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Research on evolutionary game of low-carbon logistics in two-level supply chain under carbon tax policy
KTH, School of Industrial Engineering and Management (ITM), Production engineering. School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, China; Center for Service Science and Engineering, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430065, China.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-7585-4674
School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, China; General Manager's Office, Hubei Commerce and Logistics Group Co., Ltd., Wuhan 430014, China.
School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, China.
School of Management, Wuhan University of Science and Technology, Wuhan 430080, China.
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2024 (English)In: Sustainable Futures, E-ISSN 2666-1888, Vol. 8, article id 100387Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Aiming at the problem of low carbon emission reduction in the sustainable development of the logistics industry, this study adopts the research method combining game theory and dynamic system analysis. A tripartite evolutionary game model including the logistics company, the manufacturer, and the government is constructed, and the strategy choice and mutual influence of each participant in the process of low-carbon emission reduction are discussed. At last, MATLAB software is used to simulate the model. By adjusting the values of different parameters, the process and results of the dynamic evolution of the system are displayed intuitively. It was found that the government's sound penalty and subsidy policy plays a key role in promoting the evolution of the manufacturer and the logistics company to adopt low-carbon strategies. Specifically, higher subsidies and moderate penalties can encourage enterprises to take low-carbon measures and promote the system's evolution to a low-carbon and stable equilibrium point. These conclusions help the logistics company and the manufacturer to identify the key factors and paths of low-carbon development, promote growth in the direction of low-carbon, green, and sustainable development, and provide theoretical support and empirical basis for the government to formulate and improve relevant policies on carbon emission reduction, and improve the effectiveness and pertinency of policies.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier BV , 2024. Vol. 8, article id 100387
Keywords [en]
Carbon tax policy, Evolutionary game, Low-carbon logistics, Two-level supply chain
National Category
Environmental Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-357187DOI: 10.1016/j.sftr.2024.100387ISI: 001440919000001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85210140818OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-357187DiVA, id: diva2:1918264
Note

QC 20241211

Available from: 2024-12-04 Created: 2024-12-04 Last updated: 2025-04-25Bibliographically approved

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Wang, YongWang, Lihui

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