Dynamics of networking agents competing for high centrality and low degree
2006 (English)In: Physical Review Letters, ISSN 0031-9007, Vol. 96, no 9Article in journal (Refereed) Published
We model a system of networking agents that seek to optimize their centrality in the network while keeping their cost, the number of connections they are participating in, low. Unlike other game-theory based models for network evolution, the success of the agents is related only to their position in the network. The agents use strategies based on local information to improve their chance of success. Both the evolution of strategies and network structure are investigated. We find a dramatic time evolution with cascades of strategy change accompanied by a change in network structure. On average the network self-organizes to a state close to the transition between a fragmented state and a state with a giant component. Furthermore, with increasing system size both the average degree and the level of fragmentation decreases.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 96, no 9
prisoners-dilemma, social networks, cooperation, emergence
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15507DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevLett.96.098701ISI: 000235905700082OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-15507DiVA: diva2:333548
QC 201005252010-08-052010-08-05Bibliographically approved