Margins of error in value comparisons: a critique of the small improvement argument
2007 (English)In: Meeting Abstracts; 81st Annual Meeting April 3 - 8, 2007, San Francisco , 2007Conference paper (Refereed)
In this paper margin of error principles for comparative value judgements are outlined. They are based on the idea that if a proposition concerning the value relation between two value bearing options is true, but there are sufficiently similar cases in which it is false, it is not available to be known. To demonstrate the usefulness of the principles, they are applied in building an epistemological case against the so-called small-improvement argument (SIA), which is often considered the strongest case for value incomparability. If we acknowledge margins for error in comparative value judgement, it follows that some of the crucial steps in SIA are epistemically unwarranted.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-6537OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-6537DiVA: diva2:11274
American Philosophical Association, 81st Annual Meeting, April 3 - 8, 2007, San Francisco
QC 201011122006-12-072006-12-072010-11-12Bibliographically approved