Optimal Economic Interventions in Scheduled Public Transport
2008 (English)In: Research in Transportation Economics, ISSN 0739-8859, Vol. 23, no 1, 30-40 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This chapter analyses appropriate regulatory instruments for public transport markets under monopoly and competition, respectively. For the monopoly case, the operator chooses too low supply, compared to welfare optimum. In contrast, for the competition case the operators choose too high supply, at least for the competition model that we have considered most appropriate. It is found that under monopoly a subsidy should be applied, while under competition taxation should be applied.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 23, no 1, 30-40 p.
Economics and Business
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-10762DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2008.10.010ScopusID: 2-s2.0-60449103925OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-10762DiVA: diva2:227918
QC 201110042009-07-212009-07-212011-10-04Bibliographically approved