A Learning Testbed for False Data Injection Attacks
2023 (English)In: Proceedings of 2023 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT EUROPE 2023, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2023Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
This paper presents a user-friendly software-based power system cybersecurity testbed for educational purposes, focusing on false data injection attacks (FDIAs). While numerous testbeds are already available for experimenting with FDIAs, the high level of sophistication associated with these testbeds often requires users to possess extensive knowledge of the different hardware and software systems involved in power system control. This project aims to introduce cybersecurity to a broader crowd and, by extension, promote research in the field. Specifically, we propose an easy-to-use application with a graphical user interface (GUI) to allow non-computer-familiar users to utilize it. The current version of the application allows users to simulate the stationary behaviour of an IEEE test system, test it with customized FDIAs, and monitor the system’s response through the GUI. Currently, the application is in a proof-of-concept stage, and to encourage contributions from well-meaning developers, we have open-sourced the project for community involvement. We also suggest several potential application improvements to guide the development process in the right direction.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2023.
Keywords [en]
cybersecurity, False data injection attacks, learning, power system testbed, state estimation
National Category
Computer Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-344561DOI: 10.1109/ISGTEUROPE56780.2023.10407381Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85187285870OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-344561DiVA, id: diva2:1845949
Conference
2023 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT EUROPE 2023, Oct 23 2023 - Oct 26 2023 Grenoble, France
Note
Part of ISBN: 979-835039678-2
QC 20240322
2024-03-202024-03-202024-03-22Bibliographically approved