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A Secure Control Framework for Resource-Limited Adversaries
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5491-4068
University of Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1835-2963
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9940-5929
2015 (English)In: Automatica, ISSN 0005-1098, E-ISSN 1873-2836, Vol. 51, no 1, p. 135-148Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Cyber-secure networked control is modeled, analyzed, and experimentally illustrated in this paper. An attack space dened bythe adversary's model knowledge, disclosure, and disruption resources is introduced. Adversaries constrained by these resourcesare modeled for a networked control system architecture. It is shown that attack scenarios corresponding to denial-of-service,replay, zero-dynamics, and bias injection attacks on linear time-invariant systems can be analyzed using this framework.Furthermore, the attack policy for each scenario is described and the attack's impact is characterized using the concept ofsafe sets. An experimental setup based on a quadruple-tank process controlled over a wireless network is used to illustrate theattack scenarios, their consequences, and potential counter-measures.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2015. Vol. 51, no 1, p. 135-148
Keywords [en]
Attack space, Cyber-physical systems, Secure control systems, System security
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-159725DOI: 10.1016/j.automatica.2014.10.067ISI: 000348015500017Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84920703223OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-159725DiVA, id: diva2:787043
Funder
EU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 608224Swedish Research Council, 2009-4565; 2013-5523Knut and Alice Wallenberg Foundation
Note

QC 20150220

Available from: 2015-02-09 Created: 2015-02-09 Last updated: 2022-06-23Bibliographically approved

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preprint(740 kB)598 downloads
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Teixeira, AndréSandberg, HenrikJohansson, Karl Henrik

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