THE GOVERNMENT’S BUSINESS?

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The engagement of Swedish industry in the Liberian American–Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO), which mined iron in Liberia between 1963 and 1989, was the largest Swedish commercial investment in Africa during the Cold War. In this paper I investigate how political and administrative actors of the Swedish government conceptualized the link between private and public interests in the context of LAMCO’s operations, and how this shaped Swedish government policy towards the company and Liberia. I identify two phases: a phase of almost unanimous political support for LAMCO and close Swedish–Liberian relations from ca. 1955 to 1965, and a more fragmented phase following 1965, during which LAMCO was increasingly understood as a political liability. My findings show how business interests could figure into Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War, highlighting the coherence with which Swedish industry and government acted in relation to the commercial interests in Liberia before ca. 1965, but also the lack of coherence – between government and industry as well as within the state apparatus – that followed the turn to a more activist policy after the mid-1960s.

Keywords Sweden, Liberia, LAMCO, development, foreign policy, developing countries, Cold War

Introduction
The Liberian American–Swedish Minerals Company (LAMCO) operated in Liberia from the mid-1950s to the end of the 1980s. Resting on an association of Swedish, US, German, and Liberian interests, its business was mining iron ore in Nimba County at the border with Guinea. Operations started in 1963, with the ore primarily being delivered to the United States, Germany, and Japan. At first a profitable endeavour, LAMCO’s futures then waxed and waned with global business cycles. When operations ceased on the eve of the Liberian Civil War in 1989, its owners had recovered their investments but had not made major profits.¹
Though an international consortium, the Swedish investors were the driving forces behind LAMCO, and company operations were wholly organized by the Swedish industrial group Grängesbergsbolaget (Gränges). It was also the largest Swedish commercial investment in Africa during the Cold War by a significant margin. The involved actors understood that this had political significance: in 1960, the Liberian Consul-General (and Gränges staff member) in Stockholm, Wilhelm af Klinteberg, stressed to the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs how Sweden stood to gain from LAMCO, not only in terms of commercial profit but more importantly in terms of goodwill abroad, and that this ‘emphasized the importance’ of Swedish government support for the project.2

The first purpose of this paper is to analyse the development of such connections between Swedish companies’ investments in Liberia and the Swedish state. Presently, we know little about the nature of public–private coordination in Swedish foreign policy in the context of decolonization and the Cold War. The existing literature on government and business interactions in decolonizing Africa is predominantly focused on colonial or superpower agendas. Scholars have, for example, examined the extent to which the British government worked together with British companies to secure market access and continued commercial preponderance after decolonization, and have variously argued both that there was little coordination3 and that there was a clear ‘coherence of purpose’, with the government actively taking steps to protect business interests.4 Businesses have also been analysed as postcolonial tools of diplomacy. Historian Stephanie Decker has demonstrated how the US government was able to use the Kaiser Industries conglomerate as a go-between in Ghana, giving Washington some measure of insight and influence in Accra even as official relations between the two states were strained.5 More specifically concerned with natural resources, Gabrielle Hecht has, furthermore, shown how the French state and private companies acted in concert to secure access to postcolonial resources by framing mining as a development project.6 But the extent to which the Swedish government sought to protect Swedish investments in Cold War Africa or the extent to which it saw such investments as political possibilities remains unknown, as earlier work on Swedish Cold War history has not significantly engaged with this dimension of foreign policy.7

Among this work, the body of scholarship most relevant for the present study is the historiography of the active foreign policy, a term signifying the critical and activist stances in foreign policy that Sweden increasingly took between ca. 1962 and 1980. In this period, Sweden regularly criticized colonialism and superpower interventionism (West and East), emphasized solidarity with the poor and oppressed peoples of the world, and launched an extensive foreign aid programme. Historians have explained this activism along different lines: as being ideologically motivated and undergirded by the international solidarity ideals of Swedish social democracy; as responding to an increasingly radicalized domestic public opinion; and as being grounded in the particulars of Swedish foreign relations, with engagements in and for the developing countries being politically important as ways to transcend the limitations of neutrality and increase the legitimacy of the Swedish stance. In terms of research foci, most work has been directed to high-level policy statements and debates and to the debates on and management of particular political issues, such as the Vietnam War.8 The interaction between policy and Swedish companies doing business in the developing world is rarely highlighted. One exception is the Swedish electro-technical company ASEA’s (Allmänna Svenska Elektriska Aktiebolaget) involvement in the controversial Cabora Bassa hydropower project in Portuguese Mozambique, which led to a major public
controversy in 1968 and 1969. The government found itself torn over the issue, unwilling to abandon the significant economic interests involved yet under severe pressure from critics both within the Social Democratic party and from broad anti-colonial groups outside. ASEA eventually withdrew from the project on its own accord, to the government’s relief.  

Historian Nikolas Glover has also analysed industrial interests in Swedish development aid. There was, Glover suggests, common ground between state and business on aid-related matters in the 1950s and early 1960s, but a distinct change in 1965, when the government made clear to industry representatives that the Swedish aid policy, expressing Swedish solidarity in practice, was not intended to benefit Swedish private interests. Glover explains this shift as a response to the political organization of developing countries: in particular, the formation of the G77 group made it politically problematic that Sweden, though proclaiming its solidarity with the global poor, remained an industrialized country that benefited from what the G77 understood as an unequal economic relationship with the developing world. To help safeguard Swedish legitimacy in the eyes of developing countries, the government thus chose to demarcate its aid programme from Swedish trade interests. Though Glover does not discuss this aspect, the policy shift would likely have been coldly received by many senior civil servants at the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet, UD), whom, memoirs suggest, understood foreign aid in the first instance as a trade policy instrument at the time. This hints at a second notable absence in the earlier research: namely that we know relatively little about how different parts of the Swedish government and civil service contributed to the making of foreign policy vis-à-vis the developing world. There is a tendency in earlier work to portray the state as a monolithic actor, or at least to portray foreign policy-making as wholly dominated by influential politicians. How foreign policy issues were represented by less publicly visible actors within the various parts of the government apparatus, and how policy was made in practice, is not as clear.

As such, the second purpose of the paper is to examine which foreign policy actors took an interest in LAMCO, how and why they did so, and how this shaped the resulting foreign policy vis-à-vis Liberia. This helps decentre the understanding of the state as a uniform foreign policy actor, thus increasing our knowledge of the workings of the public administration tasked with the practical implementation of Swedish policy in the forms of diplomacy and aid. We already know that the move towards the active foreign policy both coincided with and helped produce significant sociocultural change within the Swedish foreign service, and that the administration of the growing foreign aid was a focal point for many of the resulting tensions. As will be clear from the following, studying Liberia and LAMCO makes it possible to see how some of the tensions and contradictions could play out, increasing our understanding of the active foreign policy in practice.

To summarize, the paper has two interconnected aims: to analyse the development of connections between Swedish foreign policy and the Swedish investments in Liberia through LAMCO, and to examine which actors were involved in shaping this policy and how their involvement manifested. This makes two contributions to the literature. One, it increases our knowledge of Swedish foreign policy in the context of decolonizing Africa, specifically as it developed in relation to Swedish business interests. This adds to the Swedish historiography of the active foreign policy, in which the business dimension hitherto has been underexplored. It also
adds to international scholarship on the industry–diplomacy nexus in the context of decolonization, by complementing it with an example pertaining to Western but non-aligned and ‘activist’ Sweden. Two, the study broadens our understanding of how foreign policy was made by demonstrating some of the constituent tensions, between and within government agencies, that shaped it. Of particular importance is that the rise of foreign aid ushered in a new form of political understanding of the developing world as well as a new generation of policy actors, who often found themselves in conflict with an older guard committed to a more traditional understanding of the national interest.

I use archival sources, primarily from UD, to narrate how the Swedish government initially strived to protect and promote Swedish companies’ investments in LAMCO. These efforts formed part of a longer historical trajectory of Swedish foreign policy, originating in the early 1900s when UD was reorganized in response to the needs of the growing export industry. Supporting Swedish commercial interests abroad became one of its key tasks through the first half of the 20th century, a task that shaped its functions and culture and resulted in considerable mutual trust between diplomats and industrialists. But the Swedish government’s interest in LAMCO represents more than a bureaucracy continuing in its tracks. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, most Swedish foreign policy actors understood the company – which was then widely regarded as a positive example of a development-stimulating direct investment – not only as a useful tool to promote Sweden as an investment and trading partner in developing countries (though this was undoubtedly important) but also as a means of promoting a positive image of Sweden as well as of generating legitimacy and sympathy for the particularly Swedish geopolitical position.

From the mid-1960s, Swedish foreign policymaking became considerably more fragmented. With the foreign aid programme came new actors with perspectives that eventually challenged earlier understandings of foreign policy, and the political organization of developing countries created a new policy context that, together with the radicalization of public debate, contributed to changing the cabinet’s priorities. Though many still supported LAMCO, by 1970 the dominant perspective had shifted to one in which the company was a political liability rather than a source of prestige. In the following, I will demonstrate empirically how this shift played out.

LAMCO and Liberia
The development of LAMCO as a business enterprise has been well described in earlier research and is not in focus here, but some details on its background and setting are nonetheless needed. The initial impulse was the interest of US business promoters in the early 1950s to exploit iron ore deposits in Liberia that had been highlighted by surveys carried out within the US Point Four programme. These promoters approached several Swedish companies in their search for partners with mining experience. A driving force in Sweden came to be the Wallenberg family, a Swedish family of bankers and industrialists that, directly or indirectly, controlled major parts of Swedish industry. Stockholms Enskilda Bank (SEB), the family bank, took on a coordinating role, with its interest spearheaded by the bank’s Managing Director, Marcus Wallenberg, the most prominent Swedish industrial leader of his generation. Another driving force was Grängesbergsbolaget, which by 1955 knew it would be
forced to sell its stake in LKAB (Luossavaara-Kiirunavaara Aktiebolag), the company controlling the major ore fields in the far north of Sweden, to the state by 1957. This would free up significant capital for Gränges, part of which it was ready to invest in ventures abroad.

In 1955, SEB (also representing Atlas Copco and Nordströms Linbanor, two other Wallenberg-controlled companies), Gränges, Skånska Cementgjuteriet, Iföverken, and Sentab together formed the Swedish LAMCO Syndicate, a joint Swedish party that then entered into negotiations with other interested parties in Liberia, the United States, and West Germany about the project’s realization. The negotiations were complicated and resulted in a complex financial setup, in part because Swedish legislation limited the Swedish parties’ possibilities of transferring funds from Sweden to Liberia. The resulting corporate structure was dominated by three interests: the Swedish syndicate (in which a majority stake was held by Gränges, although SEB remained eminently influential), the Liberian state, and the US Bethlehem Steel Corporation, with further financing provided from US and German banks. Operatively, things were simpler. The company constructed a mine on the remote Mount Nimba, a mining town called Yekepa at the foot of the mountain, a 250-kilometre railroad from the mine to the Atlantic Ocean, and processing facilities and a harbour at Buchanan on the coast. All were to be operated by the LAMCO Joint Venture Operating Company, a newly created subsidiary of Gränges. All extractive and transport activities in Liberia were thus under Gränges’ direct control, drawing on the company’s extensive experience not only in mining but also in railroad operations and maritime shipping. During the construction phase, close to 12,000 people worked for LAMCO or its contractors; this was reduced to 3,700 when mining started in the mid-1960s. About 15% were salaried expatriates, and these made up 75% of all white-collar workers in the company at that time.18

Liberia was something of a special case in its time, being neither a colonial territory nor a recently independent postcolonial state. It had been independent since 1847 and had retained formal sovereignty through the Scramble for Africa of the late 19th century. It nevertheless shared aspects of the postcolonial experience. Formed by liberated US slaves, Liberia remained through most of the 20th century economically, culturally, and politically dominated by their Americo-Liberian descendants. These constituted an English-speaking elite that shared few interests with the ethnically diverse rural population, whose inhabitation of what became Liberian territory predated the US arrival. By the end of World War II, Liberian president William V. S. Tubman, first elected in 1944 and in power until his death in 1971, had, however, embarked on a project of ‘unification’. This ostensibly strived to integrate all of Liberia’s population into the state, primarily through economic development based on an ‘open-door’ policy of welcoming foreign investments. The mining concession that the government granted LAMCO thus followed a pre-existing pattern, with its most significant predecessor being the US Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, which had established a rubber plantation in the country as early as the 1920s. Liberia was also one of the few African states to staunchly keep to an open-door policy even as decolonization unfolded, and developing countries continued to grow.19
Representing Sweden

When the Swedish LAMCO Syndicate was formed in 1955, UD immediately saw the need to determine what actions should be taken in regard to this potentially major Swedish investment in a country in which Sweden had had few interests before. In October 1955, a ministry memorandum highlighted the interests of Swedish companies in Liberia and the need for them to be ‘provided for as well as possible’. A key form of support, it argued, would be to establish Swedish diplomatic representation in Monrovia. This view was strongly shared and promoted by the industrial interests involved. In 1957, a director at the General Export Association of Sweden (an interest organization and service organ for Swedish companies active abroad) shared with UD his view that while ‘the Swedish effort in Liberia by any measure is extremely important, the question of Swedish representation there is unsolved’. At a meeting in August 1957, the leaders of the LAMCO Syndicate also agreed that they should, in whatever ways they could, promote Swedish representation in Liberia. Internal considerations and external demands thus coincided to make the question of how to represent Sweden in Monrovia increasingly important to UD in the second half of the 1950s. Also, as there was a long history of close coordination between UD and business interests, the two sides generally saw eye to eye on matters like this.

This is attested to by the fact that Gränges’ CEO, Erland Waldenström, participated in a high-level meeting on Swedish representation in Liberia, held at UD in September 1958. On this occasion, Leif Belfrage, the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs – the Minister’s immediate subordinate – explicitly ‘confirmed that the foreign policy leadership were prepared to contribute to the promotion of our economic interests in Liberia’. By this time, UD had decided that Richard Thyberg, the Swedish envoy to Lisbon, should be given side responsibilities as the Swedish representative in Monrovia, and the meeting discussed whether Thyberg should remain an envoy or, as Waldenström preferred, be given the title of ambassador, the highest diplomatic rank. Belfrage noted that if promoting Thyberg would advance Swedish economic interests, then UD would ‘positively’ weigh such a decision against the ‘practical consequences’ it would entail, notably an otherwise unwarranted review of the status of the Swedish envoy to Rabat and Tunis. In the end, Thyberg retained his envoy status when first accredited in Monrovia, but was promoted to ambassador in 1959, becoming the first Swedish diplomat to attain this rank in sub-Saharan Africa.

As the project took clearer shape and its realization grew more likely, LAMCO’s importance thus grew within UD. One aspect of this was the consular demands that would arise out of the great numbers of Swedes that were expected to work for the company, but it is also clear that UD’s political leadership understood the commercial interests in Liberia as Swedish interests and was prepared to support these interests even if this support impacted on other parts of Swedish foreign policy in Africa. Marcus Wallenberg even seems to have been convinced that political support for the project was so strong in the late 1950s that, if need be, the cabinet would override the National Bank’s capital controls and allow a greater measure of direct investments abroad (but, as LAMCO successfully secured international financing, this conviction was never put to the test). In 1961, when LAMCO’s mine, railway, and port all were well under construction, Sweden established a permanent embassy in Monrovia. The cabinet motivated it...
with the ‘considerable Swedish investments’ in Liberia and the large number of Swedes residing in the country, the vast majority being employed by LAMCO or its contractors. But though the question of Swedish representation in Monrovia was intertwined with the Swedish mining investments, there was also a broader political interest in decolonizing West Africa, manifested in the Swedish government getting the Monrovia ambassador accredited in Abidjan, Accra, Conakry, and Freetown as well. This further illustrates how the desire to support the investments in LAMCO affected Swedish foreign policy more broadly. Similar to how UD in 1958 had been ready to promote LAMCO in the face of other ‘practical consequences’ for the Swedish representation in northern Africa, so did the establishment of the embassy in Monrovia in 1961 have implications for Swedish relations with West Africa. Liberia’s near-neighbour Ghana had five times Liberia’s population and was, through its colourful and influential leader Kwame Nkrumah, central to rising discussions on the politics of developing countries. It would have been a considerably more politico-logical choice of location for a second West African embassy (after the more obvious one in Nigeria, also established in 1961) had it not been for LAMCO’s iron mining. The Swedish ambassador to Monrovia, Bo Gunnar Järnstedt, noted as much in a letter to Stockholm in 1962, and reported that he had come to understand ‘that Accra was less than delighted that Ghana, from our perspective […] comes under Liberia’.

Other foreign policy issues were thus subordinated to the economic interests that had put Liberia at the centre of Swedish West African concerns.

One of the main tasks for the Swedish diplomats in Monrovia in the early 1960s was to represent the Swedish government in various contexts tied to the industrial investments. A major event took place in December 1962 when a Swedish delegation of industry leaders, both with ties to LAMCO and representing other major interests, visited Liberia. Järnstedt reported to Stockholm that the stay had been ‘very successful’ as it had highlighted the broad Swedish involvement in LAMCO, an involvement that ‘maybe more than anything else’ had ‘increased Swedish prestige’ in West Africa. He also noted how LAMCO, and other international investments, would ‘give Liberia a solid foundation for relatively fast and comprehensive economic development’.

Even more prominent was the ceremony that marked LAMCO’s start of production, held in Yekepa in November 1963 in the presence of numerous dignitaries, including Erland Waldenström and Marcus Wallenberg, President Tubman and his vice-president William Tolbert, and Prince Bertil of Sweden. The embassy helped coordinate the planning: Järnstedt proposed themes for Wallenberg’s speech, promised to arrange for him to be received by Tubman, and expressed how he looked forward with ‘joy’ to meeting the industrial leaders and participating in the inauguration of the ‘great’ LAMCO project. Prince Bertil’s presence helped give a royal sheen to the ceremonies which was appreciated by the Liberians, and after the inauguration Järnstedt reported with satisfaction that there was ‘no other way in which the Swedish participation in the LAMCO project could have been so effectively accentuated’. Much as he had in the report on the earlier delegation, Järnstedt emphasized how this participation meant that LAMCO had ‘fortified Swedish prestige both in Liberia and far beyond its borders’. He also highlighted the ‘decisive importance of the Swedish efforts’ and how the end results of these efforts bore ‘witness to Swedish entrepreneurial initiative, far-sightedness, and technical knowledge’.

Such statements implied that it was through the particular expertise in mining, construction, and
railway technologies embodied in Swedish companies that the remote ore-body at Nimba had been connected to global markets, for the mutual benefit of Liberia and Sweden. This also meant a political victory for President Tubman, whose open-door policy had secured the largest foreign investments to date, and Järnstedt had suggested that Wallenberg should mention both the open-door policy and the unification policy it was to fund in his speech.

Neither the establishment of a new embassy nor the recurring diplomatic representation of Swedish qualities in a country in which major private investments were underway were uncommon or unexpected policy actions as such. UD’s main purpose was to look after Swedish interests abroad and, as its leadership understood it at the time, these interests were often predominantly commercial. In contexts like Liberia, where there were few other pressing political or security concerns, promoting Swedish trade and industry was thus the key task. What nonetheless was special with the Liberian case was the direct coordination of foreign policy initiatives with a particular private interest. The problem of Swedish representation in Monrovia had been formulated and solved exclusively in the context of LAMCO, and it seems clear that UD believed that an association with LAMCO could help the Swedish government reach other political goals in Africa and beyond. This view of LAMCO as both economically and politically valuable to Sweden is arguably the key as to why the project had near-unanimous support among foreign policy actors at the time, up to and including Prime Minister Tage Erlander: according to an SEB memo from November 1964, Erlander expressed his satisfaction with the ‘daring Swedish initiative’ that he considered a ‘recognized success that brought our country great credit abroad’ during dinner party conversation.

That LAMCO was seen as bringing prestige and credit to Sweden rested on a conceptualization of mining as development: an understanding of Swedish companies’ capital investments and expert deployments in iron mining as promoting the development of Liberian society. This trope was by no means invented by Swedish diplomats or industrialists, but had long been evoked by industrialized nations seeking access to resources abroad. In the 1960s, it could also function as a way to negotiate tensions between postcolonial states’ desire for resource autonomy and continued resource interests by former metropoles. Sweden, whose relationship with Liberia had never been colonial, framed its interests in similar ways but for other purposes: it promoted a uniquely positive role in the developing world for itself that combined technical expertise with apparent political disinterest, simultaneously drawing on and legitimizing Swedish geopolitical neutrality. An example can be found in a report from the Swedish embassy in Washington, D.C., in which the ambassador reported with satisfaction that LAMCO ‘often is treated with flattering interest by the American press’, as an instance of support to developing countries that did not provoke discussions of ‘interventions into national autonomy or colonialism’. It was instead understood as a form of politically neutral and mutually beneficial economic assistance: a few years later, Swedish diplomat Bengt Rösiö argued that LAMCO had given Liberia ‘capital, economic stimulation, and [...] access to an infrastructure of railroads, ports, mines and education that will remain even if Lamco does not’. This reasoning also cohered with views advanced both by the Swedish industrial interests and by the Liberian government throughout the 1960s: Swedish expertise and technology, channelled through LAMCO, would help Liberia modernize. More broadly, it rested on a
core premise of modernization theory, namely that the provision of technological skills and industrial rationality were keys to development. This made the involvement of private industry crucial, and the Swedish diplomats argued (with politicians like Erlander seemingly agreeing) that if Swedish industry, framed as standing apart from superpower interests and colonial legacies, could come to be associated with development processes, then Sweden would derive international prestige that could be used as leverage for other political ends. Representing Sweden in Liberia was thus important to support LAMCO, not only for economic reasons but also because if LAMCO succeeded, then it would itself be representing Sweden and Swedish qualities in a new global arena.

This reasoning successfully combined a pre-existing foreign policy logic that afforded primacy to commercial interests with a new framing of a non-colonial and neutral Sweden having a special role to play in the postcolonial world, and that made it appealing to most diplomats and policymakers at the time. But by the early 1960s it was already on track to be challenged by the rise of foreign aid, another way for Sweden to relate to non-industrialized areas of the globe that potentially came with its own logics, goals, and ideas about international prestige.

The instrument of aid
Swedish foreign aid has its roots in the provision of scholarships and multilateral cooperation from the late 1940s, with the first bilateral agreements signed in 1952 and a more comprehensive aid policy following a decade later. In these early stages, industrial interests were clearly taken into account. Representatives of industry participated in the ‘Sverige Hjälper’ inquiry, which, in 1959, presented proposals for an extended bilateral aid programme and used trade interests as one of its criteria for selecting projects. The 1962 government bill that outlined the first political guidelines for Swedish aid was also cautiously positive to what it called ‘commercial aid’, defined as public measures intended to stimulate commercially motivated efforts in developing countries by private industry. And when, in 1964, the Swedish Students’ UN Association argued for an increased alignment of Swedish development aid with business interests, it found support for this view not only from major companies but also from Arne Björnberg and Per-Erik Rönquist, the Secretary-General and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Swedish Agency for International Assistance (Namnend för internationellt bistånd, NIB), the newly formed government agency charged with administering the expanding Swedish foreign aid.

This widely shared understanding brought LAMCO – by far the most significant Swedish investment in the developing countries at the time – into the aid debate. The end result was the most public way in which private interests and foreign policy coincided in Liberia: the Liberian–Swedish Vocational Training Centre (VTC), a Swedish aid-funded vocational training school in Yekepa directly linked to LAMCO’s planned operations and personnel needs. Seeing the school as a beneficial complement to its own training programmes, LAMCO had agreed to provide part of the funding, and a 1961 memorandum from the Swedish embassy correctly noted that this planned project was the first Swedish aid effort organized ‘in cooperation with private industry’.
Although there was broad agreement at the time that coordination between industry and aid was beneficial, this direct link between aid and a particular business still became somewhat problematic from a diplomatic viewpoint. The Swedish diplomats in Monrovia reported, on multiple occasions and with some concern, that it was important to present the vocational school as aid to the Liberian state, so as to maintain the boundary between LAMCO and the Swedish government and avoid giving the impression that the school was an underhanded subsidy of LAMCO. For example, in 1962, the Swedish chargé d’affaires a.i. Karl-Anders Wollter wrote to Stockholm that ‘we absolutely must avoid […] to give the impression [in Liberia] that the primary purpose of the project is to support LAMCO and only thereafter to support Liberia’. 42

The Swedish diplomats were keen on managing this boundary because, even though the aid project was based on the premise that it would be closely coordinated with LAMCO, they understood its main rationale as transcending any immediate practical effects. They argued that Swedish aid would generate ‘goodwill’ in Liberia that would, over the longer term, be necessary for LAMCO and thus for the Swedish national interest, but such goodwill would only be generated if the state-to-state character of the aid was not questioned. Ambassador Järnstedt reported on the school in 1964:

As for Sweden, it would be fortunate if the school – aside from its value to Liberia’s educational system – could contribute to creating goodwill for our country. Such goodwill is naturally of particular importance to the operations of the major mining company LAMCO, in which, as you know, Swedish companies have made significant investments that can bring full returns only over the long term.

In Järnstedt’s earlier reports to Stockholm on the school, he also reflected on the conditions of Swedish investments in Liberia and the need to pre-empt criticism of aid programmes on the grounds of being insensitive to local conditions. He noted that it would be:

important that construction etc. to which Sweden contributes, is carried out according to the standard that would have been applied if the buildings had been intended for Swedish personnel. It seems necessary to avoid accusations (no matter that these in our case would be completely ungrounded) that foreign interests are happy to exploit African natural resources, but less interested in giving the African staff the same standard.

He further cautioned against giving the impression that the donor country sees itself as providing ‘the all-knowing advice of a custodian’, for which ‘the recipient simply has to accept and give thanks’. Although suggesting that such a manner would be completely alien to Swedes, one nonetheless had to take care to avoid it, as it ‘would give certain grounds to accusations of what presently (maybe under the influence of Marxist slogans, which go back to Lenin’s theories of “Imperialism”) is labelled neo-colonialism by radical African statesmen like Ghana’s Nkrumah and Guinea’s Sékou Touré’. 44

Here Järnstedt alluded to important debates in the context of decolonization and African nationalism. Nkrumah and Touré were leading figures in the Casablanca Group of...
states that argued for African political unification in the early 1960s, and Nkrumah in particular was well-known for his criticism of foreign exploitation of African natural resources, which he saw as a crucial part of the continued Northern interference that he called ‘neo-colonialism’. As Järnstedt correctly noted, this drew on Leninist theories of imperialism, which described a Western-controlled global economy violently exploiting the developing world for raw materials and had been very important in establishing the worldview of many postcolonial African leaders. It was also related to the influential structuralist economic theories that contended that the existing global economic structures put the raw-material-exporting developing countries at an unfair disadvantage and, for the particular case of mining, rejected the link between foreign-owned mines and development. In effect, radical leaders like Nkrumah presented a counter-narrative to the mining as development trope, demanding raw material sovereignty and arguing that as long as foreign companies controlled the mines, mining was an instrument only of exploitation. Tubman, in contrast, remained committed to seeing mining as a means to development and consequently stuck to the open-door policy of encouraging foreign investments in Liberia. He was also opposed to the federalist aims of the Casablanca states. Järnstedt’s reference to these debates demonstrate how the introduction of foreign aid brought about a new and more direct relationship between Sweden and the developing world, and how this relationship opened up for new political logics and risks. It was to defuse the potential of LAMCO, or Swedish development aid associated with it, being interpreted as exploitative that the Swedish diplomat developed his argument about how any accusation of Swedish interests not providing for their African employees would be ‘completely ungrounded’, or how ‘alien’ it would be for Sweden to engage in top-down, imposing, ‘neo-colonial’ aid. It was an articulation of the same understanding of Sweden’s role in the world that made it possible to see LAMCO as a particularly creditable investment, and which also lay behind the oft-repeated understanding at the time that, because Sweden lacked a colonial past, it was a particularly suitable donor country in postcolonial settings. Leaving aside the matter of whether there were grounds or not for such smugness, it was a widely shared belief that had the potential of functioning as a convenient excuse for avoiding critical engagement with one’s own activities. Within this cognitive frame, the two potentially contradictory ideas that Sweden would never engage in aid tainted by neo-colonialism, and that it was important that Swedish aid supported LAMCO in light of how the company could benefit the Swedish national interest, could be reconciled.

Frictions in trade and aid
From the outset, there had been a measure of administrative friction surrounding VTC. The first Swedish teachers were upset by the close coordination planned between LAMCO and the school, protesting that VTC de facto had become a subdivision of LAMCO, with the company doing ‘all it could “to profit from the Swedish state”.’ This confrontation of idealism with the realities of the aid to Liberia foreshadowed broader tensions in Swedish aid that came to the forefront after NIB’s management was replaced in 1964 and the agency itself was then replaced with the new Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) in 1965. Led by Social Democratic bureaucrat Ernst Michanek, the new NIB/SIDA leadership strove to strengthen the Swedish aid administration and to limit the number of recipient
countries. Unlike the teachers in Yekepa, there is nothing to suggest that Michanek or his influential deputy, Anders Forsse, were ideologically opposed to the coordination of aid with business interests, but their first priority was to establish a more structured Swedish aid programme, wholly under the control of their agency and decided on its own terms rather than on the terms of other Swedish interests. In this respect, they were in opposition to business interests and to many at UD who, like Järnstedt, rather argued that the aid should grow ‘naturally’ and ‘with links to existing Swedish […] interests in the developing countries’, much as VTC had come about.

By the time the school was inaugurated in 1964, similar tensions were increasing in broader discussions of Sweden’s engagements in the developing countries. As noted above, Nikolas Glover has shown that the Swedish cabinet in 1965 made clear that it did not intend for Swedish aid to benefit Swedish private economic interests; a policy that contradicted the rationale under which VTC had been established. More generally, it reflected how Swedish political concerns increasingly were tuned to how its policies were received in developing countries. This had the potential of making the mining engagement in Liberia more problematic, as the mid-1960s saw a growing critical debate on North-South resource relations in which the developing countries became increasingly vocal in their demands for resource sovereignty. The domestic discussion of Swedish–Liberian relations was also directly affected by the October 1966 broadcast on Swedish public television of Svart vecka i Nimba (Black Week at Nimba), a documentary that detailed a labour conflict at LAMCO’s mine, in response to which the Liberian government had sent in military units to restore order and arrest union leaders. The subsequent debate, often very critical of LAMCO, also spilled over on VTC, with Leftist intellectual group Unga filosofer (Young Philosophers) proclaiming in 1967 that the aid project amounted to a ‘declaration of solidarity’ with the company’s operations and methods. Given that a very dim view of these methods had been broadly promoted in Sweden by the documentary, VTC was, if nothing else, a potential public relations problem for SIDA and the Swedish government. The film had in fact already resonated on the highest political level. In a 1966 parliamentary discussion between Swedish Communist Party leader C. H. Hermansson and Prime Minister Erlander, the latter deviated sharply from his dinner conversation two years earlier and compared his emotional response to Svart vecka with his responses to the Swedish agricultural labour conflict of 1922 and 1923 and the East German uprising of 1953 (although he then opened up for the possibility that the documentary had exaggerated the situation).

These debates heralded things to come, but had no immediate impact on the bilateral relationship with Liberia. During 1967, that relationship was instead shaped by ongoing friction relating to the operation of VTC. The original Swedish–Liberian agreement had been signed for five years (1962–1967), on the premise that the school would then be taken over by the Liberian government. In early 1967, however, Järnstedt’s successor as ambassador, Olof Ripa, reported that it was ‘clear’ that Liberia had neither the finances nor the personnel for such a takeover. SIDA’s view, as related by Anders Forsse, was that as the construction was finished, SIDA should withdraw, as Liberia was not a prioritized country for Swedish aid and also ‘in light of the harsh treatment’ by the government of SIDA’s request for funding for the budget year 1967/1968. Both these motives reflected important changes in the political context. The latter referred to a political conflict that had seen aid minister
Ulla Lindström resign after failing to secure what she deemed to be the minimum acceptable budget for the aid programme. The former was linked to Michanek’s appointment as Secretary-General of NIB and then the creation of SIDA to replace NIB in 1965, with Michanek retained as its head. This increased the agency’s influence over the aid programme, and Michanek and Forsse used this new momentum to delineate Swedish aid both in terms of countries and domains. They chose six priority countries on the basis of already being major recipients of Swedish aid. Liberia, where aid volumes were comparatively small, was not on the list; mining investments notwithstanding.

SIDA nevertheless changed its stance after it became clear that LAMCO was keen to see the school continue, and agreed to support an extension of Swedish aid to VTC until 1970. Around the same time, the Swedish government also made a final political decision in support of LAMCO, as well as being favourable to Liberia, when it signed a bilateral agreement on avoiding double taxation in 1969. This had long been on the Swedish agenda, but the Liberian authorities had shown limited interest. Only after an intervention by Erik Leijonhufvud at SEB, who made a personal approach to the Liberian Minister of Finance (whom he knew through LAMCO), did negotiations start in 1967. In parallel with the bilateral negotiations, the Swedish LAMCO syndicate also negotiated with the Liberian government over the application of the agreement, and, to the Liberians, reaching an agreement with the syndicate was a precondition for an agreement with Sweden. On the Swedish side, the negotiations were led by taxation experts from the Ministry of Finance, who concluded an agreement in 1969. It was deemed advantageous for Liberia and can be understood as another attempt to create goodwill in Monrovia. Signing taxation agreements like these was nothing unusual – Sweden had them with a number of developing countries – but in this case, the major involvement of industry in the negotiations and the generous agreement reached suggests a final coordinated attempt by the Swedish government and industry to support Swedish commercial interests in Liberia.

The year after, in 1970, the Swedish–Liberian agreement on VTC was extended once more. But by this time there was no longer coordination on the Swedish side. In the late 1960s, the conditions of the Swedish aid programme had changed again. After a second government bill on foreign aid was passed by Parliament in 1968, a heated discussion on the politics of foreign aid took place both within the Social Democratic party and the Swedish foreign administration. Voices promoting a radical change of the country selection criteria were increasingly heard. Social Democrat and former SIDA staff member Birgitta Dahl opened the debate in 1968 with an article in Social Democratic journal Tiden, and was soon joined by civil servant Lennart Klackenberg, who was responsible for international aid issues at the Ministry of Finance, and by three mid-level officials at UD’s aid division: Rolf Ekéus, Ethel Ringborg, and Ulf Svensson. All argued that a principle for the selection of recipient countries for Swedish aid should be that there was a political system in place that sought to achieve redistributive goals, understood in practice as countries committed to some form of socialism. The SIDA leadership – dominated by Michanek and Forsse – opposed this, arguing that aid goals could be equally well achieved in countries with different social and economic systems and that need was another important factor, as did an older guard at UD who still primarily saw to trade interests. But the redistributive principle was, with encouragement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson,
adopted by the 1969 congress of the Social Democratic party and was later written into the 1970 Government Bill on the state budget (though eventually toned down in the final version passed by Parliament). By this time, Torsten Nilsson and the new Prime Minister Olof Palme, who replaced Erlander in October 1969, both saw a more politicized aid as an important part of the government’s new stance towards developing countries, and so the cabinet also arranged for a new department for international development cooperation at UD in 1970. Lennart Klackenberg was recruited to lead it, and it was staffed largely with younger and comparatively more radical civil servants and had a clear political mandate to implement the new vision of Swedish development aid. It was also responsible for the humanitarian aid that Sweden increasingly provided to the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and in South Africa; another expression of the active foreign policy that further contributed to the radicalization of the aid administration.

The chief impact of these political changes on the Swedish aid to Liberia was to complicate the process of extending the aid agreement in 1970, an extension otherwise unanimously supported by SIDA, LAMCO, and the ambassador in Monrovia, Hans Sköld. It proved difficult to realize even the minimum alternative of a two-year extension with a reduced Swedish presence, because ‘the question of further aid to Liberia’ was ‘by no means politically unproblematic’, as Curt Ström at SIDA’s division for educational aid put it in a letter to Sköld. Even after the cabinet had agreed to the extension, SIDA felt that a demonstratively long time passed before UD finalized the agreement, and that this was a symptom of a larger issue. This is clear from correspondence between Anders Forsse and Lars Kalderén at UD’s new development cooperation department. Forsse complained about the handling of, in his view, the rather simple matter of a ‘small extension’ of the agreement, and commented that it seemed to SIDA as if the time taken to deal with matters like this was ‘a function of certain civil servants’ personal views of the recipient country in question’. Kalderén predictably denied that the personal views of his staff had any bearing on the department’s work, but acknowledged that, from a policy perspective, ‘certain recipient countries’ were more problematic than others, and so more time had to be spent on issues involving them.

This correspondence demonstrates that a new political logic of aid had grown influential in UD’s management of Swedish relations with developing countries while SIDA’s influence had decreased. In this new climate, there was little room for initiatives motivated by the older, trade-focused foreign policy logic and consequently no interest in using aid funds to support the distinctly non-socialist Liberian regime.

Companies like LAMCO were also increasingly political liabilities for the government in the face of the radicalized public opinion: the Social Democratic party’s own youth wing condemned LAMCO and other companies active in the developing world as ‘vehicles of capitalist imperialism’ at its 1970 congress. So when the agreement on VTC again expired at the end of 1972, there was no discussion of re-negotiating it. The school was handed over to the Liberian government and SIDA withdrew.

