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Strategic arrivals to queues offering priority service
MIT, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA..
Indian Inst Technol, Mumbai, Maharashtra, India..
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Automatic Control.
2019 (English)In: Queueing systems, ISSN 0257-0130, E-ISSN 1572-9443, Vol. 92, no 1-2, p. 103-130Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We consider strategic arrivals to a FCFS service system that starts service at a fixed time and has to serve a fixed number of customers, for example, an airplane boarding system. Arriving early induces a higher waiting cost (waiting before service begins) while arriving late induces a cost because earlier arrivals take the better seats. We first consider arrivals of heterogenous customers that choose arrival times to minimize the weighted sum of waiting cost and cost due to expected number of predecessors. We characterize the unique Nash equilibria for this system. Next, we consider a system offering L levels of priority service with a FCFS queue for each priority level. Higher priorities are charged higher admission prices. Customers make two choicestime of arrival and priority of service. We show that the Nash equilibrium corresponds to the customer types being divided into L intervals and customers belonging to each interval choosing the same priority level. We further analyze the net revenue to the server and consider revenue maximizing strategiesnumber of priority levels and pricing. Numerical results show that with only a small number of queues (two or three) the server can obtain nearly the maximum revenue.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2019. Vol. 92, no 1-2, p. 103-130
Keywords [en]
Games in queues, Strategic arrivals, Priority queues, Pricing, Service differentiation
National Category
Transport Systems and Logistics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-251695DOI: 10.1007/s11134-019-09604-3ISI: 000466925200005Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85065221593OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-251695DiVA, id: diva2:1316676
Note

QC 20190520

Available from: 2019-05-20 Created: 2019-05-20 Last updated: 2019-05-29Bibliographically approved

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Proutiere, Alexandre

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CiteExportLink to record
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Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf