Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Indeterminate preferences
2006 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 130, no 2, 297-320 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It is commonly assumed that preferences are determinate; that is, that an agent who has a preference knows that she has the preference in question and is disposed to act upon it. This paper argues the dubiousness of that assumption. An account of indeterminate preferences in terms of self-predicting subjective probabilities is given, and a decision rule for choices involving indeterminate preferences is proposed. Wolfgang Spohn's and Isaac Levi's arguments against self-predicting probabilities are also considered, in light of Wlodek Rabinowicz's recent criticism.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 130, no 2, 297-320 p.
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-15982ISI: 000240410600007OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-15982DiVA: diva2:334024
Note
QC 20100525Available from: 2010-08-05 Created: 2010-08-05Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Peterson, Martin
In the same journal
Philosophical Studies

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 32 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf