The choice of multiple or single auctions in emissions trading
2005 (English)In: Climate Policy, ISSN 1469-3062, E-ISSN 1752-7457, Vol. 5, no 1, 97-107 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Whether CO2 permit auctions should be held on one, several or many occasions per commitment period has not been discussed at any length in the literature. When at all observed, auction frequency has often been set at once per month or quarter. Here, it is argued that for reasons of efficiency, it is generally best to have just one single auction per commitment period. The arguments given relate to the role played by such factors as emission trading design, auction design, market power, transaction costs and, in particular, 'the winner's curse'.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2005. Vol. 5, no 1, 97-107 p.
emissions trading, allocation, auctions, auction frequency, winner's curse, common value auctions, winners curse, information, epas
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15143ISI: 000232893000008OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-15143DiVA: diva2:333184
QC 20100525 QC 201201192010-08-052010-08-052012-01-19Bibliographically approved