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Elimination of Rent Control in the Swedish Rental Housing Market: Why and How?
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Real Estate and Construction Management, Building and Real Estate Economics.
Uppsala University, Sweden.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-6639-4466
Number of Authors: 22012 (English)In: Journal of Housing Research, ISSN 1052-7001, Vol. 21, no 2, p. 159-181Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

If housing market rent control is completely eliminated, welfare gains may arise from tenant redistribution. The amount of such welfare gains is estimated at approximately SEK 20 billion (approximately USD 3 billion) for inner Stockholm. In addition, welfare gains may arise from the production of new housing. We demonstrate that total deregulation is preferable to partial deregulation limited to new housing. Furthermore, inefficient overproduction of new housing would follow partial deregulation. Tenants facing rent increases if rent control were phased out would suffer welfare losses, and should be compensated to fulfill the Pareto criterion. Various compensation models could be used, as analyzed here. The amounts necessary to fully compensate tenants in attractive submarkets may be substantial. The Pareto criterion is not necessarily a desirable guideline for politicians if it implies huge wealth redistribution; it is still, however, a natural criterion in connection to all welfare economic analysis.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Informa UK Limited , 2012. Vol. 21, no 2, p. 159-181
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-332068DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2012.12092062Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85015805820OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-332068DiVA, id: diva2:1783013
Note

QC 20230718

Available from: 2023-07-18 Created: 2023-07-18 Last updated: 2023-07-18Bibliographically approved

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Söderberg, Bo

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