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What Justifies Judgments of Inauthenticity?
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History, Philosophy.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1456-4352
2018 (English)In: HEC Forum, ISSN 0956-2737, E-ISSN 1572-8498Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The notion of authenticity, i.e., being “genuine,” “real,” or “true to oneself,” is sometimes held as critical to a person’s autonomy, so that inauthenticity prevents the person from making autonomous decisions or leading an autonomous life. It has been pointed out that authenticity is difficult to observe in others. Therefore, judgments of inauthenticity have been found inadequate to underpin paternalistic interventions, among other things. This article delineates what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that for persons who wish to live according to the prevailing social and moral standards and desires that are seriously undesirable according to those standards, it is justified to judge that a desire is inauthentic to the extent that it is due to causal factors that are alien to the person and to the extent that it deviates from the person’s practical identity. The article contributes to a tradition of thinking about authenticity which is known mainly from Frankfurt and Dworkin, and bridges the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and real authenticity-related problems in practical biomedical settings.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2018.
Keywords [en]
Authenticity, Autonomy, Decision-making, Paternalism, Bioethics
National Category
Ethics
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-233506DOI: 10.1007/s10730-018-9356-5ISI: 000452209200004PubMedID: 29971534Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85049565770OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-233506DiVA, id: diva2:1240383
Note

QC 20180822

Available from: 2018-08-21 Created: 2018-08-21 Last updated: 2022-06-26Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Authenticity in Bioethics: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Authenticity in Bioethics: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice
2019 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The aim of this doctoral thesis is to bridge the gap between theoretical ideals of authenticity and practical authenticity-related problems in healthcare. In this context, authenticity means being "genuine," "real," "true to oneself," or similar, and is assumed to be closely connected to the autonomy of persons. The thesis includes an introduction and four articles related to authenticity. The first article collects various theories intended to explain the distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity in a taxonomy that enables oversight and analysis. It is argued that (in-)authenticity is difficult to observe in others. The second article offers a solution to this difficulty in one theory of authenticity. It is proposed that under certain circumstances, it is morally justified to judge that the desires underlying a person's decisions are inauthentic. The third article incorporates this proposition into an already established theory of personal autonomy. It is argued that the resulting conceptualization of autonomy is fruitful for action-guidance in authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The fourth article collects nine cases of possible authenticity-related problems in healthcare. The theory developed in the third article is applied to the problems, when this is allowed by the case-description, to provide guidance with regard to them. It is argued that there is not one universal authenticity-related problem but many different problems, and that there is thus likely not one universal solution to such problems but various particular solutions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2019. p. 147
Series
Theses in philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1650-8831 ; 62
Keywords
Authenticity, autonomy, decision-making, healthcare, paternalism, informed consent, bioethics
National Category
Ethics
Research subject
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-244301 (URN)978-91-7873-124-4 (ISBN)
Public defence
2019-06-10, Kollegiesalen, Brinellvägen 8, Stockholm, 13:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2014–4024Forte, Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare, 2014–4024
Available from: 2019-03-21 Created: 2019-02-18 Last updated: 2022-06-26Bibliographically approved

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Ahlin, Jesper

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