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Research on Evolutionary Game of Pharmaceutical Supply Chain Platform Considering Government Supervision Behavior
KTH, School of Industrial Engineering and Management (ITM), Production engineering. Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430080, Peoples R China.Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Ctr Serv Sci & Engn, Wuhan 430065, Peoples R China..ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7585-4674
Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430080, Peoples R China..
Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Ctr Serv Sci & Engn, Wuhan 430065, Peoples R China.;Wuhan Univ Technol, Sanya Sci & Educ Innovat Pk, Sanya 572000, Peoples R China..
Wuhan Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430080, Peoples R China..
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2024 (English)In: IEEE Access, E-ISSN 2169-3536, Vol. 12, p. 143930-143944Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Medicine occupies an important position in people's lives, and its safety and effectiveness are directly related to people's lives and health. In recent years, with the frequent occurrence of unqualified vaccines, quality control in drug transportation has been paid more and more attention. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model composed of government, pharmaceutical enterprises, and logistics enterprises and models behavioral strategies. The interaction between the two and the influence of different parameters on the evolution are simulated and analyzed. The results show that implementing a government punishment mechanism, inter-firm revenue sharing and drug failure rate will have different impacts on the outcome of the evolutionary stability strategy of pharmaceutical enterprises and logistics enterprises. These conclusions not only enrich the theoretical literature on factors affecting the decision-making factors of pharmaceutical enterprises and logistics enterprises to ensure drug quality but also provide useful references for improving government policies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) , 2024. Vol. 12, p. 143930-143944
Keywords [en]
Games, Government policies, Vaccines, Costs, Companies, Green products, Logistics, Supply chain management, Drug delivery, Pharmaceuticals, Evolutionary computation, Product safety, Controlled products, cold chain logistics, evolutionary game, pharmaceutical supply chain
National Category
Transport Systems and Logistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-355808DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2024.3471643ISI: 001337130800001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85205884519OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-355808DiVA, id: diva2:1910252
Note

QC 20241104

Available from: 2024-11-04 Created: 2024-11-04 Last updated: 2024-11-04Bibliographically approved

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Wang, Yong

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