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Publications (9 of 9) Show all publications
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2018). Boosts vs. nudges from a welfarist perspective. Revue d' Economie politique, 128(2), 209-224
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Boosts vs. nudges from a welfarist perspective
2018 (English)In: Revue d' Economie politique, ISSN 0373-2630, E-ISSN 2105-2883, Vol. 128, no 2, p. 209-224Article, review/survey (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper compares two kinds of behavioral policies, boost and nudges, with respect to the normative questions they need to answer. Both policies are committed to welfarism - i.e. to respecting individuals' subjective reflected attitudes as the basis of judgment about what is good for them. However, because the two policy types affect behavior change in different ways, different normative requirements arise from this commitment. Nudges affect the choice context so as to change behavior, making use of behavioral evidence for stable relations between contextual features and behavioral outcomes. This intervention works irrespective of the nudged individual's understanding, evaluation or participation. Consequently, it is the nudge proponent who must argue that in the planned intervention, the nudge corrects a mistake and leads to a better outcome that is not compromised by the nudging procedure. Boosts, in contrast, affect behavior by training people in the use of decision tools. This intervention works only with the boosted individual's understanding, approval and active participation. Consequently, the boost proponent does not need to answer the difficult normative questions of mistake, welfare improvement or procedural compromise. Although it might be that nudge proponents can answer these questions for many situations, they constitute a normative burden for nudges that boosts can avoid. In this regard, boosts are therefore preferable to nudges.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Editions Dalloz Sirey, 2018
Keywords
Behavioral policy, Boost, Normativity, Nudge, Welfare
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-238270 (URN)10.3917/redp.282.0209 (DOI)2-s2.0-85047644705 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20181121

Available from: 2018-11-21 Created: 2018-11-21 Last updated: 2018-11-21Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. & Marchionni, C. (2018). Modeling model selection in model pluralism. Journal of economic methodology, 25(3), 265-275
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Modeling model selection in model pluralism
2018 (English)In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 265-275Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In his recent book, Rodrik [(2015). Economics rules. Why economics works, when it fails, and how to tell the difference. Oxford University Press] proposes an account of model pluralism according to which multiple models of the same target are acceptable as long as one model is more useful for one purpose and another is more useful for another purpose. How, then, is the right model for the purpose selected? Rodrik roughly outlines a selection procedure, which we formalize to enhance understanding of his account of model pluralism and to advance the critical discussion.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Routledge, 2018
Keywords
Rodrik, model selection, pluralism
National Category
Economics and Business
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-233300 (URN)10.1080/1350178X.2018.1488572 (DOI)000440740300005 ()2-s2.0-85050409133 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20180816

Available from: 2018-08-16 Created: 2018-08-16 Last updated: 2018-10-16Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T., Marchionni, C. & Feufel, M. A. (2018). TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES: HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS AND NUDGES. Economics and Philosophy, 34(2), 243-266
Open this publication in new window or tab >>TOWARD A FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING BEHAVIOURAL POLICIES: HOW TO CHOOSE BETWEEN BOOSTS AND NUDGES
2018 (English)In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 34, no 2, p. 243-266Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we analyse the difference between two types of behavioural policies - nudges and boosts. We distinguish them on the basis of the mechanisms through which they are expected to operate and identify the contextual conditions that are necessary for each policy to be successful. Our framework helps judging which type of policy is more likely to bring about the intended behavioural outcome in a given situation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2018
Keywords
behavioural policy, nudge, boost, heuristic, decision-making
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-231178 (URN)10.1017/S0266267118000032 (DOI)000434421300006 ()2-s2.0-85046017174 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20180720

Available from: 2018-07-20 Created: 2018-07-20 Last updated: 2018-07-20Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2017). Reflections on the 2017 Nobel memorial prize awarded to Richard Thaler. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 10(2), 61-75
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Reflections on the 2017 Nobel memorial prize awarded to Richard Thaler
2017 (English)In: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, ISSN 1876-9098, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 10, no 2, p. 61-75Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
EIPE, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2017
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-223089 (URN)10.23941/ejpe.v10i2.307 (DOI)2-s2.0-85038922795 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20180213

