2006 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 130, no 2, 297-320 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn's and Isaac Levi's arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz's recent criticism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 130, no 2, 297-320 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15982ISI: 000240410600007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-15982DiVA: diva2:334024
QC 201005252010-08-052010-08-05Bibliographically approved