Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness
2000 (English)In: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, Vol. 39, no 2, 109-118 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Inspired by Roth and Sotomayor we make a deeper mathematical study of the assortative matching markets defined by Becker, finding explicit results on stability and fairness. We note that in the limit, when the size of the market tends to infinity. we obtain the continuous model of Sattinger and retrieve his characterization of the core of the game in this limit case. We also find that the most egalitarian core solution for employees is the employer-optimal assignment.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2000. Vol. 39, no 2, 109-118 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-19556ISI: 000085389500001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-19556DiVA: diva2:338248
QC 201005252010-08-102010-08-10Bibliographically approved