Available from: 2018-02-13 Created: 2018-02-13 Last updated: 2018-02-13Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2017). Seven problems with massive simulation models for policy decision-making. In: The Science and Art of Simulation I: Exploring - Understanding - Knowing: (pp. 85-101). Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Seven problems with massive simulation models for policy decision-making
2017 (English)In: The Science and Art of Simulation I: Exploring - Understanding - Knowing, Springer, 2017, p. 85-101Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Policymakers increasingly draw on scientific methods, including simulation modeling, to justify their decisions. For these purposes, scientist and policymakers face an extensive choice of modeling strategies. This paper distinguishes two types of strategies: Massive Simulation Models (MSMs) and Abstract Simulation Models (ASMs), and discusses how to justify strategy choice with reference to the core characteristics of the respective strategies. In particular, I argue that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in determining the accuracy of the model; that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs in dealing with inevitable uncertainty; and that MSMs might have more severe problems than ASMs with misinterpretation and misapplication due to their format. While this in no way excludes the prospect that some MSMs provide good justifications for policy decisions, my arguments caution against a general preference for MSM over ASMs for policy decision purposes.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2017
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-218137 (URN)10.1007/978-3-319-55762-5_7 (DOI)2-s2.0-85033499588 (Scopus ID)9783319557625 (ISBN)9783319557618 (ISBN)
Note

QC 20171127

Available from: 2017-11-27 Created: 2017-11-27 Last updated: 2017-11-27Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2016). Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence. Economics and Philosophy, 32(3), 463-483
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Why behavioural policy needs mechanistic evidence
2016 (English)In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 463-483Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Proponents of behavioural policies seek to justify them as evidence-based'. Yet they typically fail to show through which mechanisms these policies operate. This paper shows - at the hand of examples from economics and psychology - that without sufficient mechanistic evidence, one often cannot determine whether a given policy in its target environment will be effective, robust, persistent or welfare-improving. Because these properties are important for justification, policies that lack sufficient support from mechanistic evidence should not be called evidence-based'.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge University Press, 2016
Keywords
Policy, Mechanisms, Nudge, Evidence, Welfare
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-198964 (URN)10.1017/S0266267115000425 (DOI)000386199100004 ()2-s2.0-84947704269 (Scopus ID)
Note

 QC 20170116

Available from: 2017-01-16 Created: 2016-12-22 Last updated: 2017-11-29Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2015). A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution [Review]. Journal of economic methodology, 22(1), 128-134
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A cooperative species: human reciprocity and its evolution
2015 (English)In: Journal of economic methodology, ISSN 1350-178X, E-ISSN 1018-5070, Vol. 22, no 1, p. 128-134Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2015
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-242775 (URN)10.1080/1350178X.2015.1005395 (DOI)000211305000007 ()
Note

QC 20190211

Available from: 2019-02-11 Created: 2019-02-11 Last updated: 2019-02-11Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. (2015). Behavioural Public Policy [Review]. Economics and Philosophy, 31(3), 500-506
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Behavioural Public Policy
2015 (English)In: Economics and Philosophy, ISSN 0266-2671, E-ISSN 1474-0028, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 500-506Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS, 2015
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-243644 (URN)10.1017/S0266267115000243 (DOI)000362975300009 ()
Note

QC 20190205

Available from: 2019-02-05 Created: 2019-02-05 Last updated: 2019-02-05Bibliographically approved
Grüne-Yanoff, T. & Hansson, S. O. (2013). Procedural exclusion criteria for adaptive preferences. In: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics: (pp. 167-182). Springer International Publishing
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Procedural exclusion criteria for adaptive preferences
2013 (English)In: Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, Springer International Publishing , 2013, p. 167-182Conference paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

A preference is said to be adaptive if it is formed or changed in response to the agent’s feasible options (Elster 1985, Bruckner 2009). Adaptive preferences are major candidates for being discounted (or entirely dismissed) in welfarist accounts of the good (Elster 1985, Bovens 1992, Nussbaum 2001). In this paper, we refine this basic intuition in two ways. First, we show that not all adaptive preferences should be thus discounted. Second, we provide a general framework for determining which preferences should be discounted due to their adaptiveness, including a set of procedural exclusion criteria to be used for this purpose. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer International Publishing, 2013
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-216920 (URN)10.1007/978-3-642-38376-2_11 (DOI)2-s2.0-85019730264 (Scopus ID)
Note

Export Date: 24 October 2017; Book Chapter; Correspondence Address: Grüne-Yanoff, T.; Dept. of Philosophy, Royal Institute of TechnologySweden; email: till.grune@abe.kth.se. QC 20171030

Available from: 2017-10-30 Created: 2017-10-30 Last updated: 2017-10-30Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-6727-8723

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