av stor betydelse för att tilldelas mark via markanvisning

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

13. Tidigare genomförda projekt är av stor betydelse vid tilldelning av markanvisning

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

14. Markanvisningssystemet är för resurskrävande – höga kostnader i samband med ansökningar utgör ett hinder

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

15. Vissa byggherrar prioriteras framför andra med likvärdig kompetens

- ☐ Instämmer helt
- ☐ Instämmer till stora delar
- ☐ Instämmer till mindre delar
- ☐ Instämmer inte alls

Kommentar

16. Övriga kommentarer