Evidence of Buyer Bargaining Power in the Stockholm Residential Real Estate Market
2008 (English)In: Journal of Real Estate Research, ISSN 0896-5803, Vol. 30, no 4, 475-499 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This study investigates whether uninformed buyers pay higher prices for single-family houses than do other buyers and tests whether the bargaining power increases with information. Data on real estate prices and attributes is examined, as well as household characteristics and buying process from Stockholm. The results suggest that uninformed buyers pay a higher price than informed buyers do. Bargaining power is not found to be weaker for a first-time buyer but it is weaker if the household has participated in several biddings and lost. Repeated bidding-and-losing households are more willing to increase their reservation price and pay a higher overall price compared to other households.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 30, no 4, 475-499 p.
housing-market, lowest price, search, model, determinants, time, equilibrium, information, efficient, broker
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-18006ISI: 000261206800005ScopusID: 2-s2.0-67650564447OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-18006DiVA: diva2:336051
QC 201005252010-08-052010-08-05Bibliographically approved