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Fröding, Barbro, DocentORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-9984-7831
Alternative names
Publications (10 of 26) Show all publications
Fröding, B. & Juth, N. (2015). Cognitive Enhancement and the Principle of Need. Neuroethics, 8(3), 231-242
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cognitive Enhancement and the Principle of Need
2015 (English)In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, Vol. 8, no 3, p. 231-242Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this article we argue that (i) the principle of need, on some interpretations, could be used to justify the spending of publically funded health care resources on cognitive enhancement and (ii) that this also holds true for individuals whose cognitive capacities are considered normal. The increased, and to an extent, novel demands that the modern technology and information society places on the cognitive capacities of agents, e.g., regarding good and responsible decision-making, have blurred the line between treatment and enhancement. More specifically, it has shifted upwards. As a consequence, principles of need on their most reasonable interpretations can be used to support publically funded cognitive enhancement. At least this is so, if broader aims than curing and ameliorating diseases are included in the goals of health care. We suggest that it would be plausible to see health care as accepting such broader goals already today.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2015
Keywords
Cognitive capacities, Egalitarianism, Enhancement, Goals of health care, Principle of need, Prioritizations
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-179159 (URN)10.1007/s12152-015-9234-7 (DOI)000365128000002 ()2-s2.0-84947040795 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20151216

Available from: 2015-12-16 Created: 2015-12-11 Last updated: 2017-12-01Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2015). How to be a virtuous recipient of a transplant organ. In: Organ Transplantation in Times of Donor Shortage: Challenges and Solutions (pp. 89-98). Springer Netherlands, 59
Open this publication in new window or tab >>How to be a virtuous recipient of a transplant organ
2015 (English)In: Organ Transplantation in Times of Donor Shortage: Challenges and Solutions, Springer Netherlands, 2015, Vol. 59, p. 89-98Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Netherlands, 2015
Series
International Library of Ethics Law and the New Medicine, ISSN 1567-8008 ; 59
National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-187137 (URN)10.1007/978-3-319-16441-0_9 (DOI)000368274200010 ()2-s2.0-84955686177 (Scopus ID)978-3-319-16441-0 (ISBN)
Note

QC 20160518

Available from: 2016-05-18 Created: 2016-05-17 Last updated: 2016-05-18Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Osika, W. (2015). Neuroenhancement: How mental training and meditation can promote epistemic virtue. Springer Publishing Company
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Neuroenhancement: How mental training and meditation can promote epistemic virtue
2015 (English)Book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This book explores how one can bring about changes in the brain through meditation, both through attention-focus training and through compassion training. Recent findings in the natural sciences have confirmed that it is possible for humans to achieve these structural and functional changes through various life-style practices. It is argued that meditation enables us to influence some aspects of our biological make-up and, for example, could boost our cognitive flexibility as well as our ability to act compassionate. Such changes are likely to facilitate the instilling of a number of epistemic virtues which have great bearing on our quality of life. This book offers the reader an accessible introduction to a set of neuro-enhancement methods, with a special focus on meditation techniques, and explores how such practices could contribute to make us better decision-makers and improve our moral virtues. The book is suitable for anyone looking for a text discussing the effects of neuro-enhancement from a secular ethics perspective.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Publishing Company, 2015. p. 111
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-187123 (URN)10.1007/978-3-319-23517-2 (DOI)2-s2.0-84955089915 (Scopus ID)978-3-319-23516-5 (ISBN)
Note

QC 20160519

Available from: 2016-05-19 Created: 2016-05-17 Last updated: 2016-05-19Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. (2013). Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement. Springer Netherlands
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Virtue Ethics and Human Enhancement
2013 (English)Book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Netherlands, 2013. p. 85
Series
Springer Briefs in Ethics, ISSN 2211-8101
Keywords
ethics, enhancement, cognitive, virtue, aristotle, good life
National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-136194 (URN)10.1007/978-94-007-5672-4 (DOI)978-94-007-5671-7 (ISBN)
Note

QC 20131204

Available from: 2013-12-04 Created: 2013-12-04 Last updated: 2017-03-24Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2013). Why computer games can be essential for human flourishing. Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, 11(2), 81-91
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Why computer games can be essential for human flourishing
2013 (English)In: Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society, ISSN 1477-996X, E-ISSN 1758-8871, Vol. 11, no 2, p. 81-91Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to argue that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, even in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, can be an integral part of human flourishing. Design/methodology/approach: The authors' claim is based on a modern reading of Aristotle's Nichomacean Ethics. It should be emphasized that the authors do not argue that computer gaming and other similar online activities are central to all people under all circumstances; but only seek to show that the claim holds true for some people under some circumstances and the authors try to spell out the relevant circumstances in detail. Findings: The authors provide a list of situations in which playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important, is an integral part of human flourishing. Originality/value: The paper puts some novel pressure on the widely-held belief that playing computer games for lengthy periods of time, in a manner that will force the player to forgo certain other activities normally seen as more important. The paper claims that playing some computer games and partaking in some forms of online activities could be highly conducive to what it actually means in practice to take care of oneself and, to paraphrase Aristotle, to be eager for fine actions.

Keywords
Aristotle, Computer games, Ethics, Gaming, Happiness, Internet, Moral philosophy, Virtues, Wellbeing
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-134642 (URN)10.1108/JICES-01-2013-0001 (DOI)2-s2.0-84878872726 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20131212

Available from: 2013-12-12 Created: 2013-11-27 Last updated: 2017-12-06Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2012). Virtuous Choice and Parity. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15(1), 71-82
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Virtuous Choice and Parity
2012 (English)In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 71-82Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion on the nature of choice in virtue theory. If several different actions are available to the virtuous agent, they are also likely to vary in their degree of virtue, at least in some situations. Yet, it is widely agreed that once an action is recognised as virtuous there is no higher level of virtue. In this paper we discuss how the virtue theorist could accommodate both these seemingly conflicting ideas. We discuss this issue from a modern Aristotelian perspective, as opposed to a purely exegetic one. We propose a way of resolving what seems to be a major clash between two central features of virtue ethics. Our proposal is based on the notion of parity, a concept which recently has received considerable attention in the literature on axiology. Briefly put, two alternatives are on a par (or are 'roughly equal') if they are comparable, although it is not the case that one is better than the other, nor that they are equally good. The advantages of applying the concept of parity to our problem are twofold. Firstly, it sheds new light on the account of choice in virtue theory. Secondly, some of the criticisms that have been mounted against the possibility of parity can be countered by considering the notion of choice from a virtue theory perspective.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80588 (URN)10.1007/s10677-011-9273-z (DOI)000303476400006 ()2-s2.0-84858708352 (Scopus ID)
Note

QP 2012. QC 20130212

Available from: 2012-02-09 Created: 2012-02-09 Last updated: 2017-12-07Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2012). Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship. Ethics and Information Technology, 14(3), 201-207
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Why virtual friendship is no genuine friendship
2012 (English)In: Ethics and Information Technology, ISSN 1388-1957, E-ISSN 1572-8439, Vol. 14, no 3, p. 201-207Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Based on a modern reading of Aristotle's theory of friendship, we argue that virtual friendship does not qualify as genuine friendship. By 'virtual friendship' we mean the type of friendship that exists on the internet, and seldom or never is combined with real life interaction. A 'traditional friendship' is, in contrast, the type of friendship that involves substantial real life interaction, and we claim that only this type can merit the label 'genuine friendship' and thus qualify as morally valuable. The upshot of our discussion is that virtual friendship is what Aristotle might have described as a lower and less valuable form of social exchange.

Keywords
Virtual friendship, Aristotle, Virtue ethics, Facebook
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-102616 (URN)10.1007/s10676-011-9284-4 (DOI)000307508700003 ()2-s2.0-84865403937 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20120921

Available from: 2012-09-21 Created: 2012-09-21 Last updated: 2017-12-07Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2011). Animal Ethics Based on Friendship. Journal of Animal Ethics, 1(1), 58-69
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Animal Ethics Based on Friendship
2011 (English)In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 1, p. 58-69Article in journal (Refereed) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80591 (URN)10.5406/janimalethics.1.1.0058 (DOI)
Note
QC 20120215Available from: 2012-02-09 Created: 2012-02-09 Last updated: 2012-03-21Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. & Peterson, M. (2011). Animals and Friendship: a reply to Rowlands. Journal of Animal Ethics, 1(2), 187-189
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Animals and Friendship: a reply to Rowlands
2011 (English)In: Journal of Animal Ethics, ISSN 2156-5414, Vol. 1, no 2, p. 187-189Article in journal (Refereed) Published
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80589 (URN)10.5406/janimalethics.1.2.0187 (DOI)
Note
QC 20120215Available from: 2012-02-09 Created: 2012-02-09 Last updated: 2012-02-15Bibliographically approved
Fröding, B. (2011). Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life. Neuroethics, 4(3), 223-234
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life
2011 (English)In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, Vol. 4, no 3, p. 223-234Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable.

Keywords
Virtue, Ethics, Aristotle, Cognitive, Enhancement, Moral virtue, Epistemic virtue, Neuro, The good life, Eudaimonia
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80586 (URN)10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2 (DOI)000295679000006 ()
Note
QC 20120215Available from: 2012-02-09 Created: 2012-02-09 Last updated: 2017-12-07Bibliographically approved
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ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-9984-7831

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