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Quantifying the Impact of Cyber-Attack Strategies for Control Systems Equipped with an Anomaly Detector
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Automatic Control.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Automatic Control.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Automatic Control.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1835-2963
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Automatic Control.
2018 (English)In: 2018 European Control Conference, ECC 2018, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2018, p. 331-337, article id 8550188Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Risk assessment is an inevitable step in the implementation of cost-effective security strategies for control systems. One of the difficulties of risk assessment is to estimate the impact cyber-attacks may have. This paper proposes a framework to estimate the impact of several cyber-attack strategies against a dynamical control system equipped with an anomaly detector. In particular, we consider denial of service, sign alternation, rerouting, replay, false data injection, and bias injection attack strategies. The anomaly detectors we consider are stateless, cumulative sum, and multivariate exponentially weighted moving average detectors. As a measure of the attack impact, we adopt the infinity norm of critical states after a fixed number of time steps. For this measure and the aforementioned anomaly detectors, we prove that the attack impact for all of the attack strategies can be reduced to the problem of solving a set of convex minimization problems. Therefore, the exact value of the attack impact can be obtained easily. We demonstrate how our modeling framework can be used for risk assessment on a numerical example.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2018. p. 331-337, article id 8550188
National Category
Control Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-241514DOI: 10.23919/ECC.2018.8550188Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85059816350ISBN: 9783952426982 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-241514DiVA, id: diva2:1282213
Conference
16th European Control Conference, ECC 2018, Limassol, Cyprus, 12 June 2018 through 15 June 2018
Projects
CERCES
Funder
Knut and Alice Wallenberg FoundationSwedish Foundation for Strategic Research Swedish Civil Contingencies AgencySwedish Research Council
Note

QC 20190124

Available from: 2019-01-24 Created: 2019-01-24 Last updated: 2019-03-12Bibliographically approved

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Milosevic, JezdimirUmsonst, DavidSandberg, Henrik

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