Epilogue: from LAMCO to PAIGC
The end of the aid project left Sweden in a diplomatically awkward position in Monrovia, being the only Western power to maintain an embassy there without
providing any bilateral aid. The Liberian authorities recognized this inconsistency and spent considerable time lobbying the embassy for new aid projects, but with little success: UD had definitively decided that Liberia was not to receive further bilateral aid, and the embassy consequently devoted more and more of its time to the other countries it was responsible for, as well as to contacts with PAIGC (the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), the liberation movement (soon to become Marxist government) in Portuguese Guinea (Guinea-Bissau). The political priorities were made explicit in a letter to Stockholm in 1973, which argued that the embassy should focus on contacts with the Ivory Coast (seat of the African Development Bank) and Guinea, and perhaps also formally expand to cover PAIGC, while Liberia and Sierra Leone were less important.\textsuperscript{66}

With Swedish political priorities in West Africa thus reconfigured, the very existence of an embassy in Monrovia was increasingly questioned in the late 1970s, particularly as it was also an unpopular hardship posting, considered to be among the worst in the Swedish foreign service.\textsuperscript{67} By 1977, moving the embassy to Abidjan was openly discussed within UD, even though the members of the Swedish LAMCO Syndicate were strongly opposed to such a move.\textsuperscript{68} But as the ambassador to Monrovia, Olof Skoglund, pointed out in an internal memorandum, LAMCO had changed quite significantly in recent years: the new Liberian government, led since 1971 by President William Tolbert, had adapted a stricter stance towards the international concessions and the company’s Swedishness had consequently begun to be played down. Also, LAMCO no longer made particular use of the embassy’s services, so if the company was the chief reason for the embassy’s existence, then with the prevailing state of affairs there was ‘evidently no longer any reason to maintain an embassy in Monrovia’.\textsuperscript{69} From his perspective, LAMCO was not the government’s business anymore. Skoglund was, however, replaced by Rune Fremlin, who had earlier worked for a Wallenberg company. He was eager to stay in Marcus Wallenberg’s good graces, and consequently strongly resisted a complete closure of the embassy. UD’s leadership also remained attuned enough to industrial interests to eventually opt for a compromise: it created an embassy in Abidjan in 1978 and freed up resources by experimenting with a new form of representation: namely, re-basing the ambassador to Liberia to Stockholm. Taking the syndicate’s interests into account, however, it did not close the Monrovian embassy altogether.\textsuperscript{70} Led by a more junior diplomat, it remained open until 1990, when LAMCO had ceased operations and the civil war had broken out.

**Concluding remarks**

Through its existence, LAMCO was a determining factor in Swedish foreign policy towards Liberia and West Africa. Up until the mid-1960s, most foreign policy actors within the Swedish government agreed that Swedish private investments in Liberian iron ore were also the government’s business and should be supported. This stance drew on the customary trade promotion of the foreign administration, but eventually also extended beyond it. Swedish officials understood that as LAMCO could be framed as development-promoting, it could be a means to broader political ends, particularly in the ‘development decade’ proclaimed by the United Nations in 1961. In emphasizing the link between mining and development for political purposes, the Swedish
stance was congruent with examples seen from colonial powers like France. The ultimate end was different, however, as it was formulated outside of a (post)colonial relationship and was not about access to resources or even, in the first instance, about the relationship with Liberia per se. Swedish officials took a broader view. Unlike, for example, a French uranium mine in Gabon, LAMCO could be portrayed as coming without political strings attached and without a colonial heritage, and they believed that made it possible to use it as a way to increase non-aligned Sweden’s international prestige and help counter what could be perceived as the moral deficit of the neutrality policy: Swedish neutrality increased the legitimacy of LAMCO, and LAMCO then simultaneously became a way to associate Sweden with international engagement and solidarity. Earlier research has attributed this function to early Swedish development aid; my findings thus suggest that commercial engagements could play a similar role at the time, at least as long as they could credibly be portrayed as means of development. More precisely, for most foreign policy officials it was easy to interpret a private project like LAMCO along the same lines as they would public aid activities.

This changed around the mid-1960s as Swedish foreign policy became more fragmented. Even though the Swedish aid programme initially fitted comfortably with pre-existing foreign policy logics and goals, it nevertheless created a new domain of foreign affairs in which diverging goals gradually began to manifest during the second half of the 1960s, under pressure both from the general radicalization of public debate and opinion and from renewed understandings of the relationship between economic growth and development that came with structuralist theorizing. For the parts of UD more tuned to industrial interests, including the diplomats in Monrovia, it remained important to support LAMCO by providing Swedish representation and preferably development aid, to meet consular needs and to generate goodwill in Liberia that could translate into economic gains. SIDA’s leadership under Ernst Michanek was less tuned to the business perspective as such, but nevertheless continued to promote aid to Liberia as it wanted to make use of synergies with private industry and also wanted to resist more explicit political steering of Swedish aid. In opposition, radical Social Democrats, as well as a number of mid-level aid officials and diplomats, had begun to advocate a new view of Sweden’s relationship with developing countries, looking to political conditions in recipient countries as a determining factor in making aid decisions. To them, there was nothing progressive about either the Liberian government or LAMCO and consequently no justification for Swedish aid to Liberia. Around the turn of the decade, the new Palme cabinet – in what was arguably one of the defining moments of the active foreign policy – sided with the radicals when it created the new development cooperation department at UD and populated it with civil servants who shared their views. This disempowered both the older guard of trade-oriented diplomats and the remaining pragmatists at SIDA, and from 1970 at the latest, LAMCO’s proponents were no longer in a position to frame it as the government’s business. To those by then responsible for Swedish foreign policy towards developing countries, it had become a liability rather than an argument for strong Swedish links with Liberia, and Swedish bilateral aid consequently ceased in 1972. Even so, multiple goals and perspectives continued to play a role, sometimes giving the policy towards Liberia a touch of contradiction. Business perspectives remained influential enough at UD to safeguard the Swedish embassy in Monrovia.
in spite of many arguing for its relocation to a politically more relevant capital, and
the continued representation in Monrovia even as Swedish aid being terminated
apparently made the Liberian government somewhat uncertain about the Swedish
intentions.

From a periodization point of view, these findings are in line with what we
already know of Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War. They nevertheless
depth en our understanding of how business interests could figure into this policy,
and give us a clearer picture of how the policy was made. They demonstrate the
strong coherence with which Swedish industry and government acted in relation to
significant commercial interests in Liberia before ca. 1965 and the lack of coher-
ence – between government and industry, but also within the state apparatus –
that followed the radical turn of the mid-1960s and resulted in tensions between
trade, aid, and activism, clearly seen in Liberia as in the more public controversy
surrounding Cabora Bassa. The scope of my conclusions here must, however, be
correctly understood: among Swedish direct investments in developing countries,
LAMCO was unique in terms of size and publicity. We do not know if and how
the government would have acted in relation to other major Swedish direct
investments in African or other developing countries, and the case of LAMCO
does not not allow for generalizations on this point.

I would still argue, however, that the political discourse that was deployed
around LAMCO was representative of broader trends in its time. The ideologies
undergirding the stances that various government actors took towards it were not
unique, and this is particularly so as it would have been very conceivable around
1960 that LAMCO was only the first of many major investments in developing
countries. So while there is much room for further research on the history of
Swedish business in developing countries and how the Swedish government
understood its political significance, the LAMCO case arguably already provides
a clear illustration of how political and administrative views on Swedish com-
mercial investments in developing countries developed and shifted – sometimes
quite rapidly – through the crucial juncture of the 1960s and early 1970s.

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Notes

2. Wilhelm af Klinteberg, ‘P.M. beträffande svenska intressen i Liberia’, 1 November 1960, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives [henceforth UID], 2210.03.2, P2: 233, National Archives of Sweden. All translations from Swedish by the author.
5. Decker, ‘Corporate Political Activity’.
7. There are, however, a series of studies exploring this theme in the late 19th and early 20th centuries: Avango, Högselius, and Nilsson, ‘Swedish Explorers’; Larsson, *Diplomati*; Runblom, *Svenska företag*; Vikström, Högselius, and Avango, ‘Swedish Steel’.
8. For research overviews, see, e.g., Bjereld and Ekengren, ‘Cold War Historiography’; Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet*.
12. One exception is Gunnar Åselius’ study of the radicalization of UD at the end of the 1960s: Åselius, ‘Revolutionen’.
13. This approach is related to the ‘new diplomatic history’, with its focus on studying diplomats rather than diplomacy, and to (related) research efforts into the history of diplomacy in the context of the immensely more multipolar and complex system of international relations that developed after World War II. But I make no claims at contributing theoretically to this literature.
15. Larsson, ‘Svensk exportindustri’.
16. This and the following paragraph are based on Bergström, *Svensk malmexport*. It is the most solid historical study of LAMCO, but sees the company solely through the lens of Gränges’ business considerations. For an overview of other work, most of which is not historical scholarship, see Bergström, *Svensk malmexport*, 15–19.
17. On the ‘mineral objectives’ of Point Four, see Black, ‘Interior’s Exterior’. The possible US political interest in LAMCO is not explored further here.
19. On Liberia’s economic history until 1980, see van der Kraaij, *Open Door*, for an overview of Liberia’s Cold War foreign policy (focused on its relations with the United States), see Dunn, *Liberia*.
21. Thorsten Hultman, ‘P.M. rörande svensk officiell representation i Liberia’, 6 July 1957, UID, 2210.03.2, P2: 233; ‘Sammanträde med svenska PUTU-Syndikatet den 5 augusti 1957’. The Putu syndicate was its original name, referring to an earlier area of interest. Stockholm’s Enskilda Bank archives [henceforth SEB], F1C: 1622, The Foundation for Economic History Research within Banking and Enterprise.
24. Wallenberg wanted to use this conviction as leverage in a later negotiation with the National Bank. The notes outlining this are not conclusive evidence of the cabinet’s views or even of Wallenberg’s views in the late 1950s, but still have some source value: had it been wholly improbable that the cabinet would back LAMCO, it could never have functioned as an argument. Notes from Marc Wallenberg to Erik Leijonhufvud, 4 February 1961, SEB, F1C: 1646.
26. Bo Gunnar Järnstedt to Jan Stenström, 4 April 1962, UD, 2210.03.2, P2: 233.
32. A postwar example that was also influential in Sweden can be found in the US ‘Paley Report’ from 1953, which explicitly used a mining as development trope in support of its recommendation that US companies ought to invest more in mineral production abroad. See Eckes, Global Struggle, 187; for a broader intellectual history of mining in relation to development, see Graulau, ‘Mining’.
35. Rösiö, Diplomat, 94.
36. Examples of this stance are very numerous. For a particularly clear expression of it, see ‘LAMCO and the Open Door Policy’, LAMCO News 1968/12, SEB, F1C: 1651.
37. On Swedish aid before 1962, see Nilsson, Svenskt bistånd.
38. Sverige hjälper, 32. See also Öhman, Taming, 103–10, for an analysis of the inquiry and the influence of industry on aid discourse at this time.
42. Karl-Anders Wollter to Per Lind, 20 January 1962, 2–3, UD, 2210.03.2, HP111: 81. Other examples can be found in Wollter to Bengt Odhner, 27 June 1962, 2, UD, 2210.03.2, HP111: 81 and Järnstedt to Odhner, 30 December 1963, 3, UD, 2210.03.2, HP111: 81.
43. Järnstedt to Odhner, 12 March 1964, 5, UD, 2210.03.2, HP111: 81.
45. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism. Pages 91–93 explicitly discuss LAMCO.
47. On the intra-African relations of Liberia, see Dunn, Independent Africa.
48. For problematizations of Sweden’s non-colonial past, see Naum and Nordin, Scandinavian Colonialism; Nilsson, ‘Sweden-Norway at the Berlin Conference’; Öhman, Taming.
51. Järnstedt to Alva Myrdal, 2, 7 November 1962, UD, 2210.03.2, HP111: 81.
52. Holmsen and Mannerheim, LAMCO:SLiberia, 170. For details on the documentary’s reception, see Thurén, ‘Svart vecka’.
56. Stokke, Sveriges utvecklings bistånd, 63–5.
57. Forsse to Olof Ripa, 5 April 1967, UD, 2210.03.2, U11: 88.
58. Sven Brodén to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ Director-General for Legal Affairs, 25 October 1967, UD, 2210.03.2, R75: 38; E[rik]. L[eijonhufvud], ‘Syndikatet – LAMCO; Dubbelbeskattningsavtalet’, SEB, F1C: 1624.
61. Åselius, ‘Revolutionen’, 120–2; Sellström, National Liberation, 49–50.
63. Forsse to Lars Kalderén, 23 August 1971; Kalderén to Forsse, 29 September 1971, both in UD, 2210.02.3, P2: 117.
64. On the developments at UD in the late 1960s and early 1970s, see also Åselius, ‘Revolutionen’.
70. Rune Fremlin to Marcus Wallenberg, 24 February 1979, SEB, F1C: 1643. Fremlin’s reports to Stockholm and UD’s further considerations can be found in UD, 2210.03.3, P2: 350.
Bibliography


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