Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Liberalism, Altruism and Group Consent
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology, Philosophy.
2009 (English)In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 2, no 2, 146-157 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article first describes a dilemma for liberalism: On the one hand restricting their own options is an important means for groups of people to shape their lives. On the other hand, group members are typically divided over whether or not to accept option-restricting solutions or policies. Should we restrict the options of all members of a group even though some consent and some do not? This dilemma is particularly relevant to public health policy, which typically target groups of people with no possibility for individuals to opt out. The article then goes on to propose and discuss a series of aggregation rules for individual into group consent. Consideration of a number of scenarios shows that such rules cannot be formulated only in terms of fractions of consenters and non-consenters, but must incorporate their motives and how much they stand to win or lose. This raises further questions, including what is the appropriate impact of altruistic consenters and non-consenters, what should be the impact of costs and benefits and whether these should be understood as gross or net. All these issues are dealt with in a liberal, anti-paternalistic spirit, in order to explore whether group consent can contribute to the justification of option-restricting public health policy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford Journals , 2009. Vol. 2, no 2, 146-157 p.
Keyword [en]
altruism; article; cost benefit analysis; freedom; health care policy; human; priority journal; public health
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-10943DOI: 10.1093/phe/php014ISI: 000208221600004Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-77949337925OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-10943DiVA: diva2:232980
Note

QC 20100714

Available from: 2009-08-27 Created: 2009-08-27 Last updated: 2017-12-13Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Anti-paternalism and Public Health Policy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Anti-paternalism and Public Health Policy
2009 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis is an attempt to constructively interpret and critically evaluate the liberal doctrine that we may not limit a person’s liberty for her own good, and to discuss its implications and alternatives in some concrete areas of public health policy. The thesis starts theoretical and goes ever more practical. The first paper is devoted to positive interpretation of anti-paternalism with special focus on the reason component – personal good. A novel generic definition of paternalism is proposed, intended to capture, in a generous fashion, the object of traditional liberal resistance to paternalism – the invocation of personal good reasons for limiting of or interfering with a person’s liberty. In the second paper, the normative aspect of this resistance is given a somewhat technical interpretation in terms of invalidation of reasons – the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions according to their strength. It is then argued that normative anti-paternalism so understood is unreasonable, on three grounds: 1) Since the doctrine only applies to sufficiently voluntary action, voluntariness determines validity of reasons, which is unwarranted and leads to wrong answers to moral questions. 2) Since voluntariness comes in degrees, a threshold must be set where personal good reasons are invalidated, leading to peculiar jumps in the justifiability of actions. 3) Anti-paternalism imposes an untenable and unhelpful distinction between the value of respecting choices that are sufficiently voluntary and choices that are not. The third paper adds to this critique the fourth argument that none of the action types typically proposed to specify the action component of paternalism is such that performing an action of that type out of benevolence is essentially morally problematic. The fourth paper ignores the critique in the second and third papers and proposes, in an anti-paternalistic spirit, a series of rules for the justification of option-restricting policies aimed at groups where some members consent to the policy and some do not. Such policies present the liberal with a dilemma where the value of not restricting people’s options without their consent conflicts with the value of allowing people to shape their lives according to their own wishes. The fifth paper applies the understanding of anti-paternalism developed in the earlier papers to product safety regulation, as an example of a public health policy area. The sixth paper explores in more detail a specific public health policy, namely that of mandatory alcohol interlocks in all cars, proposed by the former Swedish government and supported by the Swedish National Road Administration. The policy is evaluated for cost-effectiveness, for possible diffusion of individual responsibility, and for paternalistic treatment of drivers. The seventh paper argues for a liberal policy in the area of dissemination of information about uncertain threats to public health. The argument against paternalism is based on common sense consequentialist considerations, avoiding any appeal to the normative anti-paternalism rejected earlier in the thesis.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH, 2009. viii, 38 p.
Series
Theses in philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1650-8831
Keyword
Alcohol Interlocks; Altruism; Anti-paternalism; Epistemic paternalism; Group consent; Harm principle; Interference; Invalidation of reasons; Liberalism; Limiting liberty; Private sphere; Product safety regulation; Public health policy; Reason-actions; Self-regarding; Social responsibility; Uncertain information; Withholding of information.
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-10947 (URN)978-91-7415-226-5 (ISBN)
Public defence
2009-09-08, F3, Lindstedtsv. 26, KTH, Stockholm, 10:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Note
QC 20100714Available from: 2009-08-27 Created: 2009-08-27 Last updated: 2010-07-14Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full textScopushttp://phe.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/php014

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Grill, Kalle
By organisation
Philosophy
In the same journal
Public Health Ethics
Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 55 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf