Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
2000 (English)In: Discrete Mathematics, ISSN 0012-365X, E-ISSN 1872-681X, Vol. 217, no 3-Jan, 135-156 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2000. Vol. 217, no 3-Jan, 135-156 p.
matching, stable matching, core, lattice, optimal matching
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-19727ISI: 000086806600010OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-19727DiVA: diva2:338419
QC 201005252010-08-102010-08-10Bibliographically approved