This presentation investigates the juncture of hydropower and nuclear  engineering tradition in the form of energy complexes in the Soviet Union during the 25-year-periodof 1966-1991. During this period, the USSR tried to stimulate its economy with cheap electricity to counter economic stagnation. Communist politicians brought forth a grand-scheme nuclear agenda to address this issue. It encapsulated the civil nuclear industry as the symbol of societal progress. The promise of abundant and cheap electricity would re-fuel the ailing economy, demonstrate the technological strength of the country and proof to its own people that concrete steps were being taken towards the realisation of communism.

Soviet engineers from Gidroproekt – the USSR’s flagship hydraulic engineering agency –envisioned the creation of energy complexes, in which a nuclear power plant would provide the electricity grid’s baseload, while accompanying hydropower plants would contribute to peak-demand regulation. By combining these two means and functions inelectricity production, irrigation for agriculture and the yield of local fisheries could at thesame time be improved. The Soviet energy complexes were planned to be large (5-10GWe) and they became powerful beacons for Soviet imaginaries of socialist progress. By thus combining older hydrological with newer nuclear traditions, the complexes signified a Soviet approach to coping with electricity shortages in a context of economic crisis.

The presentation makes use of archival planning material from Gidroproekt and the Soviet Ministry of Energy. It illustrates how Soviet nuclear and hydraulic engineers created plans for three specific energy complexes. At the Southern Ukrainian, the Rozhnyatovskii and the Kolskii energy complexes the technocratic mixture of hydraulicand nuclear tradition manifested itself in remarkable attempts to change the naturalenvironment – envisioned as proof of Soviet technological superiority.