Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Spectrum Allocation for Decentralized Transmission Strategies: Properties of Nash Equilibria
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Signal Processing. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Signal Processing. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Signal Processing. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-3599-5584
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Signal Processing. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-2298-6774
2009 (English)In: EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing, ISSN 1687-6172Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The interaction of two transmit-receive pairs coexisting in the same area and communicating using the same portion of the spectrum is analyzed from a game theoretic perspective. Each pair utilizes a decentralized iterative water-filling scheme to greedily maximize the individual rate. We study the dynamics of such a game and find properties of the resulting Nash equilibria. The region of achievable operating points is characterized for both low-and high-interference systems, and the dependence on the various system parameters is explicitly shown. We derive the region of possible signal space partitioning for the iterative water-filling scheme and show how the individual utility functions can be modified to alter its range. Utilizing global system knowledge, we design a modified game encouraging better operating points in terms of sum rate compared to those obtained using the iterative water-filling algorithm and show how such a game can be imitated in a decentralized noncooperative setting. Although we restrict the analysis to a two player game, analogous concepts can be used to design decentralized algorithms for scenarios with more players. The performance of the modified decentralized game is evaluated and compared to the iterative water-filling algorithm by numerical simulations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2009.
Keyword [en]
linear precoding strategies, interference channels, game-theory, systems
National Category
Telecommunications
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-18553DOI: 10.1155/2009/354890ISI: 000267447800001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-66749177233OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-18553DiVA: diva2:336600
Note
QC 20100525 QC 20111108Available from: 2010-08-05 Created: 2010-08-05 Last updated: 2011-11-29Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Authority records BETA

Bengtsson, MatsOttersten, Björn

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
von Wrycza, PeterShankar, Mysore Rama Rao BhavaniBengtsson, MatsOttersten, Björn
By organisation
Signal ProcessingACCESS Linnaeus Centre
Telecommunications

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 70 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf