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Lee, H., Jang, H., Cho, J.-w. & Yi, Y. (2017). Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 35(2), 421-431
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts
2017 (engelsk)Inngår i: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, ISSN 0733-8716, E-ISSN 1558-0008, Vol. 35, nr 2, s. 421-431Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies, such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation-based fair revenue sharing, i.e., multi-level Internet service provider (ISP) settlements, can be a candidate solution to avoid unfair revenue share. However, it has been under-explored whether selfish ISPs actually cooperate or not (often referred to as the stability of coalition), because they may partially cooperate or even do not cooperate, depending on how much revenue is distributed to each individual ISP. In this paper, we study this stability of coalition in the Internet, where our aim is to investigate the conditions under which ISPs cooperate under different regimes on the traffic demand and network bandwidth. We first consider the under-demanded regime, i.e., network bandwidth exceeds traffic demand, where revenue sharing based on Shapley value leads ISPs to entirely cooperate, i.e., stability of the grand coalition. Next, we consider the over-demanded regime, i.e., traffic demand exceeds network bandwidth, where there may exist some ISPs who deviate from the grand coalition. In particular, this deviation depends on how users' traffic is handled inside the network, for which we consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference. We analytically compare those three scheduling policies in terms of network neutrality, and stability of cooperation that provides useful implications on when and how multi-level ISP settlements help and how the Internet should be operated for stable peering and revenue balance among ISPs.

Emneord
Network economics, traffic scheduling, coalitional game theory, Shapley value, stability
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-207913 (URN)10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659378 (DOI)000400412400015 ()2-s2.0-85017306620 (Scopus ID)
Merknad

QC 20170530

Tilgjengelig fra: 2017-05-30 Laget: 2017-05-30 Sist oppdatert: 2017-11-06bibliografisk kontrollert
Cho, J.-w. & Jiang, Y. (2015). Fundamentals of the Backoff Process in 802.11: Dichotomy of the Aggregation. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 61(4), 1687-1701
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Fundamentals of the Backoff Process in 802.11: Dichotomy of the Aggregation
2015 (engelsk)Inngår i: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, ISSN 0018-9448, E-ISSN 1557-9654, Vol. 61, nr 4, s. 1687-1701Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper discovers fundamental principles of the backoff process that governs the performance of IEEE 802.11. A simplistic principle founded upon regular variation theory is that the backoff time has a truncated Pareto-type tail distribution with an exponent of $ { (log gamma !)/log m}$ ( $boldsymbol {m}$ is the multiplicative factor and $ {gamma }$ is the collision probability). This reveals that the per-node backoff process is heavy-tailed in the strict sense for $ { gamma > 1/m^{2}}$ , and paves the way for the following unifying result. The state-of-the-art theory on the superposition of the heavy-tailed processes is applied to establish a dichotomy exhibited by the aggregate backoff process, putting emphasis on the importance of time-scales on which we view the backoff processes. While the aggregation on normal time-scales leads to a Poisson process, it is approximated by a new limiting process possessing long-range dependence (LRD) on coarse time-scales. This dichotomy turns out to be instrumental in formulating short-term fairness, extending existing formulas to arbitrary population, and to elucidate the absence of LRD in practical situations. A refined wavelet analysis is conducted to strengthen this argument.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE Press, 2015
Emneord
802.11, Point process theory, mean field theory, regular variation theory
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Elektro- och systemteknik; Informations- och kommunikationsteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-161906 (URN)10.1109/TIT.2015.2404795 (DOI)000351470800012 ()2-s2.0-84924943819 (Scopus ID)
Merknad

QC 20150319

Tilgjengelig fra: 2015-03-18 Laget: 2015-03-18 Sist oppdatert: 2017-12-04bibliografisk kontrollert
Cho, J.-w. & Yi, Y. (2014). On the Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services With Multiple Content Providers: Rationality and Fairness. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 22(3), 731-744
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services With Multiple Content Providers: Rationality and Fairness
2014 (engelsk)Inngår i: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, ISSN 1063-6692, E-ISSN 1558-2566, Vol. 22, nr 3, s. 731-744Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game-theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e, providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a "Shapley-like" payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures that are not convergent to the grand coalition under a dynamic among coalition structures. Our results give us an incontestable fact that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services and is separated from them. Three facets of the noncooperative (selfish) providers are illustrated: 1) underpaid peers; 2) service monopoly; and 3) oscillatory coalition structure. Lastly, we propose a stable payoff mechanism that improves fairness of profit sharing by regulating the selfishness of the players as well as grants the content providers a limited right of realistic bargaining. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers' competition in peer-assisted services.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE Press, 2014
Emneord
Coalition game, peer-to-peer network, Shapley value, incentive
HSV kategori
Forskningsprogram
Informations- och kommunikationsteknik
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-146711 (URN)10.1109/TNET.2013.2259637 (DOI)000338124100004 ()2-s2.0-84903268086 (Scopus ID)
Merknad

QC 20140808

Tilgjengelig fra: 2014-06-13 Laget: 2014-06-13 Sist oppdatert: 2017-12-05bibliografisk kontrollert
Lee, H., Jang, H., Yi, Y. & Cho, J.-w. (2013). On the interaction between content-oriented traffic scheduling and revenue sharing among providers. In: Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM: . Paper presented at 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013 (pp. 3201-3206).
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the interaction between content-oriented traffic scheduling and revenue sharing among providers
2013 (engelsk)Inngår i: Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, 2013, s. 3201-3206Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection, content distribution, and users. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation in revenue sharing (thus multi-level ISP settlements) can be a candidate solution for the problem of unfair revenue share. However, it is unclear whether providers are willing to behave cooperatively. In this paper, we study the interaction between how content-oriented traffic scheduling at the edge is and how stable the intended cooperation is. We consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference, compare them in terms of implementation complexity, network neutrality, and stability of cooperation, and present interesting trade-offs among them.

Serie
Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, ISSN 0743-166X
Emneord
Content distribution, Implementation complexity, Network neutralities, Recent researches, Revenue-sharing, Techno-economics, Traffic scheduling, Scheduling, Internet service providers
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-133800 (URN)10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567138 (DOI)2-s2.0-84883124875 (Scopus ID)9781467359467 (ISBN)
Konferanse
32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013
Merknad

QC 20131206

Tilgjengelig fra: 2013-12-06 Laget: 2013-11-11 Sist oppdatert: 2018-01-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Lee, H., Jang, H., Yi, Y. & Cho, J.-W. (2013). On the interaction between content-oriented traffic scheduling and revenue sharing among providers. In: 2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013): . Paper presented at 2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013 (pp. 333-338). IEEE Communications Society
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the interaction between content-oriented traffic scheduling and revenue sharing among providers
2013 (engelsk)Inngår i: 2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops (INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013), IEEE Communications Society, 2013, s. 333-338Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection, content distribution, and users. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation in revenue sharing (thus multi-level ISP settlements) can be a candidate solution for the problem of unfair revenue share. However, it is unclear whether providers are willing to behave cooperatively. In this paper, we study the interaction between how content-oriented traffic scheduling at the edge is and how stable the intended cooperation is. We consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference, compare them in terms of implementation complexity, network neutrality, and stability of cooperation, and present interesting trade-offs among them.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE Communications Society, 2013
Serie
2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013
Emneord
Content distribution, Implementation complexity, Network neutralities, Recent researches, Revenue-sharing, Techno-economics, Traffic scheduling, Scheduling, Internet service providers
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-133826 (URN)10.1109/INFCOMW.2013.6562870 (DOI)2-s2.0-84882951103 (Scopus ID)9781479900565 (ISBN)
Konferanse
2013 IEEE Conference on Computer Communications Workshops, INFOCOM WKSHPS 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013
Merknad

QC 20131118

Tilgjengelig fra: 2013-11-18 Laget: 2013-11-11 Sist oppdatert: 2018-01-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Jeong, J., Yi, Y., Cho, J. W., Eun, D. Y. & Chong, S. (2013). Wi-Fi Sensing: Should Mobiles Sleep Longer As They Age?. In: 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM: . Paper presented at 32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013 (pp. 2328-2336).
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Wi-Fi Sensing: Should Mobiles Sleep Longer As They Age?
Vise andre…
2013 (engelsk)Inngår i: 2013 Proceedings IEEE INFOCOM, 2013, s. 2328-2336Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

An essential condition precedent to the success of mobile applications based on Wi-Fi (e.g., iCloud) is an energy-efficient Wi-Fi sensing. From a user's perspective, a good Wi-Fi sensing policy should depend on both inter-AP arrival and contact duration time distributions. Prior work focuses on limited cases of those two distributions (e.g., exponential) or introduces heuristic approaches such as AI (Additive Increase). In this paper, we formulate a functional optimization problem on Wi-Fi sensing under general inter-AP and contact duration distributions, and propose how each user should sense Wi-Fi APs to strike a balance between energy efficiency and performance, depending on the users' mobility pattern. To that end, we derive an optimal condition which sheds insights into the aging property, the key feature required by efficient Wi-Fi sensing polices. Guided by the analytical studies and the implications, we develop a new sensing algorithm, called WiSAG (Wi-Fi Sensing with AGing), which is demonstrated to outperform the existing sensing algorithms up to 34% through extensive trace-driven simulations using the real mobility traces gathered from smartphones.

Serie
Proceedings - IEEE INFOCOM, ISSN 0743-166X
Emneord
Analytical studies, Efficiency and performance, Functional optimization problem, Heuristic approach, Mobile applications, Optimal conditions, Sensing algorithms, Trace driven simulation, Energy efficiency, Heuristic methods, Optimization, Algorithms
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-133806 (URN)10.1109/INFCOM.2013.6567037 (DOI)2-s2.0-84883066016 (Scopus ID)9781467359467 (ISBN)
Konferanse
32nd IEEE Conference on Computer Communications, IEEE INFOCOM 2013; Turin, Italy, 14-19 April 2013
Merknad

QC 20131205

Tilgjengelig fra: 2013-12-05 Laget: 2013-11-11 Sist oppdatert: 2018-01-11bibliografisk kontrollert
Cho, J.-w., Le Boudec, J.-Y. & Jiang, Y. (2012). On the Asymptotic Validity of the Decoupling Assumption for Analyzing 802.11 MAC Protocol. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 58(11), 6879-6893
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the Asymptotic Validity of the Decoupling Assumption for Analyzing 802.11 MAC Protocol
2012 (engelsk)Inngår i: IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, ISSN 0018-9448, E-ISSN 1557-9654, Vol. 58, nr 11, s. 6879-6893Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

Performance evaluation of the 802.11 MAC protocol is classically based on the decoupling assumption, which hypothesizes that the backoff processes at different nodes are independent. This decoupling assumption results from mean field convergence and is generally true in transient regime in the asymptotic sense (when the number of wireless nodes tends to infinity), but, contrary to widespread belief, may not necessarily hold in stationary regime. The issue is often related with the existence and uniqueness of a solution to a fixed point equation; however, it was also recently shown that this condition is not sufficient; in contrast, a sufficient condition is a global stability property of the associated ordinary differential equation. In this paper, we give a simple condition that establishes the asymptotic validity of the decoupling assumption for the homogeneous case (all nodes have the same parameters). We also discuss the heterogeneous and the differentiated service cases and formulate a new ordinary differential equation. We show that the uniqueness of a solution to the associated fixed point equation is not sufficient; we exhibit one case where the fixed point equation has a unique solution but the decoupling assumption is not valid in the asymptotic sense in stationary regime.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE Press, 2012
Emneord
802.11, Decoupling assumption, fixed point equation (FPE), mean field theory, ordinary differential equation (ODE)
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-104672 (URN)10.1109/TIT.2012.2208582 (DOI)000310156500014 ()2-s2.0-84867750236 (Scopus ID)
Forskningsfinansiär
ICT - The Next Generation
Merknad

QC 20121211

Tilgjengelig fra: 2012-11-12 Laget: 2012-11-08 Sist oppdatert: 2017-12-07bibliografisk kontrollert
Cho, J.-w. & Yi, Y. (2012). On the Shapley-like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers. In: Rahul Jain, Kannan, Rajgopal (Ed.), Game Theory for Networks: 2nd International ICST Conference, GameNets 2011, Shanghai, China, April 11-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers. Paper presented at 2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011, April 16-18 2011, Shanghai, China. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 75
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the Shapley-like Payoff Mechanisms in Peer-Assisted Services with Multiple Content Providers
2012 (engelsk)Inngår i: Game Theory for Networks: 2nd International ICST Conference, GameNets 2011, Shanghai, China, April 11-18, 2011, Revised Selected Papers / [ed] Rahul Jain, Kannan, Rajgopal, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2012, Vol. 75Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition structure consisting of multiple providers with many assisting peers, where peers assist providers to reduce the operational cost in content distribution. To distribute the profit from cost reduction to players (i.e., providers and peers), we then establish a generalized formula for individual payoffs when a “Shapley-like” payoff mechanism is adopted. We show that the grand coalition is unstable, even when the operational cost functions are concave, which is in sharp contrast to the recently studied case of a single provider where the grand coalition is stable. We also show that irrespective of stability of the grand coalition, there always exist coalition structures which are not convergent to the grand coalition. Our results give us an important insight that a provider does not tend to cooperate with other providers in peer-assisted services, and be separated from them. To further study the case of the separated providers, three examples are presented; (i) underpaid peers, (ii) service monopoly, and (iii) oscillatory coalition structure. Our study opens many new questions such as realistic and efficient incentive structures and the tradeoffs between fairness and individual providers’ compQC 2012etition in peerassisted services.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2012
Serie
Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering ; 75
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-86262 (URN)978-3-642-30372-2 (ISBN)
Konferanse
2nd International ICST Conference on Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011, April 16-18 2011, Shanghai, China
Forskningsfinansiär
ICT - The Next Generation
Merknad

QC 20120504

Tilgjengelig fra: 2012-09-01 Laget: 2012-02-13 Sist oppdatert: 2013-04-15bibliografisk kontrollert
Lee, H., Jang, H., Cho, J.-w. & Yi, Y. (2012). On the stability of ISPs' coalition structure: Shapley value based revenue sharing. Paper presented at 46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 21-23 March 2012, Princeton, NJ, USA. IEEE conference proceedings
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>On the stability of ISPs' coalition structure: Shapley value based revenue sharing
2012 (engelsk)Konferansepaper, Publicerat paper (Fagfellevurdert)
Abstract [en]

The Internet is a complex system, consisting of different economic players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution, which are typically selfish and try to maximize their own profits. Due to this different perspective of economic interest as well as dynamic changes of the Internet market, a certain degree of techno-economic inefficiency has naturally been observed, e.g., unstable peering and revenue imbalance among content, eyeball, and transit ISPs (Internet Service Providers). At the center of this issue is “good” revenue sharing among them. Recently, revenue sharing based on the notion of Shapley Value (SV) from cooperative game theory has been applied to address the afore-mentioned issue, shedding light upon many nice properties which have been used not only to understand the current Internet eco-system but also to predict its future. However, the positive features from the SV based revenue sharing can be practically feasible only when the providers agree to form a grand coalition, which may not hold in practice. In this paper, we first investigate the conditions under which the grand coalition is stable under SV by classifying the network into two cases: under-demanded and over-demanded. We then study the gap between the conditions of the grand coalition's stability and optimal coalition structures (i.e., coalition structures that maximize the aggregate revenue of ISPs).

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
IEEE conference proceedings, 2012
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-104671 (URN)10.1109/CISS.2012.6310933 (DOI)2-s2.0-84868518808 (Scopus ID)978-1-4673-3138-8 (ISBN)
Konferanse
46th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), 21-23 March 2012, Princeton, NJ, USA
Forskningsfinansiär
ICT - The Next Generation
Merknad

QC 20121112

Tilgjengelig fra: 2012-11-12 Laget: 2012-11-08 Sist oppdatert: 2013-04-15bibliografisk kontrollert
Lee, H.-W., Cho, J.-w. & Chong, S. (2010). Distributed Max-Min Flow Control for Multi-rate Overlay Multicast. Computer Networks, 54(11), 1727-1738
Åpne denne publikasjonen i ny fane eller vindu >>Distributed Max-Min Flow Control for Multi-rate Overlay Multicast
2010 (engelsk)Inngår i: Computer Networks, ISSN 1389-1286, E-ISSN 1872-7069, Vol. 54, nr 11, s. 1727-1738Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert) Published
Abstract [en]

We present a distributed algorithm to compute bandwidth max-min fair rates in an overlay multicast network supporting multi-rate data delivery. The proposed algorithm is scalable in that it does not require each logical link to maintain the saturation status of all sessions and virtual sessions traveling through it, stable in that it converges asymptotically to the desired equilibrium satisfying the minimum plus max-min fairness even in the presence of heterogeneous round-trip delays, and has explicit link buffer control in that the buffer occupancy of every bottlenecked link in the network asymptotically converges to the pre-defined value. The algorithm is based on PI (proportional integral) control in the feedback control theory and by appealing to the Nyquist stability criterion, a usable stability condition is derived in the presence of sources with heterogeneous round-trip delays. In addition, we propose an efficient feedback consolidation algorithm which is computationally simpler than its hard-synchronization based counterpart and eliminates unnecessary consolidation delay by preventing it from awaiting backward control packets that do not directly contribute to the session rate. Through simulations we further verify the analytical results and the performance of the proposed multi-rate multicast flow control scheme based on these two algorithms.

sted, utgiver, år, opplag, sider
Elsevier, 2010
Emneord
Multi-rate overlay multicast; Max-min flow control; Nyquist stability criterion; Feedback consolidation
HSV kategori
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-86137 (URN)10.1016/j.comnet.2010.02.004 (DOI)000280258300001 ()
Merknad
Qc 20120215Tilgjengelig fra: 2012-02-15 Laget: 2012-02-13 Sist oppdatert: 2017-12-07bibliografisk kontrollert
Organisasjoner
Identifikatorer
ORCID-id: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-9338-4960