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Empirical evaluation of a threat modeling language as a cybersecurity assessment tool
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-8287-3160
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-9546-9463
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Computer Science, Network and Systems Engineering.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3922-9606
2024 (English)In: Computers & security (Print), ISSN 0167-4048, E-ISSN 1872-6208, Vol. 140, article id 103743Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The complexity of ICT infrastructures is continuously increasing, presenting a formidable challenge in safeguarding them against cyber attacks. In light of escalating cyber threats and limited availability of expert resources, organizations must explore more efficient approaches to assess their resilience and undertake proactive measures. Threat modeling is an effective approach for assessing the cyber resilience of ICT systems. One method is to utilize Attack Graphs, which visually represent the steps taken by adversaries during an attack. Previously, MAL (the Meta Attack Language) was proposed, which serves as a framework for developing Domain-Specific Languages (DSLs) and generating Attack Graphs for modeled infrastructures. coreLang is a MAL-based threat modeling language that utilizes such Attack Graphs to enable attack simulations and security assessments for the generic ICT domain. Developing domain-specific languages for threat modeling and attack simulations provides a powerful approach for conducting security assessments of infrastructures. However, ensuring the correctness of these modeling languages raises a separate research question. In this study we conduct an empirical experiment aiming to falsify such a domain-specific threat modeling language. The potential inability to falsify the language through our empirical testing would lead to its corroboration, strengthening our belief in its validity within the parameters of our study. The outcomes of this approach indicated that, on average, the assessments generated by attack simulations outperformed those of human experts. Additionally, both human experts and simulations exhibited significantly superior performance compared to random guessers in their assessments. While specific human experts occasionally achieved better assessments for particular questions in the experiments, the efficiency of simulation-generated assessments surpasses that of human domain experts.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier BV , 2024. Vol. 140, article id 103743
Keywords [en]
Cyber attack simulations, Cyber security, Domain experts, Domain-specific threat modeling language, Empirical language evaluation
National Category
Computer Sciences Computer Systems
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-343486DOI: 10.1016/j.cose.2024.103743ISI: 001181589500001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85184028408OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-343486DiVA, id: diva2:1837859
Note

QC 20240215

Available from: 2024-02-15 Created: 2024-02-15 Last updated: 2025-05-02Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Cyber Security Threat Modeling of Power Grid Substation Automation Systems
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Cyber Security Threat Modeling of Power Grid Substation Automation Systems
2025 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The substation is a vital part of the power grid and serves to aid in the distribution of electricity by, for example, transforming from high to low voltage. It is essential to protect the substation as a loss of electricity would cause severe consequences for our society. The Substation Automation System (SAS) allows for remote management and automation of substations but also creates possibilities for cybersecurity threats. In this thesis efforts towards using threat modeling to assess the cybersecurity of SAS are presented. Threat modeling entails creating a model of the system that shows the possible cybersecurity threats against it. To reach this goal, previously used information sources for threat modeling in the power systems domain are found. The thesis also includes the creation of a Time-To-Compromise (TTC) estimate for cyber attacks against Industrial Control Systems. By estimating the TTC, it is possible to prioritize which attacks to defend against. One method of creating threat models is by using threat modeling languages in which the assets, associations, attacks, and defenses have been defined. In this thesis, a threat modeling language for creating threat models of SAS is presented. The threat models in this thesis are used to create attack graphs to show the possible paths an attacker could take throughout the system. The work of this thesis also consists of evaluation of threat modeling languages that have been created or used. As a result, accurate assessment of cybersecurity for SAS can be made that helps in the efforts to keep them secure against cyber attacks.

Abstract [sv]

Transformatorstationen är en viktig del av elkraftnätet och dess roll är att hjälpa till med distributionen av el genom att som dess namn beskriver transformera om spänningen. Det är nödvändigt att skydda transformatorstationen eftersom ett elavbrott skulle skapa stora konsekvenser för vårt samhälle. Ett automatiserat transformatorstationssystem gör det möjligt att hantera den externt men det öppnar även upp möjligheterna för cybersäkerhetshot. I den här avhandlingen presenteras forskning kring användning av hotmodellering för att utvärdera cybersäkerheter för SAS. Hotmodellering innebär att man skapar en modell av systemet som visar möjliga cybersäkerhetshot mot det. För att nå det målet har informationskällor för hotmodeller inom kraftnätsdomänen sammanställts genom en systematisk litteraturstudie. I avhandlingen tas det också fram ett sätt att räkna ut tiden det tar för att framgångsrikt genomföra en cyberattack mot industriella kontrollsystem. Hotmodeller kan skapas genom att använda hotmodelleringsspråk inom vilket komponenterna, relationerna, attacker och försvar är definierade. I den här avhandlingen skapas ett hotmodelleringsspråk för att skapa hotmodeller av SAS. Hotmodellerna i detta arbete kan användas för att skapa attackgrafer som visar möjliga vägarna som en attackerare skulle kunna ta genom systemet. Arbetet utvärderar även hotmodelleringsspråken som har använts eller skapats. Som ett resultat av denna avhandling kan korrekta utvärderingar av cybersäkerhet för SAS göras vilket hjälper i arbetet av att hålla dom säkra mot cyberattacker.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm, Sweden: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2025. p. xii, 45
Series
TRITA-EECS-AVL ; 2025:53
Keywords
Threat Modeling, Cybersecurity, Power systems, Substation Automation Systems, Attack graphs, Industrial Control Systems
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Research subject
Electrical Engineering
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-362974 (URN)978-91-8106-286-1 (ISBN)
Public defence
2025-06-05, https://kth-se.zoom.us/j/61562773806, U1, Brinellvägen 26, Stockholm, 09:30 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Note

QC 20250502

Available from: 2025-05-02 Created: 2025-05-02 Last updated: 2025-05-12Bibliographically approved

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Katsikeas, SotiriosRencelj Ling, EnglaJohnsson, PontusEkstedt, Mathias

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