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Demand-responsive pricing in open wireless access markets
KTH, School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Centres, Center for Wireless Systems, Wireless@kth.
KTH, School of Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Centres, Center for Wireless Systems, Wireless@kth.
2007 (English)In: IEEE VTS VEH TECHNOL CONF, 2007, 2990-2995 p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Radio resource management (RRM) across operator boundaries is emerging as a salient feature for wireless systems beyond 3G. Until recently, research has been confined to solutions where cooperating networks enter explicit sharing agreements that define how responsibilities and revenues should be divided. An alternative would be to share the infrastructure implicitly by establishing an open wireless access market wherein networks not only compete for users on a long-term time-scale, but also on a much shorter time-base. This could be realized with an architecture where autonomous trade-agents, that reside in terminals and access points (APs), manage the resources through negotiations. In this paper we develop a framework for studying demand-responsive pricing in contexts where APs with overlapping coverage compete for users. Resources are partitioned through a proportional fair divisible auction and our aim is to establish if, and when, an open market for wireless access can be se sustained. Compared to a scenario where APs cooperate, our results show that, an open access market results in better services at lower price which in the prolonging also yields more satisfied customers. As an effect demand will increase and, from the perspective of the APs, act as a counterbalance to the reduced prices. Thus, the revenue earned by the AN will be comparable to the one in which obtained through AP cooperation and monopoly (cartel) pricing. Generally speaking, the difference between the cooperative and noncooperative RRM is small when the demand is concave and increases with the convexity of demand.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2007. 2990-2995 p.
Series
IEEE VTS Vehicular Technology Conference Proceedings, ISSN 1550-2252
Keyword [en]
3G mobile communication, game theory, mobile radio, pricing, radio access networks, telecommunication network management
National Category
Telecommunications
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-26003DOI: 10.1109/VETECS.2007.613ISI: 000252237601285Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-34547280973ISBN: 978-1-4244-0265-6 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-26003DiVA: diva2:361286
Conference
65th IEEE Vehicular Technology Conference Dublin, IRELAND, APR 22-25, 2007
Note
QC 20101109Available from: 2010-11-09 Created: 2010-11-09 Last updated: 2010-11-09Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Access selection in multi-system architectures: cooperative and competitive contexts
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Access selection in multi-system architectures: cooperative and competitive contexts
2007 (English)Licentiate thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Future wireless networks will be composed of multiple radio access technologies (RATs). To benefit from these, users must utilize the appropriate RAT, and access points (APs). In this thesis we evaluate the efficiency of selection criteria that, in addition to path-loss and system bandwidth, also consider load. The problem is studied for closed as well as open systems. In the former both terminals and infrastructure are controlled by a single actor (e.g., mobile operator), while the latter refers to situations where terminals, selfishly, decide which AP it wants to use (as in a common market-place). We divide the overall problem into the prioritization between available RATs and, within a RAT, between the APs. The results from our studies suggest that data users, in general, should be served by the RAT offering highest peak data rate.

As this can be estimated by terminals, the benefits from centralized RAT selection is limited. Within a subsystem, however, load-sensitive AP selection criteria can increase data-rates. Highest gains are obtained when the subsystem is noise-limited, deployment unplanned, and the relative difference in number of users per AP significant. Under these circumstances the maximum supported load can be increased by an order of magnitude. However, also decentralized AP selection, where greedy autonomous terminal-based agents are in charge of the selection, were shown to give these gains as long they accounted for load. We also developed a game-theoretic framework, where users competed for wireless resources by bidding in a proportionally fair divisible auction. The framework was applied to a scenario where revenue-seeking APs competed for traffic by selecting an appropriate price. Compared to when APs cooperated, modelled by the Nash bargaining solution, our results suggest that a competitive access market, where infrastructure is shared implicitly, generally, offers users better service at a lower cost. Although AP revenues reduce, this reduction is, relatively, small and were shown to decrease with the concavity of demand. Lastly we studied whether data services could be offered in a discontinuous high-capacity network by letting a terminal-based agent pre-fetch information that its user potentially may request at some future time-instant. This decouples the period where the information is transferred, from the time-instant when it is consumed. Our results show that above some critical AP density, considerably lower than that required for continuous coverage, services start to perform well.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: KTH, 2007. xv, 180 p.
Series
Trita-ICT-COS, ISSN 1653-6347 ; 0701
National Category
Telecommunications
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-4286 (URN)
Presentation
2007-03-09, Sal NA2, KTH-Electrum, Isafjordsgatan 28 b v, Kista, 14:00
Opponent
Supervisors
Note
QC 20101109Available from: 2007-02-27 Created: 2007-02-27 Last updated: 2010-11-09Bibliographically approved

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