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Stealth attacks and protection schemes for state estimators in power systems
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Communication Networks. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre. (Laboratory for Communication Networks)ORCID iD: 0000-0002-4876-0223
KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Automatic Control. KTH, School of Electrical Engineering (EES), Centres, ACCESS Linnaeus Centre. (Automatic Control Lab)ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1835-2963
2010 (English)In: 2010 1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2010, IEEE , 2010, 214-219 p.Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

State estimators in power systems are currently used to, for example, detect faulty equipment and to route power flows. It is believed that state estimators will also play an increasingly important role in future smart power grids, as a tool to optimally and more dynamically route power flows. Therefore security of the estimator becomes an important issue. The estimators are currently located in control centers, and large numbers of measurements are sent over unencrypted communication channels to the centers. We here study stealthy false-data attacks against these estimators. We define a security measure tailored to quantify how hard attacks are to perform, and describe an efficient algorithm to compute it. Since there are so many measurement devices in these systems, it is not reasonable to assume that all devices can be made encrypted overnight in the future. Therefore we propose two algorithms to place encrypted devices in the system such as to maximize their utility in terms of increased system security. We illustrate the effectiveness of our algorithms on two IEEE benchmark power networks under two attack and protection cost models.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IEEE , 2010. 214-219 p.
Keyword [en]
Faulty equipments, Measurement device, Power networks, Protection schemes, Security measure, State Estimators, Stealth attacks, System security
National Category
Engineering and Technology
Research subject
SRA - ICT
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-47463ISI: 000330185100037Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84885756672ISBN: 978-1-4244-6512-5 (print)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-47463DiVA: diva2:455397
Conference
1st IEEE International Conference on Smart Grid Communications, SmartGridComm 2010; Gaithersburg, MD; United States; 4 October 2010 through 6 October 2010
Projects
EU FP7 VIKING
Funder
EU, FP7, Seventh Framework ProgrammeICT - The Next Generation
Note

QC 20111114

Available from: 2011-11-09 Created: 2011-11-09 Last updated: 2014-08-15Bibliographically approved

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Dán, GyörgySandberg, Henrik

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