Evaluation of quality regulation incentives for distribution system reliability investments
2011 (English)In: Utilities Policy, ISSN 0957-1787Article in journal (Other academic) Submitted
Designing a quality regulation that results in an adequate level of reliability in a distribution system is indeed a challenging task for the regulator. If the regulation is not well designed a socioeconomically beneficial reinvestment project is not beneficial for the DSO, and hence is not selected. This paper proposes an evaluation method for quality regulation designs. The proposed method is applied in a case study to evaluate what incentives for investments in distribution system reliability two different quality regulation designs give. One design is similar to the Swedish quality regulation that will apply from 2012 and the other design is similar to the current Norwegian quality regulation. The effect on network investment decisions when the two designs are modified to give optimal incentives for reliability on system level is also investigated. The case study result shows that even though the quality regulation on system level is designed to give incentives for socioeconomically beneficial investments, these investments may not be beneficial for the regulated DSO if the reward/penalty on the system level is capped too low.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Other Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-33814OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-33814DiVA: diva2:417909