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Human choice behaviour: a probabilistic analysis of incomparability
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
(English)Article in journal (Other academic) Submitted
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-6538OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-6538DiVA: diva2:11275
Note
QS 20120326Available from: 2006-12-07 Created: 2006-12-07 Last updated: 2012-03-26Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Incomparable risks, values and preferences
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Incomparable risks, values and preferences
2006 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other scientific)
Abstract [en]

Abstract. Consistent valuation and societal prioritization of risks presupposes comparability among risks, that is, in order to rank risks in order of severity, and allocate risk preventative resources accordingly, we must be able to determine whether one risk is better or worse than another, and by how much. It is often claimed, however, that some risks are not amenable to this kind of comparison because they are incommensurable, which roughly means that they are not comparable with respect to a common cardinal measure (e.g. money). The aim of this thesis is to i) consider what it means to say that two risks are incommensurable, ii) explore if incomparability - comparison failure with respect to a common ordinal scale - ever occurs, and how to model it if it does.

Essay I is a critical examination of the most prominent argument for incomparability, the so-called small improvement argument (SIA). It is argued that the argument fails because it conflates incomparability and a kind of evaluative indeterminacy.

Essay II outlines so-called margin of error principles for comparative value judgements. They are based on the idea that if a proposition concerning the value relation between two value-bearing options is true, but there are sufficiently similar cases in which it is false, it is not available to be known. The usefulness of these principles is demonstrated by utilizing them in an epistemological case against SIA.

Essay III presents a novel account of incomplete preference orderings which acknowledges that incomparability can vary in degrees. This is achieved by means of a probabilistic analysis of preferences.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH, 2006. x, 40 p.
Series
Theses in philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1654-627X
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-4214 (URN)978-91-7178-509-1 (ISBN)
Presentation
2006-12-20, Seminarierummet, KTH, Teknikringen 78 B, 2 tr, Stockholm, 10:00
Opponent
Supervisors
Note
QC 20101112Available from: 2006-12-07 Created: 2006-12-07 Last updated: 2010-11-12Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
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More styles
Language
  • de-DE
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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