Partnering in a (more) complete contract setting
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
Partnering is often, by economists, and in construction managerial literature related to moreincomplete contracts. This can be explained by seeing partnering as something that neutralizesopportunism. The first contribution in this paper is to question this view, by identifying thatthe introduction of partnering does not necessarily entail more incomplete contracts. Thisempirical observation can be explained by the advantages of competitive tendering andfurther motivated by the requirement from the public procurement law. The secondcontribution is to motivate partnering in this more complete contract setting, which is donethrough road maintenance examples. Partnering is seen as a way to facilitate the reaching ofmore pareto efficient allocations, by lowering transactions costs for renegotiations throughtrust and reciprocity. Seeing partnering as the willingness to renegotiate complete contractscan reduce the risk for the contractor and lead to lower prices for a given service.
Partnering, road maintenance, incomplete contracts, renegotiation, reciprocity, pareto efficiency, transaction costs
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-27636OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-27636DiVA: diva2:379215
QC 201012172010-12-172010-12-172010-12-17Bibliographically approved