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Correlation-based Detection of PMU Time Synchronization Attacks
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Network and Systems engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9988-9545
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Network and Systems engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4876-0223
2018 (English)In: 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018, 2018, article id 8587436Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Real-time monitoring and control in power systems is increasingly dependent on Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs). PMUs depend on precise time synchronization, and thus it is essential to ensure the security of time synchronization. In this paper we consider the detection of low-rate time synchronization attacks against PMUs. Based on a general clock model and a PMU measurement model we provide a closed form expression for the correlation between the clock frequency adjustments and the measured PMU phase angles in the absence of an attack. Leveraging the intuition that an attack would affect the correlation between these two quantities, we propose a model-based and a non-parametric correlation-based detector for time synchronization attacks. We evaluate the proposed detectors using extensive simulations. Our results show that they outperform traditional change detection techniques for clocks with low accuracy, for which attack detection is most challenging.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018. article id 8587436
National Category
Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-245191DOI: 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2018.8587436ISI: 000458801500012Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85061030483ISBN: 9781538679548 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-245191DiVA, id: diva2:1294163
Conference
2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018; Aalborg; Denmark; 29 October 2018 through 31 October 2018
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Note

QC 20190313

Available from: 2019-03-06 Created: 2019-03-06 Last updated: 2019-03-13Bibliographically approved

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Shereen, Ezzeldin

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
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  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
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Output format
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