Anti-paternalism and Invalidation of Reasons
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Anti-paternalism can fruitfully be interpreted as a principle of invalidation of reasons. That a reason for an action is invalid means that the reason is blocked from influencing the moral status of the action. More specifically, anti-paternalism blocks personal good reasons from influencing the moral status of certain interfering actions. Actions are only interfering in this sense if they target choice or action that is sufficiently voluntary. Antipaternalism so interpreted is unreasonable on three grounds. First, it essentially entails that the degree to which a person acts voluntarily determines whether or not her good provides reasons for action. This leads to wrong answers to moral questions. Second, anti-paternalism entails peculiar jumps in justifiability at the threshold of voluntary enough. Third, anti-paternalism imposes a distinction in kind between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. This distinction is untenable and diverts our attention away from the relative strength of reasons. Invalidation in general is unreasonable on the same grounds.
History of Technology Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-10941OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-10941DiVA: diva2:232975
QC 201007142009-08-272009-08-272010-07-14Bibliographically approved