Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Hypothesis Testing Under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-5638-3213
Bilkent Univ, Dept Elect & Elect Engn, TR-06800 Ankara, Turkey..
Queens Univ, Dept Math & Stat, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada..
2019 (English)In: IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing, ISSN 1053-587X, E-ISSN 1941-0476, Vol. 67, no 19, p. 5169-5183Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we consider binary signaling problems in which the decision makers (the transmitter and the receiver) have subjective priors and/or misaligned objective functions. Depending on the commitment nature of the transmitter to his policies, we formulate the binary signaling problem as a Bayesian game under either Nash or Stackelberg equilibrium concepts and establish equilibrium solutions and their properties. We show that there can be informative or non-informative equilibria in the binary signaling game under the Stackelberg and Nash assumptions, and derive the conditions under which an informative equilibrium exists for the Stackelberg and Nash setups. For the corresponding team setup, however, an equilibrium typically always exists and is always informative. Furthermore, we investigate the effects of small perturbations in priors and costs on equilibrium values around the team setup (with identical costs and priors), and show that the Stackelberg equilibrium behavior is not robust to small perturbations whereas the Nash equilibrium is.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC , 2019. Vol. 67, no 19, p. 5169-5183
Keywords [en]
Signal detection, hypothesis testing, signaling games, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, subjective priors
National Category
Signal Processing
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-261294DOI: 10.1109/TSP.2019.2935908ISI: 000485740600007Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85084505690OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-261294DiVA, id: diva2:1359201
Note

QC 20191008

Available from: 2019-10-08 Created: 2019-10-08 Last updated: 2020-05-25Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Authority records BETA

Saritas, Serkan

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Saritas, Serkan
By organisation
Network and Systems Engineering
In the same journal
IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
Signal Processing

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 5 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf