The small improvement argument
2008 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 65, no 1, 127-139 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It is commonly assumed that moral deliberation requires that the alternatives available in a choice situation are evaluatively comparable. This comparability assumption is threatened by claims of incomparability, which is often established by means of the small improvement argument (SIA). In this paper I argue that SIA does not establish incomparability in a stricter sense. The reason is that it fails to distinguish incomparability from a kind of evaluative indeterminacy which may arise due to the vagueness of the evaluative comparatives 'better than,' 'worse than,' and 'equally as good as'.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 65, no 1, 127-139 p.
value relations, incomparability, small improvement argument, vagueness
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-6536DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9243-0ISI: 000259444100007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-6536DiVA: diva2:11273
QC 20101112. Uppdaterad från Submitted till Published (20101112).2006-12-072006-12-072010-11-12Bibliographically approved