Political and Public Acceptability of Congestion Pricing: Ideology and Self-Interest
2010 (English)In: Journal of policy analysis and management (Print), ISSN 0276-8739, E-ISSN 1520-6688, Vol. 29, no 4, 854-U221 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Studies of the "stated preferences" of households generally report public and political opposition by urban commuters to congestion pricing. It is thought that this opposition inhibits or precludes tolls and pricing systems that would enhance efficiency in the use of scarce roadways. This paper analyzes the only case in which road pricing was decided by a citizen referendum on the basis of experience with a specific pricing system. The city of Stockholm introduced a toll system for seven months in 2006, after which citizens voted on its permanent adoption. We match precinct voting records to resident commute times and costs by traffic zone, and we analyze patterns of voting in response to economic and political incentives. We document political and ideological incentives for citizen choice, but we also find that the pattern of time savings and incremental costs exerts a powerful influence on voting behavior. In this instance, at least, citizen voters behave as if they value commute time highly. When they have experienced first-hand the out-of-pocket costs and time savings of a specific pricing scheme, they are prepared to adopt freely policies that reduce congestion on urban motorways.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2010. Vol. 29, no 4, 854-U221 p.
Economics, Public Administration
Political Science (excluding Public Administration Studies and Globalization Studies)
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-26298DOI: 10.1002/pam.20529ISI: 000282708100010ScopusID: 2-s2.0-78149374056OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-26298DiVA: diva2:372014
QC 201011232010-11-232010-11-212010-12-03Bibliographically approved