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Stable matching in a common generalization of the marriage and assignment models
KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
2000 (English)In: Discrete Mathematics, ISSN 0012-365X, E-ISSN 1872-681X, Vol. 217, no 3-Jan, 135-156 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known models: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model (where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor, Two-Sided Matching, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, asked for an explanation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two important features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the set of stable outcomes.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2000. Vol. 217, no 3-Jan, 135-156 p.
Keyword [en]
matching, stable matching, core, lattice, optimal matching
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-19727ISI: 000086806600010OAI: diva2:338419
QC 20100525Available from: 2010-08-10 Created: 2010-08-10Bibliographically approved

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Karlander, Johan
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