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Umsonst, D., Ruths, J. & Sandberg, H. (2023). Finite Sample Guarantees for Quantile Estimation: An Application to Detector Threshold Tuning. IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, 31(2), 921-928
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Finite Sample Guarantees for Quantile Estimation: An Application to Detector Threshold Tuning
2023 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Control Systems Technology, ISSN 1063-6536, E-ISSN 1558-0865, Vol. 31, no 2, p. 921-928Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In threshold-based anomaly detection, we want to tune the threshold of a detector to achieve an acceptable false alarm rate. However, tuning the threshold is often a non-trivial task due to unknown detector output distributions. A detector threshold that provides an acceptable false alarm rate is equivalent to a specific quantile of the detector output distribution. Therefore, we use quantile estimators based on order statistics to estimate the detector threshold. The estimation of quantiles from sample data has a more than a century-long tradition and we provide three different distribution-free finite sample guarantees for a class of quantile estimators. The first is based on the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality, the second utilizes the Vysochanskij-Petunin inequality, and the third is based on exact confidence intervals for a beta distribution. These guarantees are then compared and used in the detector threshold tuning problem. We use both simulated data as well as data obtained from an experimental setup with the Temperature Control Lab to validate the guarantees provided. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2023
Keywords
Detector threshold tuning, fault detection, finite sample guarantees, quantile estimation, Behavioral research, Electric power transmission networks, Errors, Image resolution, Sampling, Behavioral science, False alarm rate, Faults detection, Finite sample guarantee, Finite samples, Power grids, Threshold tuning, Tuning
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-328103 (URN)10.1109/TCST.2022.3199668 (DOI)000860940500001 ()2-s2.0-85139425024 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20230602

Available from: 2023-06-02 Created: 2023-06-02 Last updated: 2023-06-02Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D. & Sandberg, H. (2022). Experimental evaluation of sensor attacks and defense mechanisms in feedback systems. Control Engineering Practice, 124, Article ID 105178.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Experimental evaluation of sensor attacks and defense mechanisms in feedback systems
2022 (English)In: Control Engineering Practice, ISSN 0967-0661, E-ISSN 1873-6939, Vol. 124, article id 105178Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We evaluate theoretical results, developed under linearity assumptions, on the feasibility of, the worst-case impact of, and defense mechanisms against a stealthy sensor attack in an experimental setup. The goal is to determine if this sensor attack poses a threat to real systems as well. We demonstrate that for a controller with stable dynamics the stealthy sensor attack is possible to conduct and the theoretical worst-case impact is close to the achieved practical one. However, although the attack should theoretically be possible when the controller has integral action, we show that the integral action slows the attacker down and the attacker is not able to remain stealthy if it has not perfect knowledge of the controller state. In addition to that, we investigate the effect of different anomaly detectors on the attack impact and our experiments indicate that the impact under detectors with internal dynamics is smaller for the considered attack objective. Finally, we demonstrate how noise injection into the controller dynamics can unveil the otherwise stealthy attacks.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier BV, 2022
Keywords
Resilient control systems, Attack detection, Cyber-physical security
National Category
Computer Sciences Reliability and Maintenance Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-315812 (URN)10.1016/j.conengprac.2022.105178 (DOI)000822546600003 ()2-s2.0-85129486566 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20220721

Available from: 2022-07-21 Created: 2022-07-21 Last updated: 2022-07-21Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D., Hashemi, N., Sandberg, H. & Ruths, J. (2022). Practical Detectors to Identify Worst-Case Attacks. In: 2022 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2022: . Paper presented at 2022 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2022, Trieste, Italy, Aug 23 2022 - Aug 25 2022 (pp. 197-204). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Practical Detectors to Identify Worst-Case Attacks
2022 (English)In: 2022 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2022, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2022, p. 197-204Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Recent work into quantifying the impact of attacks on control systems has motivated the design of worst-case attacks that define the envelope of the attack impact possible while remaining stealthy to model-based anomaly detectors. Such attacks - although stealthy for the considered detector test - tend to produce detector statistics that are easily identifiable by the naked eye. Although seemingly obvious, human operators cannot simultaneously monitor all process control variables of a large-scale cyber-physical system. What is lacking in the literature is a set of practical detectors that can identify such unusual attacked behavior. In defining these, we enable automated detection of to-date stealthy attacks and also further constrain the impact of attacks stealthy to a set of combined detectors, both existing and new.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2022
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-333524 (URN)10.1109/CCTA49430.2022.9966095 (DOI)2-s2.0-85144597374 (Scopus ID)
Conference
2022 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications, CCTA 2022, Trieste, Italy, Aug 23 2022 - Aug 25 2022
Note

Part of ISBN 9781665473385

QC 20230802

Available from: 2023-08-02 Created: 2023-08-02 Last updated: 2023-08-02Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D. & Sandberg, H. (2021). On the confidentiality of controller states under sensor attacks. Automatica, 123, Article ID 109329.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On the confidentiality of controller states under sensor attacks
2021 (English)In: Automatica, ISSN 0005-1098, E-ISSN 1873-2836, Vol. 123, article id 109329Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

With the emergence of cyber-attacks on control systems it has become clear that improving the security of control systems is an important task in today's society. We investigate how an attacker that has access to the measurements transmitted from the plant to the controller can perfectly estimate the internal state of the controller. This attack on sensitive information of the control loop is, on the one hand, a violation of the privacy, and, on the other hand, a violation of the security of the closed-loop system if the obtained estimate is used in a larger attack scheme. Current literature on sensor attacks often assumes that the attacker has already access to the controller's state. However, this is not always possible. We derive conditions for when the attacker is able to perfectly estimate the controller's state. These conditions show that if the controller has unstable poles a perfect estimate of the controller state is not possible. Moreover, we propose a defence mechanism to render the attack infeasible. This defence is based on adding uncertainty to the controller dynamics. We also discuss why an unstable controller is only a good defence for certain plants. Finally, simulations with a three-tank system verify our results.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier BV, 2021
Keywords
Cyber-physical security, Privacy, Linear control systems, Kalman filters, Algebraic Riccati equations, Discrete-time systems
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-289011 (URN)10.1016/j.automatica.2020.109329 (DOI)000598168100021 ()2-s2.0-85096159445 (Scopus ID)
Note

QC 20210122

Available from: 2021-01-22 Created: 2021-01-22 Last updated: 2022-06-25Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D. & Sandberg, H. (2021). On the confidentiality of the reference signal under sensor attacks. In: 2021 60Th Ieee Conference On Decision And Control (Cdc): . Paper presented at 2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Austin, TX, USA, December 14-17, 2021. (pp. 3468-3473). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On the confidentiality of the reference signal under sensor attacks
2021 (English)In: 2021 60Th Ieee Conference On Decision And Control (Cdc), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2021, p. 3468-3473Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we investigate the confidentiality of the reference signal of a feedback system under sensor attacks. In particular, we analyze the conditions for when an attacker with perfect model knowledge and access to the sensor measurements can obtain an unbiased estimate of the reference signal in a feedback control system such that the estimate's error covariance converges to zero. We call such an estimate a perfect estimate. Under the assumption of linear dynamics for the plant, the controller, and the reference signal, we show that the attacker can perfectly estimate the reference signal if and only if the reference dynamics do not have eigenvalues outside the unit circle. This implies that an attacker is able to perfectly estimate common reference signals such as step functions and sinusoidal signals from noisy measurements. The convergence rate of the estimate is, however, not exponentially fast for common reference signals and depends on the reference signal to be estimated as well as the controller used. We verify our results numerically with a simulation of a three-tank system.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2021
Series
IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, ISSN 0743-1546
National Category
Computer Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-313087 (URN)10.1109/CDC45484.2021.9683766 (DOI)000781990303013 ()2-s2.0-85126071657 (Scopus ID)
Conference
2021 60th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Austin, TX, USA, December 14-17, 2021.
Note

Part of proceedings: ISBN 978-1-6654-3659-5

QC 20220530

Available from: 2022-05-30 Created: 2022-05-30 Last updated: 2022-06-25Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D., Ruths, J. & Sandberg, H. (2021). Sample-based anomaly detector tuning with finite sample guarantees. In: 2021 american control conference (ACC): . Paper presented at American Control Conference (ACC), MAY 25-28, 2021, ELECTR NETWORK (pp. 3248-3253). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Sample-based anomaly detector tuning with finite sample guarantees
2021 (English)In: 2021 american control conference (ACC), Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2021, p. 3248-3253Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

We present a sample-based approach for tuning an anomaly detector threshold to achieve an acceptable false alarm rate without a priori knowledge of system or detector dynamics. If the distribution of the output of the detector is known, finding such a threshold can be re-interpreted as determining a specific quantile of the detector output distribution, which is the minimizer of a convex optimization problem. The sample-based approach we propose approximates the threshold from the empirical distribution. We, further, identify distribution free finite sample guarantees that give the number of samples required to ensure the false alarm rate is near the acceptable value. Finally, we numerically verify our approach on both static and dynamic anomaly detectors, where we investigate both light- and heavy-tailed distributions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2021
Series
Proceedings of the American Control Conference, ISSN 0743-1619
National Category
Signal Processing Computer Sciences
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-304558 (URN)10.23919/ACC50511.2021.9482656 (DOI)000702263303053 ()2-s2.0-85108204756 (Scopus ID)
Conference
American Control Conference (ACC), MAY 25-28, 2021, ELECTR NETWORK
Note

Part of proceedings: ISBN 978-1-6654-4197-1, QC 20230117

Available from: 2021-11-09 Created: 2021-11-09 Last updated: 2023-01-17Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D. (2021). Stealthy Sensor Attacks on Feedback Systems: Attack Analysis and Detector-based Defense Mechanisms. (Doctoral dissertation). Stockholm, Sweden: KTH Royal Institute of Technology
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Stealthy Sensor Attacks on Feedback Systems: Attack Analysis and Detector-based Defense Mechanisms
2021 (English)Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this thesis, we investigate sensor attacks on feedback systems and how anomaly detectors can be used as a defense mechanism. We consider an attacker with access to all sensor measurements and full knowledge about the closed-loop system model. The attacker wants to maximize its impact on the system while not triggering an alarm in the anomaly detector. The defender wants to mitigate the attacker's impact with detector-based defense mechanisms, which consider the normal operating cost as well.

The sensor attack consists of three different stages and we begin by analyzing each stage separately. First, to launch its stealthy attack, the attacker needs to estimate the internal controller state perfectly while only accessing the measurements. We prove that the attacker can perfectly estimate the controller state if and only if the linear controller dynamics do not have eigenvalues outside of the unit circle. The theory for controller state estimation is applied to reference estimation as well, where we show that the attacker can estimate common reference signals, such as constant and sinusoidal signals, regardless of the controller used. Second, the attacker estimates the internal anomaly detector state. When the detector has linear dynamics, the attacker is able to estimate the state while injecting a malicious signal that mimics the detector output statistics based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence. In the third stage, the attacker launches its worst-case attack on the closed-loop system. We provide a convex optimization approach to estimate the worst-case impact of an attack with an infinity norm-based objective. All stages are evaluated in an experimental setup, which shows that both the controller and the detector play a critical role for the feasibility and the severity of the attack.

Next, we investigate detector-based defense mechanisms and begin by looking into metrics to compare detectors under attack. The metric we consider first is based on the worst-case attack impact and the average time between false alarms. Since the attacker's objective, and, thus, the impact, is often unknown, we propose a metric that has the advantage of being agnostic to the attacker's objective. We then present a fixed detector threshold setting based on a Stackelberg game framework, which minimizes the cost induced by the false alarms and the attack impact. Further, a moving target defense is obtained by designing a dynamic threshold setting where the threshold is periodically chosen at random from a discrete set. By analyzing one period in a Bayesian game framework, we determine the optimal distribution over the discrete set by solving a linear program, such that the operator's cost is minimized. In the Bayesian framework, we also include uncertainty about the attacker's objective into our analysis. Additionally, we determine a necessary and sufficient condition for when the optimal distribution does not concentrate the probability on only one threshold. For comparing detectors and threshold-based defense mechanisms, we need to know which threshold results in a certain false alarm rate under nominal conditions. Since the threshold tuning is often non-trivial, we derive three finite sample guarantees for a data-driven threshold tuning such that the threshold guarantees an acceptable false alarm rate with a high probability.

Abstract [sv]

I den här avhandlingen undersöker vi sensorattacker mot återkopplade system och hur feldetektorer kan användas som försvarsmekanism. Vi betraktar en angripare som har tillgång till alla sensormätningar samt har fullständig kunskap om den slutna systemmodellen. Angriparen vill maximera sin påverkan på systemet utan att utlösa ett larm i feldetektorn. Försvararen vill mildra angriparens påverkan med hjälp av detektorbaserade försvarsmekanismer som även tar hänsyn till driftskostnaden.

Sensorattacken består av tre olika steg och vi börjar med att analysera varje steg separat. I det första steget måste angriparen, för att inleda sin osynliga attack, uppskatta regulatorns interna tillståndet perfekt genom att endast använda mätningarna. Vi bevisar att angriparen kan uppskatta regulatorns tillstånd perfekt om och endast om dess linjära dynamik inte har egenvärden utanför enhetscirkeln. Teorin för uppskattning av regulatortillståndet används även för att uppskatta referensen och vi visar att angriparen kan uppskatta vanligt använda referenssignaler, t.ex. konstanta och sinusformade signaler, oavsett vilken regulator som används. I det andra steget uppskattar angriparen det interna tillståndet för feldetektorn. När detektorn har linjär dynamik kan angriparen uppskatta tillståndet samtidigt som hen injicerar en skadlig signal som efterliknar detektorns utdatastatistik, mätt genom Kullback-Leibler-divergensen. I det tredje steget inleder angriparen sitt kraftfullaste angrepp på det slutna systemet. Vi presenterar en konvex optimeringsmetod för att uppskatta den värsta effekten av en attack mätt genom oändligthetsnormen. Alla steg utvärderas i en experimentell uppställning, som visar att både regulatorn och detektorn spelar en avgörande roll för angreppets genomförbarhet och svårighetsgrad.

Därefter undersöker vi detektorbaserade försvarsmekanismer och börjar med att titta på mått för att jämföra olika detektorer under angrepp. Den första måttet vi överväger är baserat på den värsta attackens påverkan och den genomsnittliga tiden mellan falska larm. Eftersom angriparens mål, och därmed konsekvenserna av attacken, ofta är okända föreslår vi ett mått som har fördelen att vara oberoende av angriparens mål. Vidare presenterar vi en fast tröskel för feldetektoren som bygger på ett Stackelbergspel, vilket minimerar kostnaderna för falska larm och attackens påverkan. Ett dynamiskt försvar uppnås genom att feldetekorns tröskel väljs slumpmässigt och periodiskt från en diskret uppsättning av trösklar. Genom att analysera en period inom ramen för bayesianska spel fastställer vi den optimala fördelningen över den diskreta mängden genom att lösa ett linjärt program så att operatörens kostnad minimeras. I det bayesianska ramverket inkluderar vi också osäkerhet om angriparens mål i analysen. Vidare fastställer vi ett nödvändigt och tillräckligt villkor för när den optimala fördelningen inte koncentrerar sannolikheten på endast ett tröskelvärde. För att kunna jämföra detektorer och tröskelbaserade försvarsmekanismer måste vi veta vilken tröskel som resulterar i en viss falsklarmsfrekvens under nominella förhållanden. Eftersom tröskelinställningen oftast inte är trivial, härleder vi tre garantier för ändliga urval för en datadriven tröskelavstämning så att tröskeln garanterar en godtagbar falsklarmsfrekvens med hög sannolikhet.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm, Sweden: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2021. p. 203
Series
TRITA-EECS-AVL ; 2021:64
National Category
Control Engineering
Research subject
Electrical Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-303502 (URN)978-91-8040-019-0 (ISBN)
Public defence
2021-11-09, https://kth-se.zoom.us/meeting/register/u50qd-mprTorHt3D83f70OXsEbQH_6_gVH64, F3, Lindstedtsvägen 26, Stockholm, 09:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Funder
Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, MSB 2020-09672Swedish Research Council, 2016-00861Swedish Energy Agency, 42794-1
Note

QC 20211018

Available from: 2021-10-18 Created: 2021-10-15 Last updated: 2022-06-25Bibliographically approved
Umsonst, D., Saritas, S. & Sandberg, H. (2020). A Nash equilibrium-based moving target defense against stealthy sensor attacks. In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control: . Paper presented at 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020, 14 December 2020 through 18 December 2020 (pp. 3772-3778). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A Nash equilibrium-based moving target defense against stealthy sensor attacks
2020 (English)In: Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2020, p. 3772-3778Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This paper investigates a moving target defense strategy based on detector threshold switching against stealthy sensor attacks. We model the interactions between the attacker and the defender as a game. While the attacker wants to remain stealthy and maximize its impact, the defender wants to minimize both the cost for investigating false alarms and the attack impact. We define the moving target defense as a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and are able to formulate an equivalent finite matrix game of the original game. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a moving target defense strategy. A globally optimal moving target defense strategy is obtained via a linear optimization problem by exploiting the structure of the matrix game. Simulations with a four tank system verify that by applying an optimal moving target defense strategy, the defender reduces its cost compared to the optimally chosen fixed detector threshold. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2020
Keywords
Game theory, Linear programming, False alarms, Finite matrices, Linear optimization problems, Mixed strategy, Moving target defense, Nash equilibria, Tank system, Threshold switching, Network security
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-301193 (URN)10.1109/CDC42340.2020.9304197 (DOI)000717663403007 ()2-s2.0-85099879819 (Scopus ID)
Conference
59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2020, 14 December 2020 through 18 December 2020
Funder
Swedish Research CouncilSwedish Energy Agency
Note

QC 20210908

Available from: 2021-09-08 Created: 2021-09-08 Last updated: 2023-04-05Bibliographically approved
Kang, B., Umsonst, D., Faschang, M., Seitl, C., Friedberg, I., Kupzog, F., . . . McLaughlin, K. (2020). Intrusion Resilience for PV Inverters in a Distribution Grid Use-Case Featuring Dynamic Voltage Control. In: NadjmTehrani, S (Ed.), CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES SECURITY (CRITIS 2019): . Paper presented at 14th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS), SEP 23-25, 2019, Linkoping Univ, Linkoping, SWEDEN (pp. 97-109). Springer Nature
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Intrusion Resilience for PV Inverters in a Distribution Grid Use-Case Featuring Dynamic Voltage Control
Show others...
2020 (English)In: CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURES SECURITY (CRITIS 2019) / [ed] NadjmTehrani, S, Springer Nature , 2020, p. 97-109Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

ICT-enabled smart grid devices, potentially introduce new cyber vulnerabilities that weaken the resilience of the electric grid. Using real and simulated PV inverters, this work demonstrates how cyber-attacks on IEC 61850 communications to field devices can force an unstable state, causing voltage oscillations or overvoltage situations in a distribution grid. An automated resilience mechanism is therefore presented, combining intrusion detection and decentralised resilient controllers, which is demonstrated to assure stable operation of an energy system by counteracting cyber-attacks targeting embedded PV inverters.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Nature, 2020
Series
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743 ; 11777
Keywords
Cyber security, Smart grids, Resilient control, Intrusion response
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-290491 (URN)10.1007/978-3-030-37670-3_8 (DOI)000612959400008 ()2-s2.0-85077508058 (Scopus ID)
Conference
14th International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security (CRITIS), SEP 23-25, 2019, Linkoping Univ, Linkoping, SWEDEN
Note

QC 20210325

Available from: 2021-03-25 Created: 2021-03-25 Last updated: 2022-06-25Bibliographically approved
Chong, M., Umsonst, D. & Sandberg, H. (2019). Local voltage control of an inverter-based power distribution network with a class of slope-restricted droop controllers. In: IFAC PAPERSONLINE: . Paper presented at 8th IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems (NECSYS), SEP 16-17, 2019, Loyola Univ, Chicago, IL (pp. 163-168). ELSEVIER, 52(20)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Local voltage control of an inverter-based power distribution network with a class of slope-restricted droop controllers
2019 (English)In: IFAC PAPERSONLINE, ELSEVIER , 2019, Vol. 52, no 20, p. 163-168Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Motivated by the environmental and economical benefits of using renewable energy, we consider the problem of regulating the voltage of a power distribution network in a line configuration where each customer is equipped with an inverter. The substation at the head of the line determines the nominal voltage level which is communicated to each customer in the distribution line. The voltage level of each customer is regulated by an inverter which generates reactive power according to our class of droop controllers satisfying the sloperestriction property. This paper provides a sufficient condition for regulating the customers' voltage level within a desired band, which depends on the properties of the distribution line (line impedances) and the droop controller employed. This is achieved when only the upper bound of all the customers' net power usage is known, thereby preserving the privacy of each customer. Simulation studies are performed on a benchmark model for a distribution system with renewable sources. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ELSEVIER, 2019
Keywords
power distribution, power-system control, nonlinear control
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-266501 (URN)10.1016/j.ifacol.2019.12.152 (DOI)000504302900029 ()2-s2.0-85082694027 (Scopus ID)
Conference
8th IFAC Workshop on Distributed Estimation and Control in Networked Systems (NECSYS), SEP 16-17, 2019, Loyola Univ, Chicago, IL
Note

QC 20200406

Available from: 2020-04-06 Created: 2020-04-06 Last updated: 2022-06-26Bibliographically approved
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-7459-3019

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