Cognitive Enhancement, Virtue Ethics and the Good Life
2011 (English)In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, Vol. 4, no 3, 223-234 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
This article explores the respective roles that medical and technological cognitive enhancements, on the one hand, and the moral and epistemic virtues traditionally understood, on the other, can play in enabling us to lead the good life. It will be shown that neither the virtues nor cognitive enhancements (of the kind we have access to today or in the foreseeable future) on their own are likely to enable most people to lead the good life. While the moral and epistemic virtues quite plausibly are both necessary and sufficient for the good life in theory, virtue ethics is often criticised for being elitist and unachievable in practice for the vast majority. Some cognitive enhancements, on the other hand, might be necessary for the good life but are far from sufficient for such an existence. Here it will be proposed that a combination of virtue and some cognitive enhancements is preferable.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 4, no 3, 223-234 p.
Virtue, Ethics, Aristotle, Cognitive, Enhancement, Moral virtue, Epistemic virtue, Neuro, The good life, Eudaimonia
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-80586DOI: 10.1007/s12152-010-9092-2ISI: 000295679000006OAI: oai:DiVA.org:kth-80586DiVA: diva2:496470
QC 201202152012-02-092012-02-092012-02-15Bibliographically approved