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Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility
KTH, Superseded Departments, Numerical Analysis and Computer Science, NADA.
2000 (English)In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 29, no 4, 555-569 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

We consider the TU version of Gale and Shapley's roommate game. We find several results that: are analogous to known results for the NTU game, such as a characterization of stable outcomes by forbidden miners, a characterization of the extreme points of the core, and a median property of stable outcomes. The TU roommate game is a special case of the TU partitioning game of Kaneko and Wooders. Bondareva and Shapley's balancedness condition for the core of such games is the starting point for our forbidden miners approach.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2000. Vol. 29, no 4, 555-569 p.
Keyword [en]
roommate problem, partitioning game, transferable utility, core, forbidden minors, partitioning games, matchings, existence
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-20649ISI: 000168844800007OAI: diva2:339345
QC 20100525Available from: 2010-08-10 Created: 2010-08-10Bibliographically approved

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Karlander, Johan
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