2015 (English)In: Logique et Analyse, ISSN 0024-5836, E-ISSN 2295-5836, Vol. 58, no 232, 487-508 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It is argued that David Lewis' two triviality results (the probability of the conditional cannot be the conditional probability; desire cannot be belief) both present a potential problem for expressivism, are related, and can both be resolved in the same way: by allowing for gappy propositions (propositions that can lack truth value). In particular, a semantics for 'A is good' is provided that allows one to embrace the major premises leading up to Lewis' triviality result while avoiding its conclusion.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Peeters Publishers, 2015. Vol. 58, no 232, 487-508 p.
Research subject Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-193555DOI: 10.2143/LEA.232.0.3144294ScopusID: 2-s2.0-84973890018OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-193555DiVA: diva2:1015922
ProjectsEn expressivistisk meningsteori
FunderSwedish Research Council
QC 201610052016-10-042016-10-042016-10-05Bibliographically approved