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On the Effects of Distance-decreasing Attacks on Cryptographically Protected GNSS Signals
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Network and Systems engineering. (Networked Systems Security Group)
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Network and Systems engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3267-5374
2019 (English)In: Proceedings of the 2019 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, 2019, p. 363-372Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The security of global navigation satellite systems draws attention increasingly, and authentication mechanisms for civilian services seem very effective in thwarting malicious behavior. For example, the Galileo E1 Open Service introduces navigation message authentication. Authentication, as well as encryption at navigation message or spreading code level, can prevent spoofing attacks, but do not preclude replay attacks. In this work, we consider a type of strong replay attacks, distance-decreasing attacks, against cryptographically protected GNSS signals. Distance-decreasing attack enhance an attacker’s capability of allowing it to mislead the victim receiver that the GNSS signals arrive earlier than true signals. We analyze the instantiation and the effects of the distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected GNSS signals, on navigation message authenticated signals, and on spreading-code encrypted signals. We discuss different strategies that the attacker can adopt to introduce the least bit errors to the re-transmitted signals and avoid being detected at the victim receiver. We provide evaluation results of distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected signals and authenticated navigation message signals, based on different strategies and configurations, and we sketch countermeasures to the different strategies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. p. 363-372
Keywords [en]
Distance-Decreasing (DD) attacks, Early Detection (ED), Late Commit (LC), Navigation Message Authentication (NMA), Spreading Code Encryption (SCE)
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Research subject
Electrical Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-248026Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85068322902ISBN: 0-936406-21-6 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-248026DiVA, id: diva2:1301717
Conference
2019 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation, January 28 - 31, 2019, Reston, Virginia
Note

QC 20190412

Available from: 2019-04-02 Created: 2019-04-02 Last updated: 2019-10-04Bibliographically approved

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fulltext(1369 kB)86 downloads
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Authority records BETA

Zhang, KeweiPapadimitratos, Panagiotis

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
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Language
  • de-DE
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  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
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Output format
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