Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Formal Barriers to Longest-Chain Proof-of-Stake Protocols
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Theoretical Computer Science, TCS.
Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA..
Carnegie Mellon Univ, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA..
Princeton Univ, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA..
2019 (English)In: ACM EC '19: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 ACM CONFERENCE ON ECONOMICS AND COMPUTATION, ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY , 2019, p. 459-473Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The security of most existing cryptocurrencies is based on a concept called Proof-of-Work, in which users must solve a computationally hard cryptopuzzle to authorize transactions ("one unit of computation, one vote"). This leads to enormous expenditure on hardware and electricity in order to collect the rewards associated with transaction authorization. Proof-of-Stake is an alternative concept that instead selects users to authorize transactions proportional to their wealth ("one coin, one vote"). Some aspects of the two paradigms are the same. For instance, obtaining voting power in Proof-of-Stake has a monetary cost just as in Proof-of-Work: a coin cannot be freely duplicated any more easily than a unit of computation. However some aspects are fundamentally different. In particular, exactly because Proof-of-Stake is wasteless, there is no inherent resource cost to deviating (commonly referred to as the "Nothing-at-Stake" problem). In contrast to prior work, we focus on incentive-driven deviations (any participant will deviate if doing so yields higher revenue) instead of adversarial corruption (an adversary may take over a significant fraction of the network, but the remaining players follow the protocol). The main results of this paper are several formal barriers to designing incentive-compatible proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies (that don't apply to proof-of-work).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY , 2019. p. 459-473
Keywords [en]
cryptocurrencies, proof of stake, longest chain
National Category
Computer and Information Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-260215DOI: 10.1145/3328526.3329567ISI: 000483848100053Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85069041487OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-260215DiVA, id: diva2:1355764
Conference
20th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC) held as part of the ACM Federated Computing Research Conference, Phoenix, AZ, JUN 24-28, 2019
Note

QC 20190930

Available from: 2019-09-30 Created: 2019-09-30 Last updated: 2019-09-30Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Brown-Cohen, Jonah
By organisation
Theoretical Computer Science, TCS
Computer and Information Sciences

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 7 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf