Cryptanalysis of a universally verifiable efficient re-encryption mixnet 2012 (English)In: 2012 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE 2012, USENIX Association , 2012Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)

Abstract [en]

We study the heuristically secure mix-net proposed by Puiggalí and Guasch (EVOTE 2010). We present practical attacks on both correctness and privacy for some sets of parameters of the scheme. Although our attacks only allow us to replace a few inputs, or to break the privacy of a few voters, this shows that the scheme can not be proven secure.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages

USENIX Association , 2012.

Keywords [en]

Electronic voting, Voting machines, Mix-net, Re-encryption, Cryptography

National Category

Computer Sciences

Identifiers

URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-314743Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84906222651OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-314743DiVA, id: diva2:1675595

Conference

2012 Electronic Voting Technology Workshop/Workshop on Trustworthy Elections, EVT/WOTE 2012, co-located with the 21st USENIX Security Symposium, 6 August 2012 through 7 August 2012, Bellevue

Note

QC 20220623

Available from: 2022-06-23 Created: 2022-06-23 Last updated: 2022-06-25Bibliographically approved

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Khazaei, ShahramTerelius, BjörnWikström, Douglas

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Khazaei, ShahramTerelius, BjörnWikström, Douglas

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Theoretical Computer Science, TCS

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Computer Sciences

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