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The logic of dominance reasoning
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy.
2006 (English)In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 35, no 1, 41-63 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The logic of dominance arguments is analyzed using two different kinds of conditionals: indicative (epistemic) and subjunctive (counter-factual). It is shown that on the indicative interpretation an assumption of independence is needed for a dominance argument to go through. It is also shown that on the subjunctive interpretation no assumption of independence is needed once the standard premises of the dominance argument are true, but that independence plays an important role in arguing for the truth of the premises of the dominance argument. A key feature of the analysis is the interpretation of the doubly conditional comparative I will get a better outcome if A than if B which is taken to have the structure (the outcome if A) is better than (the outcome if B).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 35, no 1, 41-63 p.
Keyword [en]
ramsey test, epistemic conditionals, belief revision
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15710DOI: 10.1007/s10992-005-9007-6ISI: 000237893200003ScopusID: 2-s2.0-33746111823OAI: diva2:333752
QC 20100525Available from: 2010-08-05 Created: 2010-08-05Bibliographically approved

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