A universally composable mix-net
2004 (English)In: THEORY OF CRYTOGRAPHY, PROCEEDINGS Book Series: LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE / [ed] Naor, M, BERLIN: SPRINGER , 2004, Vol. 2951, 317-335 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
A mix-net is a cryptographic protocol executed by a set of mix-servers that provides anonymity for a group of senders. The main application is electronic voting. Numerous mix-net constructions and stand-alone definitions of security are proposed in the literature, but only partial proofs of security are given for most constructions and no construction has been proved secure with regards to any kind of composition. We define an ideal mix-net in the universally composable security framework of Canetti . Then we describe a mix-net based on Feldman  and using similar ideas as Desmedt and Kurosawa , and prove that it securely realizes the ideal mix-net with respect to static adversaries that corrupt a minority of the mix-servers and arbitrarily many senders. The mix-net executes in a hybrid model with access to ideal distributed key generation, but apart from that our only assumption is the existence of a group in which the Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem is hard. If there are relatively few mix-servers or a strong majority of honest mix-servers our construction is practical.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
BERLIN: SPRINGER , 2004. Vol. 2951, 317-335 p.
, LECTURE NOTES IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, ISSN 0302-9743
public-key cryptosystem, practical mix, secure, encryption, attack
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-43986ISI: 000189415300018ScopusID: 2-s2.0-35048873776ISBN: 3-540-21000-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-43986DiVA: diva2:450872
1st Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC 2004). MIT, Cambridge, MA. FEB 19-21, 2004
QC 201110242011-10-242011-10-192012-01-20Bibliographically approved