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PrIXP: Preserving the privacy of routing policies at Internet eXchange Points
Université catholique du Louvain, Belgium.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9675-9729
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2017 (English)In: Proceedings of the IM 2017 - 2017 IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network and Service Management, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2017, p. 435-441, article id 7987309Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Internet eXchange Points (IXPs) serve as landmarks where many network service providers meet to obtain reciprocal connectivity. Some of them, especially the largest, offer route servers as a convenient technology to simplify the setup of a high number of bi-lateral peerings. Due to their potential to support a quick and easy interconnection among the networks of multiple providers, IXPs are becoming increasingly popular and widespread, and route servers are exploited increasingly often. However, in an ever-growing level of market competition, service providers are pushed to develop concerns about many aspects that are strategic for their business, ranging from commercial agreements with other members of an IXP to the policies that are adopted in exchanging routing information with them. Although these aspects are notoriously sensitive for network service providers, current IXP architectures offer no guarantees to enforce the privacy of such business-critical information. We re-design a traditional route server and propose an approach to enforce the privacy of peering relationships and routing policies that it manages. Our proposed architecture ensures that nobody, not even a third party, can access such information unless it is the legitimate owner (i.e., the IXP member that set up the policy), yet allowing the route server to apply the requested policies and each IXP member to verify that such policies have been correctly deployed. We implemented the route server and tested our solutions in a simulated environment, tracking and analyzing the number of exchanged control plane messages.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2017. p. 435-441, article id 7987309
National Category
Communication Systems Computer Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-222317DOI: 10.23919/INM.2017.7987309Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85029407358OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-222317DiVA, id: diva2:1180776
Conference
15th IFIP/IEEE International Symposium on Integrated Network and Service Management, IM 2017, Lisbon, Portugal, 8 May 2017 through 12 May 2017
Funder
EU, Horizon 2020, 644960EU, FP7, Seventh Framework Programme, 607093
Note

QC 20180207

Available from: 2018-02-06 Created: 2018-02-06 Last updated: 2018-02-07Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
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  • asciidoc
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