Change search
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences
KTH, School of Engineering Sciences (SCI), Mathematics (Dept.).
2008 (English)In: International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN 0020-7276, E-ISSN 1432-1270, Vol. 36, no 3-4, 421-440 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A fundamental fact in two-sided matching is that if a market allows several stable outcomes, then one is optimal for all men in the sense that no man would prefer another stable outcome. We study a related phenomenon of asymmetric equilibria in a dynamic market where agents enter and search for a mate for at most n rounds before exiting again. Assuming independent preferences, we find that this game has multiple equilibria, some of which are highly asymmetric between sexes. We also investigate how the set of equilibria depends on a sex difference in the outside option of not being mated at all.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2008. Vol. 36, no 3-4, 421-440 p.
Keyword [en]
mutual mate choice, strategic mating, independent preferences, equilibrium, multiple equilibria, asymmetric equilibria
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-33266DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0082-5ISI: 000253625400008ScopusID: 2-s2.0-40149084189OAI: diva2:414642
QC 20110504Available from: 2011-05-04 Created: 2011-05-02 Last updated: 2011-05-04Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text

Other links

Publisher's full textScopus

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Sjöstrand, Jonas
By organisation
Mathematics (Dept.)
In the same journal
International Journal of Game Theory

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

Altmetric score

Total: 35 hits
ReferencesLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link