Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading
Department of Economics, Stockholm University.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-1819-0805
2005 (English)In: Climate Policy, ISSN 1469-3062, E-ISSN 1752-7457, Vol. 5, no 1, 97-107 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Whether CO2 permit auctions should be held on one, several or many occasions per commitment period has not been discussed at any length in the literature. When at all observed, auction frequency has often been set at once per month or quarter. Here, it is argued that for reasons of efficiency, it is generally best to have just one single auction per commitment period. The arguments given relate to the role played by such factors as emission trading design, auction design, market power, transaction costs and, in particular, 'the winner's curse'.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2005. Vol. 5, no 1, 97-107 p.
Keyword [en]
emissions trading, allocation, auctions, auction frequency, winner's curse, common value auctions, winners curse, information, epas
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15143ISI: 000232893000008OAI: diva2:333184
QC 20100525 QC 20120119Available from: 2010-08-05 Created: 2010-08-05 Last updated: 2012-01-19Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Mandell, Svante
In the same journal
Climate Policy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Total: 36 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link