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Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts
KTH, School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Communication Systems, CoS, Network Systems Laboratory (NS Lab).ORCID iD: 0000-0001-9338-4960
2017 (English)In: IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, ISSN 0733-8716, E-ISSN 1558-0008, Vol. 35, no 2, p. 421-431Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies, such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation-based fair revenue sharing, i.e., multi-level Internet service provider (ISP) settlements, can be a candidate solution to avoid unfair revenue share. However, it has been under-explored whether selfish ISPs actually cooperate or not (often referred to as the stability of coalition), because they may partially cooperate or even do not cooperate, depending on how much revenue is distributed to each individual ISP. In this paper, we study this stability of coalition in the Internet, where our aim is to investigate the conditions under which ISPs cooperate under different regimes on the traffic demand and network bandwidth. We first consider the under-demanded regime, i.e., network bandwidth exceeds traffic demand, where revenue sharing based on Shapley value leads ISPs to entirely cooperate, i.e., stability of the grand coalition. Next, we consider the over-demanded regime, i.e., traffic demand exceeds network bandwidth, where there may exist some ISPs who deviate from the grand coalition. In particular, this deviation depends on how users' traffic is handled inside the network, for which we consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference. We analytically compare those three scheduling policies in terms of network neutrality, and stability of cooperation that provides useful implications on when and how multi-level ISP settlements help and how the Internet should be operated for stable peering and revenue balance among ISPs.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2017. Vol. 35, no 2, p. 421-431
Keywords [en]
Network economics, traffic scheduling, coalitional game theory, Shapley value, stability
National Category
Communication Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-207913DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2017.2659378ISI: 000400412400015Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85017306620OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-207913DiVA, id: diva2:1103295
Note

QC 20170530

Available from: 2017-05-30 Created: 2017-05-30 Last updated: 2017-11-06Bibliographically approved

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Cho, Jeong-woo

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