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Equalizer Zero-Determinant Strategy in Discounted Repeated Stackelberg Asymmetric Game
Key Laboratory of Systems and Control, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, 100190, Beijing, China; School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, 100049, Beijing, China.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science (EECS), Intelligent systems, Decision and Control Systems (Automatic Control).
Department of Control Science and Engineering, Tongji University, 201804, Shanghai, China; Shanghai Research Institute for Intelligent Autonomous Systems, Tongji University, 210201, Shanghai, China.
2024 (English)In: Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, ISSN 1009-6124, E-ISSN 1559-7067, Vol. 37, no 1, p. 184-203Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackelberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the opponents’ best response (BR), is technically the optimal strategy for the leader. However, computing an SSE strategy may be difficult since it needs to solve a mixed-integer program and has exponential complexity in the number of states. To this end, the authors propose an equalizer ZD strategy, which can unilaterally restrict the opponent’s expected utility. The authors first study the existence of an equalizer ZD strategy with one-to-one situations, and analyze an upper bound of its performance with the baseline SSE strategy. Then the authors turn to multi-player models, where there exists one player adopting an equalizer ZD strategy. The authors give bounds of the weighted sum of opponents’s utilities, and compare it with the SSE strategy. Finally, the authors give simulations on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the moving target defense (MTD) to verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Nature , 2024. Vol. 37, no 1, p. 184-203
Keywords [en]
Discounted repeated Stackelberg asymmetric game, equalizer zero-determinant strategy, strong Stackelberg equilibrium strategy
National Category
Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-344190DOI: 10.1007/s11424-024-3408-5Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85186122016OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-344190DiVA, id: diva2:1842910
Note

QC 20240307

Available from: 2024-03-06 Created: 2024-03-06 Last updated: 2024-03-07Bibliographically approved

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Chen, Guanpu

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