Five Practical Attacks for “Optimistic Mixing for Exit-Polls”
2004 (English)In: SELECTED AREAS IN CRYPTOGRAPHY, BERLIN: Springer Verlag , 2004, 160-174 p.Conference paper (Refereed)
Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels  recently presented an efficient mix-net, which they claim to be both robust and secure. We present five practical attacks for their mix-net, and break both its privacy and robustness. The first attack breaks the privacy of any given sender without corrupting any mix-server. The second attack requires that the first mix-server is corrupted. Both attacks are adaptations of the “relation attack” introduced by Pfitzmann [24, 23]. The third attack is similar to the attack of Desmedt and Kurusawa  and breaks the privacy of all senders. It requires that all senders are honest and that the last mix-server is corrupted. The fourth attack may be viewed as a novel combination of the ideas of Lim and Lee  and Pfitzmann [24, 23]. It breaks the privacy of any given sender, and requires that the first and last mix-servers are corrupted. This attack breaks also Jakobsson , including the fixed version of Mitomo and Kurosawa . The fifth attack breaks the robustness in a novel way. It requires corruption of some senders and the first mix-server. This attack breaks also Jakobsson and Juels .
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
BERLIN: Springer Verlag , 2004. 160-174 p.
, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743
Computer and Information Science
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-50924ISI: 000189504800012ISBN: 3-540-21370-8OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-50924DiVA: diva2:463070
10th Annual International Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography. Carleton Univ, Ottawa, CANADA. AUG 14-15, 2003
QC 201112092011-12-082011-12-082011-12-09Bibliographically approved