Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Freedom of choice and expected compromise
KTH, School of Architecture and the Built Environment (ABE), Philosophy and History of Technology.
2010 (English)In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217X, Vol. 35, no 1, 65-79 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This article develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed, which is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 35, no 1, 65-79 p.
Keyword [en]
AXIOMATIC APPROACH, PREFERENCE, DIVERSITY, OPPORTUNITY
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-25223DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0430-4ISI: 000277794300005Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-77952553685OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-25223DiVA: diva2:356597
Note
QC 20101013Available from: 2010-10-13 Created: 2010-10-13 Last updated: 2017-12-12Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Essays on value, preference and freedom
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Essays on value, preference and freedom
2009 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Essay I develops a new framework for preference relations, that makes further preference relations beyond the trichotomy of preference, dispreference and indifference conceptually possible. The new framework models relations in terms of swaps, which are conceived of as transfers from one alternative state to another. With this new preference framework the essay presents a fitting-attitude analysis of new value relations that avoids some problems of earlier proposals.

Essay II examines the small-improvement argument that is usually considered the most powerful argument against comparability, that is, the view that for any two alternatives an agent is rationally required to either prefer one of the alternatives to the other or be indifferent between them. The essay argues that while there might be reasons to believe each of the premises in the small-improvement argument, there is a conflict between these reasons. The conflict is such that we are not provided with a reason to believe the conjunction of the premises.

Essay III develops a new measure of freedom of choice based on the proposal that a set offers more freedom of choice than another if, and only if, the expected degree of dissimilarity between a random alternative from the set of possible alternatives and the most similar offered alternative in the set is smaller. Furthermore, a version of this measure is developed that is able to take into account the values of the possible options.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH, 2009. viii, 61 p.
Series
Theses in philosophy from the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1654-627X ; 34
Keyword
preference relations, value relations, rationality constraints, incomparability, the small-improvement argument, freedom of choice
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-11056 (URN)978-91-7415-421-4 (ISBN)
Presentation
2009-09-23, 231, Teknikringen 78B, Stockholm, 10:00 (Swedish)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2009-09-17 Created: 2009-09-13 Last updated: 2010-10-13Bibliographically approved
2. Preference and Choice
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Preference and Choice
2011 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 2011. 62 p.
Series
Theses in Risk and Safety from the Division of Philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology, ISSN 1654-627X
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-34690 (URN)978-91-7415-951-6 (ISBN)
Public defence
2011-05-18, F3, Lindstedtsvägen 26, KTH, Stockholm, 10:00 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Note

QC 20110613

Available from: 2011-06-13 Created: 2011-06-13 Last updated: 2015-06-15Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Gustafsson, Johan E.
By organisation
Philosophy and History of Technology
In the same journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 66 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • harvard1
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf